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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Graciela María Mercedes Lu 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Geography 
 
June 2016 
 
Title: Struggles Over Governance of Oil and Gas Projects in the Peruvian Amazon 
 
 
 
This dissertation examines the shifting and multi-scalar governance of oil and gas 
projects in Peruvian Amazon.  Using cases studies of oil extraction in blocks 1AB (192), 
8 in Loreto (2006 to 2015), and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process for 
the expansion of the Camisea gas project in block 88 in Cusco, this dissertation explores 
how environmental decision-making processes of oil and gas projects are structured and 
enacted.   In doing so, this study sheds light on the shifting interactions, negotiations, 
struggles and (at times) open conflicts between actors that define why, how and where 
hydrocarbon projects take place in the Amazon.  Recognizing the variety of actors, I 
organize my analysis around government institutions, indigenous mobilizations, 
environmental assessments and the economic distribution of revenues from oil and gas 
projects.  
From my analysis I argue that resource extraction is changing substantially the 
relationship between the government and the indigenous peoples in the Peruvian 
Amazon.  These changes involve profound changes in indigenous rights and the creation 
of new institutions and capacities in the state to address the social-environmental effects 
of extractive industries.   The surge of social-environmental conflicts and the influence of 
 v 
 
international finance institutions have prompted the Peruvian government to reform the 
institutional framework regulating resource extraction.  This reforms are taking place 
amid the globalization of indigenous rights, discourses, and laws (such as the Prior 
Consultation Law) granting special rights to indigenous peoples.   However, power-
knowledge asymmetries in the decision-making processes (such as the environmental 
assessments) tend to increase the sense of mistrust among the local populations, resulting 
in increasing social-environmental conflicts.   In addition, the uneven distribution of 
benefits from resource extraction is creating regional disparities, increasing the 
dependency of some regions on resource extraction.   An examination of the 
implementation of the EIA process for the expansion of the Camisea project in block 88 
exposes unresolved practices of representation and citizenship of the indigenous peoples 
in voluntary isolation.  However, overall, Amazonian indigenous people’s struggles are 
shifting the traditional national, social, and political life.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“There is no country more diverse, not with a greater multiplicity of earthly and human 
resources; it has all degrees of heat and hue, love and hatred, of warps and subtleties,  
of symbols both utilized and inspiring…” 
 
José María Arguedas, 1968 
 
 
This dissertation explores the governance of oil and gas projects in indigenous 
territories and protected areas in the Peruvian Amazon.1  It examines the ongoing 
practices that are redefining how hydrocarbon exploration and extraction are managed 
and how different government and non-government actors interact with each other in the 
decision-making processes of oil and gas projects in the Amazon.  Governance denotes 
the political, social and administrative mechanisms through which access to and use of 
natural resources are governed by state and non-state actors.  The term also refers to the 
“organizational and institutional arrangements through which society-environment 
relations are governed” (Himley, 2008, p. 434).   In the case of the access to and use of 
resources such as minerals, oil, and gas governance involve the institutional 
superstructure of regulation, as opposed to the underlying political economy of resource 
production. (Bakker and Bridge, 2008, p. 255). 
As in other regions of the world, the growing demand for energy in Peru over the 
past decade has led to a surge in oil and gas activities in protected areas or their periphery 
                                                 
1 Amazon region comprises the Rupa Rupa and Omagua regions according the Pulgar-Vidal (1996) 
categories of Peru’s natural regions.  
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(buffer zones), and on indigenous territories (Bernal, 2011).   In this context, this 
dissertation addresses the decision-making processes in ongoing and new oil and gas 
projects the Amazon to elucidate whether and how a range of actors—particularly public 
institutions, oil and gas corporations, indigenous organizations and environmental 
advocates— play a role in deciding how, where and under what conditions resource 
extraction take place in contemporary Peru.   The main research question of this 
dissertation is the following: Is the surge in oil and gas projects in the Peruvian Amazon 
overlapping indigenous territories and protected areas influencing environmental 
governance?  If so, in what ways? To answer this question, this main research question is 
broken down into the following sub-questions:  How are decision-making processes 
involving oil and gas projects structured and enacted?   What are the roles of the various 
actors involved in this process?  How are indigenous groups responding to these 
activities in the Peruvian Amazon?     
To address these questions, I analyze the two cases (Figure 1): The first one 
examines the ongoing oil exploitation in blocks 1AB (renamed 192 since August 2015) 
and 8 in the north east of Loreto from 2006 to October 2015.  In this case, I examine 
specifically the role of government and non-government actors in the management of the 
social-environmental impacts of oil extraction and the implementation of an indigenous 
consultation process undertaken in 2015 to transfer Block 1AB (192) to a new operator in 
August 2015.  The second case analyzes the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
process that took place from 2012 to 2014 that authorized the expansion of gas activities 
in block 88 in Camisea, Cusco.  In addition, I analyze how the economic benefits from oil 
and gas projects in Cusco are managed and distributed to understand its implication in 
 3 
 
environmental decision-making processes.  Both settings involve operations at different 
stages (ongoing extraction and the second one focuses on the expansion of hydrocarbon 
prospecting activities) in indigenous territories and protected areas.     
This analysis offers the opportunity to explore the shifting regimes of governance 
of the hydrocarbon sector in the last ten years.  Drawing on interviews, legal, policy and 
archival research conducted during my fieldwork in Peru from 2012 to 2015 and over 
twenty years of experience as an environmental scientist in the non-profit sector 
examining hydrocarbon projects in Peru and Latin America, my research examines the 
political interests, institutional and political framework and the decision-making 
mechanisms affecting protected areas and oil/gas projects in indigenous territories.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Location of Blocks 1AB (192), 8 and 88 (Camisea) 
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Lu, 2015. Data source:  Perupetro 2015  
 
 
 
Research Problem and Context 
 
 5 
 
Peru is the seventh largest oil producer in Latin America.  The country’s estimated 
741 million barrels and 25 trillion cubic feet of proved2 crude oil and natural gas reserves 
are located mostly in the Amazon3, a region inhabited by more than fifty ethnic groups 
and containing more than thirty national and regional protected areas4.  From 2003 to 
2013, Peru’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 86%, raising the overall demand 
for energy, including hydrocarbons (oil and gas).  During this period, the consumption of 
oil and gas increased 100%, especially in the more prosperous and densely populated 
cities, particularly (but not exclusively) those along the coast.  Roughly 40% of the 31 
million Peruvians live in coastal cities, most of them (9.8 million) in Lima (INEI, 2015).  
This part of the country’s population benefitted most from the 6.9% average annual 
income growth of the past decade (INEI, 2014a; World Bank, 2015). Although the 
country’s economy slowed down to a GDP growth rate of 2.4% in 2015, financial 
institutions are still optimistic and predict an economic recovery of at least 4% for the 
next two years (World Bank, 2015; IMF 2015).   From 1995 to 2012 the domestic 
demand for oil and gas grew 244%.   During this period, oil consumption (diesel 2 and 
gasoline) grew from 134,097 to 253,848 terajoules and gas from 12,343 to 87,783 
terajoules (INEI, 2014b). Peru’s economic growth trend suggests that its dependence on 
hydrocarbons is expected to continue in the immediate future, especially in Lima city, 
                                                 
2 Reserves are those quantities of petroleum which are anticipated to be conmmercially recovered from 
known accumulations.   Proved reserves: At least 90% of reasonable certainty that estimated hydrocarbon 
reserve will equal or exceed the estimate.  Probable reserves: At least a 50% probability that the quantity of 
hydrocarbons will equal or exceed the estimated reserves. Possible: at least 10% certainty that the amount 
actually recovered will equal or exceed the estimated reserves.  
 
3 Peru has eighteen sedimentary basins potentially holding hydrocarbon reserves.  These are located in the 
Amazon and along the north coast of Piura and Tumbes. 
 
4 In addition, the Peruvian Amazon also has more tan 50 private conservation áreas (ACP) in privately-
owned lands and recognized by the national government.  
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which generates roughly half of the national oil demand.  The economic growth of the 
last years has not been effective in reducing the economic gap between urban and rural 
households (especially in the Andes and Amazon) as the percentage of poverty of rural 
households is still 3.2 higher (in terms of income) than urban households along the coast5 
(Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Peru:  Urban and Rural Poverty6 Levels (2004 – 2012) 
 
Data source: INEI, 2015 
 
The economic growth in the densely populated cities has also been accompanied by 
more accessible bank loans to buy motor vehicles (cars, motorcycles, vans, buses, etc.).  
                                                 
5 Spatial dimensions of these inequalities are not only material.  Numerous scholars have explored the 
racial, cultural and social dimensions of these inequalities and its implications on how people and regions 
are perceived and governed (Orlove 1993; De la Cadena 1991, Ames 2011).  As Ames (2011) argues, an 
analysis of the political and economic discourses in Peru in the last century reveals how the popular 
geographic division of Peru’ in ‘three natural regions’ costa, sierra y selva (coast, mountains and jungle) 
perpetuates racial and social hierarchies.   
 
6 Peru’s statistics and census agency (INEI) defines poverty based on the number of people whose monthly 
per capita expenditure is below the value of the basic consumer basket.   
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Therefore, it is not a surprise that the number of motor vehicles in Peru has increased 
61% in last ten years (Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  Annual Growth of Motor Vehicles in Peru 2004-2013  
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number of 
vehicles 
(thousands) 
1,361 1,440 1,474 1,534 1,641 1,733 1,850 1,980 2,138 2,223 2,423 
 
Data source: Ministry of Transportation, 2014; INEI 2015 
 
Given the optimistic predictions of Peru’s continued  economic growth for at least the 
next two years, the number of cars (and consequently fuel consumption from the 
transportation sector) is envisioned to continue growing in the future (Banks Association 
of Peru, 2016)7. 
The implications of this problem are far reaching.  Ground transportation (the top 
energy consumer of Peru’s energy sector) is the country’s second source of greenhouse 
gases after deforestation due to forest and grassland conversions.8  The city of Lima, 
which has the greatest number of motor vehicles, generates roughly half of the demand 
for national oil, and emits 11 million tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere 
each day (Ministry of the Environment, 2014a).   Surprisingly, the general principles of 
the National Policy of the Transportation Sector9 focus on the development of road 
                                                 
7 http://gestion.pe/mercados/mas-35000-creditos-vehiculares-se-habrian-otorgado-al-cierre-2014-2119135 
8 Only in the year 2000 did transportation emit 40 percent (9,881 Gg of CO2) of the total GHG emissions produced by 
the energy sector (24,226 Gg CO2).   
 
9 Política Nacional del Sector Transporte. Approved by Ministry Resolution No. 817-2006-MTC/09. 
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infrastructure and safety but do not have any specific goals to reduce greenhouse 
emissions, air pollution or fuel consumption.    
The sharp growth in motor vehicles in Peruvian cities has also gone hand in hand 
with a sustained decline in national crude oil production since the 1980s.  Consequently, 
Peru imports 67% of crude oil that the country needs to supply the national demand 
(OSINERGMIN, 2015).  Although national crude oil production has dropped in the past 
decade, overall hydrocarbon production (oil, natural gas and associated condensed oils) 
has grown substantially since the Camisea gas project in the early 2000s, which supplies 
national (industrial and domestic users mostly in Lima) and international markets 
(Figures 3 and 4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Crude Oil Production 2004-2014 
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Data source: Perupetro, 2014 
 
 
Figure 4.  Gas Production According to Regions 2004-2014 
 
 
 
Data source: Perupetro, 2014 
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In 2012, Peru’s average demand for liquid hydrocarbons (crude oil and natural gas 
liquids) reached 137.7 thousand barrels per day, of which 97.6 thousand corresponded to 
diesel, 33.3 thousand to gasoline and 6.8 thousand to industrial fuels (Figure 5).   A closer 
analysis shows that diesel is the fuel with the highest demand and 61% of it (59.5 
thousand barrels per day) is sold in gas stations in the cities (OSINERGMIN, 2013). 
 
Figure 5.  National Demand for Liquid Hydrocarbons 2008-2012 
  
 
Source: OSINERGMIN, 2013, p. 28 
 
 
As mentioned, the gap between the oil production and growing demand over the past 
decade has motivated the government to create laws and policies enabling foreign 
investors to seek out new sources of oil and natural gas, many of them overlapping 
indigenous territories and protected areas in the Amazon (Bernal, 2011).  The 
liberalization of the economy resulted in a growth of the energy consumption of the 
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mining sector from 10,837 to 25,388 terajoules from 1994 to 2008, increasing the 
demand for oil (INEI, 2014b).   In contrast with the oil sector in Venezuela and Ecuador, 
Peru’s “upstream” operations (exploration and exploitation) are predominantly performed 
by foreign companies while refining, transportation, basic petrochemical and bulk 
commercialization is in hands of the state-owned company Petroperu.  Part of those legal 
changes to enable foreign investments was the enactment of the Hydrocarbon Act of 
1993,10 created as part of structural adjustment economic measures during the first 
government of President Alberto Fujimori (1990-1995).   This law explicitly aimed to 
stimulate foreign investments, free markets and deregulate resource extraction, especially 
large scale metal mining and the hydrocarbon sector.   Other legal reforms of the same 
period include modifications of oil contracts providing incentives to foreign companies 
and the liberalization of the oil market (including refining, import, sales and some 
industrial transformations).   Consequently, from 2004 to 2013 alone, investments in oil 
exploration and exploitation projects increased by more than a factor of four; however, to 
this date none of these have resulted in major discoveries, and thus the gap between 
national oil production and demand continues to grow (Figures 6 and 7).     
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Crude Oil Production and Consumption in Peru 2000 – 2013 
                                                 
10 Law No. 26221 (Ley Orgánica que Norma las actividades de Hidrocarburos en el Territorio Nacional).  
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Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015. 
 
Figure 7.  National and Foreign Investment in the Hydrocarbon Sector  
 
Data source: Perupetro, 2014 
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 As shown in Figure 8, the Amazon is one of the key areas targeted in this new 
push to find oil and gas.  From 2003 to 2009 hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation 
concessions grew from 15% to over 70% of the Amazon, overlapping the territories of 
roughly 300,000 peoples belonging to 53 ethnic groups and 12 linguistic families, 
including fourteen native groups in voluntary isolation or who have just started to interact 
with other groups in the last twenty years (Ombudsman’s Office, 2006).   
 
Figure 8.  Amazon Indigenous Territories, Territorial Reserves and Oil Concessions  
 
                              Data source:  Perupetro 2015; IBC 2013. 
As mentioned, the growing number of social-environmental conflicts associated 
with oil and mining projects involved an unprecedented number of casualties.  Only from 
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August 2011 to May 2015, conflicts related to extractive industries have caused 20 deaths 
and 875 injured (Ombudsman’s Office, 2015).   This situation prompted the government 
to enact in 2011 the Prior Consultation Law (No. 29785 – Ley del Derecho a la Consulta 
Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios, Reconocido en el Convenio 169 de la 
Organización International del Trabajo - OIT). The law recognizes the collective rights 
of indigenous people, most importantly the right to consultation prior to the approval of 
extractive activities in their territories.  The concept of “prior consultation” is a right 
envisaged in International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) Convention169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which Peru signed in the 1993.  While this new law has 
the potential to offer new legal avenues for indigenous rights and participation, some 
indigenous organizations claim that it “could result in more social mobilizations” (Inter-
Ethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest – AIDESEP, 
4/4/2012).   
Complicating the turmoil generated by the conflicts related to oil and gas projects 
in indigenous territories, these activities also overlap protected areas (such as indigenous 
reserves) and their buffer zones.  More than one third of Peru’s protected areas managed 
by the state and regional governments (37 of 94 in total) are located in the tropical 
rainforest, and roughly half of them are overlapped by oil and gas concessions (Gamboa, 
2012).   Some organizations, such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN), a world 
leading organization in biodiversity conservation, consider that all exploration and 
extraction of mineral resources in protected areas should be prohibited by law and that 
such projects should entail Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA)11:  
                                                 
11 As appears in UICN’s Resolution 2.82, approved during its congress held in Amman, Jordan in 2000. 
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“All mineral and oil/gas exploration and exploitation …should be subject to an 
appropriate and rigorous appraisal process, such as an Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment (EIA), prior to considering whether to grant consents and 
licenses.  These appraisal processes should respect the highest international best-
practice standards…” 
 
(UICN 2013, p.1).    
 
This organization also recommends dialogue between stakeholders and early 
discussion with developers and licensing authorities.   In agreement with this opinion, the 
World Commission on Protected Areas adds recommendations for oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation activities in the areas immediately adjacent protected areas and Natural 
World Heritage Sites, called ‘buffer zones’ (Beltran & Phillips, 2000).  
These seemingly contradictory interests have resulted in complex resource 
governance dynamics in which multiple overlapping organizational, institutional and 
knowledge systems are redefining how access to natural resources is regulated and 
negotiated (Himley, 2008, p.435).  In this context, the central argument of this 
dissertation is that resource extraction is changing substantially the relationship between 
the government and the indigenous peoples in the Peruvian Amazon.  These changes 
involve profound changes in indigenous rights and the creation of new institutions and 
capacities in the state to address the social-environmental effects of extractive industries.  
This dissertation aims to advance the ongoing discussions in geography about the role of 
social contestation in the uneven and multi-scaled points of contact as well as friction and 
negotiation between state and non-state actors. Key to this approach is to avoid the 
homogenization of indigenous and non-indigenous interests (i.e. corporations, state 
actors, and environmentalists) and the reduction of the interests of indigenous groups 
merely to the category of resistance.  Finally, I aim to provide new insights into scholarly 
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examinations of resource governance and the political impacts of indigenous movements 
in Peru and Latin America. 
 17 
 
 
CHAPTER II  
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Resource Governance 
This dissertation examines the governance of oil and gas projects in indigenous 
territories and protected areas in the Peruvian Amazon.  In doing so, this research aims to 
contribute new insights into scholarly examinations of environmental governance, 
emerging work on the political ecology of oil/gas extraction, and academic literatures 
exploring the political impacts of indigenous rights.  Environmental governance has been 
studied in the context of neoliberal globalization as a concept embracing the 
organizational and institutional arrangements through which society-environment 
relations are governed.  In this context, the concept of governance entails an array of 
actors and institutions that structure the access and control over resources (Painter, 2000; 
Himley 2008, p. 434).   Environmental governance was initially a term that emphasized 
new geographies of the “governance” of human-environment relations beyond (and 
through) the nation-state.  Over time, however the concept has been enriched by attention 
to variously scaled non-state actors (local governments and public organisms, non- 
governmental organizations), to a range of state agencies and institutions, as well as to 
private corporations.   Rhodes (1997) adds that environmental governance is growing in 
importance relative to conventional government due to the interdependence and 
interactions between organizations; and the participation of the state steering these 
interactions.   In the last years, political ecologists are increasingly concerned about 
resource extraction and its relationship with a broad range of concerns such as water, 
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indigenous rights, development and democracy in Latin America (Bebbington, 2012; 
Bebbington and Bury, 2013; Hindery, 2013; Sawyer, 2012; Perreault, 2013; Valdivia, 
2015; Himley, 2008).   Some of the existing literature also focuses on the state-resources 
relationship in post-neoliberal governments such as Bolivia and Ecuador (Hindery, 2013; 
Perreault &Valdivia, 2010).   These studies do suggest that the use and access of resource 
extraction and state power can be mutually constitutive, and as Gavin Bridge (2014, 126) 
notes, these “highlight the importance of examining the political formations currently 
emerging at the resource state nexus”.  The case studies presented in Chapters IV and V 
aim to expose change processes of the state role in regulating the use and access to 
natural resources. 
Of particular importance to recent scholarship on environmental governance is the 
role of social contestation and social movements in the reconfiguration of organizational 
and institutional arrangements through which social-environment relations are governed. 
Anthony Bebbington’s (2008) analysis of the mining conflicts of Tambogrande and Rio 
Blanco in Peru, suggests that social-environmental conflicts have the potential to boost 
institutional changes that could contribute to a more inclusive and legitimate resource 
governance.  Indeed, the final measure of success of social struggles over resource 
extraction is the extent to which these result in instituitional change (Bebbington & Bury 
(2013, p. 24).  This dissertation aims to shed light on how these institutional changes 
occur and what are the roles of state and non-state actors in these changes.   
 
In the last decade geographers have increased their attention to “political 
ecologies of the subsoil” (metal mining and oil) due to its “significance for the 
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transformation of social life” (Bebbington & Bury, 2013).  However, the existing 
scholarship needs to assess the how overlapping interests such as resource extraction with 
protected areas and indigenous territories affect the environmental governance.  Of 
particular importance to scholarly treatments of environmental governance is also the role 
of the distribution of revenues from resource extraction and how it affects decision-
making processes (Le Billon 2006, 2007).   This dissertation brings together these issues 
and contributes to understand the complex relations between nature and society.  Chapter 
VI of this dissertation adds to the ongoing conversations of geographers about this issue 
and exposes how the efforts to decentralize Peru’s political administration with the 
country’s new “regions” has generated a “reward system” to extractive industries.    In 
addition, this study aims to contribute to the ongoing debates about the effects of 
extractive industries in indigenous identities and citizenship rights.  The case of the 
expansion of the Camisea gas project presented in Chapter V aims to expose issues such 
as the representation of indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation in environmental 
decision-making processes. 
 
Since the 1990s, a new extractive regime of environmental governance is evident 
in Latin America as international agreements, policies, laws, and rules have emerged to 
create a ‘good business climate’ for extractive industries).   Since 2005 to date, Peru has 
signed 20 regional and/or bilateral free trade agreements including the US, China, 
Singapore, South Korea, the European Union, Mexico and Japan (Appendix D).  
Furthermore, international financial institutions such as the World Bank (2000), 
advocated for neoliberal reforms and foreign investment by arguing that they could 
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improve the state’s ability to regulate the environment. This resulted in the creation of 
numerous regulations and policies to favor foreign investment, thus creating 
contradictory processes that involved an expansion of deregulated spaces that Jessop 
(2009) call a destatization of the political system from state-centric control of resources 
to the transference of functions from centralized agencies to a diverse group of actors 
such as regional and local authorities, community organizations, and NGOs.  This has 
been accompanied by the creation of complex regulatory frameworks where state 
institutions exercise decision-making functions, affecting the access and control over 
natural resources, reflected in initiatives such as the creation of regional governments 
(gobiernos regionales) in Peru in 2002.12  However, these changes involve complex 
dynamics where multiple and overlapping organizational, institutional, and knowledge 
systems are redefining how the access to natural resources is regulated and negotiated 
(Himley, 2008, p.435).   These systems involve uneven power dynamics between state 
and non-state actors that negotiate the access and control over natural resources.  These 
interactions take place at different scales in complex configurations where natural 
resources mediate the relationship between citizens and government institutions (Bakker 
& Bridge, 2008; Valdivia, 2008; Perreault, 2014).  
This role of the state is changing radically with the emergence of new actors at 
different scales that are shifting the allocation and control over resources and the 
modality of regulation from government to governance, where non-state actors are 
increasingly supplementing the formal state authority (Himley, 2010, Bakker and Bridge 
                                                 
12 With the creation of the Regional Governments’ Act - Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales No. 27867 
adopted on November 18, 2002.  The Regional Government’s mission is to ‘organize the public 
administration according to exclusive functions –shared and delegated-, in compliance with national and 
sectorial policies, to contribute to the sustainable and integrate development of the region. 
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2008, Bridge and Perreault, 2009).   However, as Bakker and Bridge (2008) contend, 
these shifts do not occur swiftly; they are the result of a number of contradictory 
intermingled formal and informal interactions at different scales affecting decision-
making processes.  These relations are changing and evolving in contradictory ways as 
shown in Chapter IV.    
This tendency to maintain centralized control of hydrocarbon (and mining) 
resources could be explained by the fact that these resources are fundamental for the 
national economy; therefore, the state has interest in keeping direct control over the 
decision-making processes of resource extraction.  This control is mostly exercised 
through the legal, political and institutional means as explained in more detail in chapters 
IV and V.   This dissertation explores in greater detail the strategic decisions of the 
central government of Peru that define control mechanisms of natural resources through 
formal and informal ways.   
Contemporary oppositional movements are increasingly employing new tools of 
communication (e.g. internet, social networking), which have substantially improved 
their capacities and spawned new forms of networking and social organizing (Bulkeley, 
2005; Liverman, 2004; Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002; Escobar, 2008). These technologies are 
changing the capacity of the organizing of groups in remote areas.  As Warren and 
Jackson (2002, p.2) noted, indigenous groups use the media and Internet with increasing 
expertise to mobilize and to “present their case for self-determination to the court of 
public opinion”.  This dissertation draws on and contributes new insights into this 
emerging scholarship, by closely examining diverse (and multi-scaled) points of contact 
and negotiation as indigenous communities and organizations interact with state officials, 
 22 
 
conservationists, and corporations. It traces out these networks and interactions in order 
to assess how alliances are formed to exert power in these contexts, and the outcomes of 
these pressure points on emerging regimes of environmental governance.     
 
Resource Extraction and the Neoliberal State 
 Resources are inherently political as they involve competing claims over access 
to, control over and definitions of nature; hence resources can be also deeply conflictive 
(Bakker & Bridge, 2008).  In the case of oil and gas exploration and extraction in the 
Peruvian Amazon, this problem is magnified by the radical social, cultural and economic 
differences between government and non-government actors involved in the decision-
making processes.  As Bebbington (2012, p. xv) notes, in the Andean region, economic 
growth and resource extraction (mainly oil and metal mining) is occurring on 
unprecedented scale and speed, resulting in significant social, spatial and political 
changes.  Traditionally, Latin American countries’ governments play a key role in 
defining the legal and political framework regulating access and management of 
resources.  However, during the last decade, Peru’s resource management and regulatory 
framework has shifted from state-centric forms of regulation based in Lima to variously 
scaled non-state actors (local and regional authorities, indigenous communities, research 
organizations, NGOs and private firms) and decentralized regional governments, which is 
redrawing the public-private divide (Himley, 2008).   Nevertheless, given the centrality 
of oil and gas production in the national economy, oil and gas extraction has remained 
tightly controlled by government agencies in Lima, dominated primarily by the Ministry 
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of Economy (MEF), the hydrocarbon licensing authority Perupetro,13 and the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines (MEM).  Since the early 1990s the growth and the ‘modernization’ of 
the national economy has required the creation of ‘resource management instruments’ 
such as the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process and an array of norms to 
govern the allocation of resources (such as the rules for environmental protection and 
public participation for hydrocarbon projects,14 amongst others).  These legal instruments 
and newly created government agencies (Ministry of the Environment - MINAM, the 
Oversight Organization for Energy and Mining - OSINERGMIN, the Agency for 
Environmental Assessment and Enforcement - OEFA, the National Environmental 
Certification Service - SENACE and others described in Chapters IV and V) aim to 
advance the state’s role as ‘resource administrator.’  Moreover, United Nations agencies, 
International Finance Institutions (IFI) and multinational corporations (MNC) have 
advocated governments to create avenues (at least in theory) to afford indigenous 
peoples, citizen groups, NGOs, etc. rights to participate in decision-making processes 
(Sawyer & Gomez, 2012; Himley, 2008).  Yet, the state is in the difficult position of 
administrating decisions in the interest of short-term economic growth, addressing the 
growing demand for energy, controlling the increasing number of social-environmental 
conflicts sparked by the extraction of oil (and mining), and complying with the conditions 
from IFIs and MNCs.   
 As Painter (2012) argues, it is difficult to define the state and to come up with an 
overall theory of the state that would comprise the state in all its forms.  More generally, 
                                                 
13 The state-owned company in charge of promoting, negotiating, subscribing and supervising oil and gas 
contracts. 
 
14 Supreme Decree No. 012-2008-EM 
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a theory of the state focuses on the state as a set of institutions for the protection and 
maintenance of society (Johnston et al., 2000, p. 789).   O’Donnell (2010), defines the 
state as a set of apparatuses and bureaucratic institutions; a legal system with variable 
binding and sanctioning capacities; a benchmark of collective identity; and a barrier that 
distinguishes between the state and other states.  O’Donnell also points out that the state, 
or more especifically the state apparatus has an ideological dimension as these claim to 
represent the nation’s interests, the social order and individual rights.  In addition, 
Mitchell (1991) suggests that the state is not an actual entity separed from the rest of 
society, but that it is present as an “imagined collective actor”, with what Sinesio López 
(2008) calls “an invisible power”, in whose name individuals are identified as citizens or 
subjects, aliens or foreigners and is perceived as a central authority within the national 
territory with the power to decide who is politically included or excluded in a society.     
 A popular view of the state are the bureaucratic institutions such as the judiciary, 
the armed forces, etc. However, despite these institutions are part of the state, literature 
about the state make a distinction between state formation, state functions and state 
apparatus.  In Johnson et al. (2000) words:  
“The question of form examines how a specific state structure is constituted by, 
and evolves within, a given social formation. (A capitalist society should, in 
principle give rise to a distinctively capitalist state).  The issue of fuction refers to 
those activities undertaken in the name of the tate; in other words, what the stae 
actually ‘does’.  Finally, state apparatus refers to the mechanisms through which 
these functions are executed.”    
 (p. 789). 
 López (2008) adds that despite there are some similarities between European and 
Latin American states, there are important differences between them based on the types 
of capitalist development of these regions, especially with regards to the economic 
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dependency of Latin American states, particularly on the use of natural resources for 
export.   The integration of Latin American states to the globalized economy is 
increasingly influencing not only the internal relationships between citizens and the state 
but also how the state manages natural resources and the reactions of the local 
populations where these activities take place.  In many instances, the lack of transparency 
in decision-making processes and weak capacity of state institutions to address the social 
demands of the people create political instability.   The damages inflicted to communities 
by environmental degradation and the government’s failure to consolidate the rule of law 
and social equity, have generated a profound mistrust of local communities and 
indigenous organizations towards the state.   
 Tanaka (2010) and Sawyer & Gomez (2012) agree that the state’s role is impacted 
by the state’s lack of neutrality as it is often subjected to the interests of IFIs and, 
particularly, those of MNCs as these groups occasionally fund political campaigns and 
influence the appointments of key staff in the high spheres of government.  For Urteaga 
Crovetto (2012), the problem is that the neoliberal structuring from the 1990s to date is 
profoundly influenced by the fluid movement of key individuals holding high rank 
positions in public agencies and IFIs contributing to the creation of alliances between 
these entities, enabling large scale oil/gas projects to secure funding and government 
approval15.   This ‘revolving door’ of key individuals working for IFIs and state agencies 
(especially since the 1990s) has blurred the lines between the private (national and 
international) and public sectors, disconnecting the state from its theoretical ‘neutral’ 
status in its negotiations with MNCs.  This has resulted in the consolidation of a 
                                                 
15 Hindery (2013) describes a similar situation in Bolivia, where Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, former 
minister of Bolivia’s economic plan, oversaw the implementation of neoliberal reforms in favor of foreign 
oil companies.  
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neoliberal economic model that facilitates the approval and development of large scale 
resource extraction activities.  One example of this is Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Prime 
Minister of Peru from 2005-2006, who switched high rank positions in the public and 
private sectors.  Twice Minister of Economy during the government of Alejandro Toledo 
(2001-2006), Kuczynski was also Minister of Energy and Mines in the 1980s and held 
senior positions at the World Bank (WB) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).  
As Dammert (2010) and Urteaga Crovetto (2012, p.109) observe, during 2002-2003 
Kuczynski was President of the IDB’s Private Sector Commission. During this time the 
IDB was deciding a loan for TGP, the company in charge of the Camisea gas 
transportation pipeline.  Additionally, at this same time (2003- 2004) Kuczynski was also 
financial advisor for Ray Hunt, President of Hunt Oil, a partner of the Camisea Gas 
Transportation Consortium (TGP) and the Camisea gas production consortium.  
Moreover, from 2002 –2004 Kuczynski was director of Tenaris, a company selling steel 
pipes for the transportation of the Camisea gas. Therefore, the affiliations of some high 
ranking government officials with IFIs facilitate decisions involving large-scale resource 
extraction and infrastructure projects. This is not the only case.  Other key government 
officials, such as Jaime Quijandría, former Minister of Economy (2001- 2003) and twice 
minister of energy and mines (2001; 2003 – 2004) worked as Executive Director of the 
World Bank in 2004. Pedro Gamio held the positions of Vice-Minister of Energy, was 
consultant for the IDB, and lawyer for the National Society for Mining and Petroleum (an 
association of mining and oil corporations).  Likewise, prior to being President of Peru, 
Alejandro Toledo (in office 2001-2006) worked for the WB and IDB.  For Dammert 
(2010), this ‘revolving door’ of key staff in the Peruvian government and IFIs poses an 
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ethical problem affecting the relations between citizens and the political and economic 
elites.  Moreover, as Urteaga Crovetto (2012, p. 103) argues, the implications are more 
far-reaching as the state facilitates the financing, approval and eventual development of 
oil and gas projects such as Camisea.  This has a profound influence on how 
neoliberalism and corporate globalization are perceived as ‘inevitable’, contributing to 
the disempowerment of citizen group’s effective participation in the decision-making 
process.   
 Unveiled state corruption such as the scandal involving the former head of the 
state energy agency Perupetro (appointed by President Alan García) and Discover 
Petroleum from Norway in 2008 revealed undercover deals between high ranking 
government officials and oil companies.  This case and the rotation of key government 
staff in IFIs exposes ways through which the state is vulnerable to what Sawyer and & 
Gomez (2012) call ‘institutional capture’ where companies, MNC and IFIs influence 
government decisions in favor of resource extraction16.    
For Tanaka, roughly in the last years ten years the state has also sought to 
legitimize itself by partially integrating some excluded groups.  As other countries of 
Latin America, even though the Peruvian state is still strongly influenced by powerful 
corporate interests, it is also open to processes of contestation outside and inside the 
government.  José de Echave, Luis Peirano and Aída García Naranjo (former 
governmental Ministers for President Humala) are some examples of people who (in a 
similar way of the rotation of people from financial institutions and corporations to key 
                                                 
16 A television station broadcasted audio of an alleged conversation between a lobbyist and a government 
official discussing payments to help Discover Petroleum win contracts.  The scandal was followed by street 
protests, the resignation of the Council of Ministers, the appointment of a new cabinet of ministers and the 
imprisonment of some of the implicated people. 
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positions in the state) have held key positions in the government whose trajectories are 
closer to the progressive and civil society groups than conservative or corporate ones.17   
As Tanaka noted, in the last years, the state has also experienced the creation of spaces 
within the state with a certain degree of autonomy that could be even against the 
longstanding economic and political interests, in part due to the fact that at least in the in 
the last five years several high ranking government officials appointed in key positions 
are not career politicians.  The government decision to appoint these individuals in key 
positions mentioned above could be interpreted as what Tanaka (2008) call a state’s 
“partial inclusive rationale” through which the government seeks to legitimize itself and 
secure popular approval by integrating people traditionally excluded in key government 
positions.  All these aspects and the often contradictory role of the state as an 
‘administrator’ of natural resources through numerous administrative authorities and 
regulations.   It is in the confluence these multiple dimensions where the state is open to 
the influence of processes of contestation.   
Although always present, corruption has gained more relevance in the last fifteen 
years.  Annual national surveys about the perception of corruption in Peru, show that 
corruption is perceived as the leading problem the state (58%), followed by lack of 
efficiency of authorities and government officers (22%) (Apoyo, 2013).    
 
Indigenous Citizenship 
Traditionally, citizenship has referred “to a particular set of political practices 
involving specific public rights and duties with respect to a given political community 
                                                 
17 Other examples are: Antonio Brack Egg, Ricardo Giesecke, Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, the first two past and 
the latter current Minister of the Environment; Juan Ossio, Susana Baca, Luis Peirano former Ministries of 
Culture; Humberto Campodónico, former Board President of PetroPerú, among others.  
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(Bellamy, 208 p. 3).  This is a multilayered and multifunctional concept that imples a 
membership to a particular political community (a nation-state) that embraces the ideal of 
an association of free people with equal rights to participate in decision-making 
processes.    This quality of membership and the idea of belonging define who is a citizen 
and therefore who has the capacity to participate in both the political and the socio-
economic life of a community (Yashar, 2005).  
Since the 1970s, Amazonian indigenous groups of Peru organized to demand their 
recognition as citizens but also with collective rights and self-determination through 
“differentiated citizenship” (Kymlika, 1995).  They also claim equal rights to participate 
freely and be adequately informed in decision-making processes of issues affecting their 
lives.   Problematically, it is the nation-state that has the power to regulate these rights.  
In other words, according to the foundational concepts of citizenship, the states are the 
political entities that define the rules to acknowledge these rights, how people interact 
with the state to address their interests, and what rights do people possess (Yashar, 2005).   
In other words, the state and its institutions sanction the rules of the game and establish 
differences, creating political identities in groups that enjoy certain privileges while 
marginalizing others. Citizenship functions on one hand as a mechanism of inclusion in a 
social sphere and on the other hand as a mechanism of exclusion (Brubaker, 1992).    
In analyzing identity politics, it is also necessary to examine the mechanisms of 
exclusion (Stevenson, 2001; Yashar, 2005). In Latin America, mechanisms of exclusion 
are profoundly influenced by mainstream European democracies where these 
mechanisms of exclusion (or what Bellamy (2008) calls traditional qualifications for 
citizenship), are influenced by mainstream Western values (Stevenson, 2001).   In Latin 
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America, as in many colonized regions, citizenship has been marked out by abstract legal 
definitions as to who is to be included and excluded from the political community. These 
forms of marginalization have been widely applied in Peru and Latin America at different 
times to negate full status of citizenship to Blacks, Indians and women (Yashar, 2005).   
These social groups were categorized by the ruling elites as illiterate or lesser beings 
incapable of having a political voice in decision-making processes.  A historical analysis 
of the political transformations in Latin America shows that in addition to racial and 
cultural marginalization, there are spatial and institutional factors that affect the 
experience of citizenship where the states have not effectively sanctioned democratic 
individual rights in rural spaces (Bello, 2004; Yashar, 2007).    
The uneven presence of the state in rural areas of Latin America has contributed 
to the emergence of more vocal and increasingly powerful indigenous movements that 
redefine the content of citizenship (what being a citizen entails) in ways that paralleled 
but cannot be reduced to the multicultural struggles found in the older democracies of 
North America, Australia, and New Zealand (Yashar, 2005 p.34).  The indigenous 
peoples of Peru have experienced parallel processes to those in other Latin American 
countries where indigenous peoples are neither totally assimilated nor autonomous.   
Bello (2004) and Van Cott (2010) argue that the way to address the limitations of 
traditional theories of citizenship in contemporary Latin America is through the analysis 
of multiculturalism as a proposed alternative to the old nation-building projects based on 
the construction of a single ‘national culture’ ideologies based on unifying concepts of 
mestizaje that would result in “one culture, one nation”.  However, Bello (2004, p.3) 
cautions that “multiculturalism in Latin America is still a broad concept and it is not clear 
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if it is a discourse of the state, groups in power, an academic debate, a way to describe a 
reality, or a strategy to organize a society”.  Other scholars, such as Lucero (2008), Hale 
(2002), Postero (2004) and Hindery (2013) are more skeptical and contend that 
multicultural citizenship privileges certain kinds of neoliberalism and prefer intercultural 
social inclusion instead of a multicultural homogeneity.  Therefore, spatial and cultural 
differences present in Latin America challenge the traditional theoretical frameworks of 
citizenship, particularly when groups within societies do not share common experiences 
in relation to the state. Such is the case of rural communities where the presence of the 
state and its institutions is limited, if not absent (Yashar, 2005).    
In Peru, as other Latin American countries, colonial legacies still influence the 
formation of ideologies, policies, and regulations that result in an institutionalized 
negation of alterity and ethnic diversity.  It is extensively documented that during 
colonial times, institutions such as the church and schools banned the use of indigenous 
language and traditional practices in the name of progress and development (Burga, 
1988).  For most of Peru’s history as an independent country until 1979, being a citizen 
able to vote was equivalent to being able to read and write, a requisite that marginalized 
large segments of the indigenous population. 
Neoliberal transformations in the last three decades in Latin America have 
resulted in profound changes resulting in states that are more effective in sanctioning 
corporate rights than individual rights (Yashar, 1997). Citizenship regimes and 
institutions (particularly how these privilege certain groups) are critical to the emergence 
of political indigenous identities and social mobilizations in Latin America where 
indigenous claims for cultural rights are redefining and extending democratic citizenship 
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rights and responsibilities (Yashar, 2005).  These mobilizations emerge from members of 
cultures traditionally ‘invisible’ to the mainstream ‘national culture’ and mark a “rupture 
with the past characterized by subordination and segregation of the colonial period and 
on old principles of citizenship and political assimilation of indigenismo” (Assies, 1999, 
p. 22).   For many scholars “multi” connotes separation and is associated with the 
neoliberal reforms versus more genuine interculturality. Some examples of these 
transformations are visible today in the constitutional reforms adopted by Nicaragua, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Ecuador that include national multiethnic, plurinational 
or multicultural principles (Bello, 2009).      
Peru’s literacy requirements excluded indigenous people from suffrage until the 
constitutional amendment of 1979.   However, this situation has changed substantially in 
the last decade as the result of meaningful mobilizations of several Amazon ethnic groups 
that advance the recognition of individual and communal rights.  These mobilizations 
contributed to the creation of the Prior Consultation Law (Act No. 29785 of September 7, 
2011) based on principles of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries and influenced by 
other international legal instruments such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).  These landmark changes indicate that indigenous 
peoples in Latin America are progressively gaining access to citizenry, and that their 
concerns are increasingly being part of the political dialogue about what an inclusive 
society can and should be.  
Amazonian indigenous people’s struggles are shifting the traditional national, 
social, and political life; they are ethnic minorities and citizens defending both 
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particularity and equality (Varese & Chirif, 2006).  The conflicts and violent encounters 
between government authorities and indigenous groups in the Peruvian Amazon in the 
past decade resurfaced questions about the existence of colonial trends influenced by 
resource extraction, where indigenous peoples are perceived as an “obstacle to progress 
that affects the Peruvian nation’s access to Western capitalist modernity” (Chirif, 2009, 
2010; Varese, 2009).  This dissertation aims to shed light on the ongoing processes in the 
tropical forests of Cusco and Loreto where indigenous groups are trying to enforce their 
rights to participation in decision-making processes and to enforce their citizen rights.   
 
Methods and Data Analysis 
The research data collection and generation for this dissertation was conducted 
over four years in multiple segmented fieldwork periods:  one month of preliminary 
research in 2011 and 8.5 months of core fieldwork divided in four travels to Peru from 
2012 to 2015.  During the preliminary research, I visited Pucallpa, Contamana, Iquitos, 
Lima and the Shipibo-Konibo villages of Santa Rosa and Canaán de Cachiyacu, which is 
in the area of influence of oil block 31-B in Ucayali operated by Maple Gas Company.  
My 2011 preliminary fieldwork included three weeks of participation in workshops and 
meetings organized by the regional authorities of Ucayali, local environmental 
authorities, indigenous federations, NGOs and research institutions in Lima, Pucallpa and 
Contamana.  These workshops and meetings were specifically about the social and 
environmental impacts of oil and gas extraction in the Amazon region.  It also comprised 
meetings with researchers, members of conservation, indigenous rights and 
environmental organizations in Lima, as well as preliminary bibliographic research.  This 
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preliminary work was paramount to assess the feasibility of my research and to select the 
case studies in this dissertation.  My contacts in government; indigenous, research and 
private institutions; and the information collected from my work in twelve oil and gas 
cases in the Peruvian Amazon from 1995 to date was instrumental to selecting the cases 
of analysis in Loreto and Cusco for this dissertation and to refining my research 
questions.  As a staff scientist of the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW) in 
Lima, Peru since 1991, I have had the chance to hold conversations, interviews, 
participate in meetings, workshops organized by different actors, public hearings for the 
discussion of environmental impact assessment studies of oil and gas cases in Peru and 
other countries in the world.  In this capacity I have reviewed numerous national policies, 
laws, social and environmental impact studies, toxicological, public health and other 
technical reports about oil and gas activities including those in concessions:  1AB, 8, 31, 
56, 88, 103, 107, 108, 123, 126 and 131 in the Peruvian Amazon18.  In addition, I have 
reviewed similar documents from Belize, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Kenya, and Costa 
Rica.  
Oil concessions 1AB and 8 are the Peru’s most productive onshore oil 
concessions.  As explained later, these concessions contributed to the “boom” of the oil 
production in the Amazon in the 1970s and are still a major crude oil production site.  
The Camisea gas project in Cusco, on the other hand, represents the beginning of natural 
gas production era in Peru in the early 2000s.   The analysis of governance and decision-
making processes in these two regions allowed me to observe the political, institutional 
and social-economic factors influencing how, where, when and under what conditions 
                                                 
18  Concessions 103, 107, 108, 123, 126 and 131 are in exploration phase.  The other projects are producing 
oil and gas. 
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hydrocarbon projects are carried out.    Some variables that I address in this research and 
that have been underrepresented in the literature on oil and gas extraction are inter-
connected cultural, political and economic factors predisposing some areas to social-
environmental conflicts more than others (Valdivia, 2008; Bebbington et al., 1998; Finer 
et al., 2008; Orta & Finer, 2010).   During my preliminary research in the summer of 
2011, I had informal conversations with (n=8) with indigenous leaders from the 
Corrientes, Pastaza, Marañon and Camisea river basins of the indigenous federations 
ORAU, FECONACO, FEDIQUEP, ACODECOSPAT and COMARU in Pucallpa, 
Iquitos and Lima.   
My core fieldwork was conducted in 8.5 months during four fieldwork travels 
from 2012-2015.  My fieldwork consisted of 6 weeks in July and August 2012; 14 weeks 
(September to December) 2013, 8 weeks July to September 2014, and 6 weeks in July 
and August 2015.  In Iquitos (capital of the Department of Loreto, the country’s largest 
city of the Amazon) and Lima, I undertook my research in association with DAR 
(Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales – Law, Environment and Natural Resources), 
an environmental and indigenous rights organization with strong emphasis on the 
Amazon region and with significant experience in oil and gas projects in protected areas 
and indigenous territories, and PUINAMUDT (Pueblos Indígenas Amazónicos Unidos en 
Defensa de sus Territorios - Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon United in Defense of 
their Territories) an indigenous organization formed by the indigenous federations of the 
Corrientes, Pastaza, Alto Tigre, and Marañon River basins.  These organizations gave me 
the chance to participate in fifteen meetings and workshops with different national and 
local actors involved in oil and gas activities. They also provided me with office space in 
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Lima and Iquitos, lodging in Iquitos, logistical support, contact information, guidance, 
and invitations to strategic meetings, discussions with state and non-state actors.   Along 
with my fieldwork in Iquitos, I conducted significant research in Lima, where I continued 
my affiliation with DAR and PUINAMUDT. 
Research for this study involved three methods of data collection: (1) semi-
structured interviews with indigenous leaders, conservation and environmental 
organizations, national and regional authorities and oil company representatives; (2) 
participation in workshops and meetings with key actors (between 2011 and 2015); and 
(3) research of publications, news, laws, policies and archival documents.  I conducted 61 
semi-structured interviews with indigenous leaders and/or members of organizations 
(n=11); researchers (n=8); government agencies at the local and national levels (n=11); 
former heads of the national environmental authority (n=2), national and international 
environmental and conservation organizations (n=20) and the oil/gas industry 
representatives (n=3), and cooperation agencies (3), intergovernmental organization (2), 
oil and gas consultants (1). Table 2 contains a list of the interviews conducted.  Approval 
from the University of Oregon’s Institutional Review Board (“Human Subjects”) to 
conduct this research.  The overall aim of interviews was to understand the roles of the 
key actors, the political and institutional framework, and the power relations between the 
parties involved in oil/gas projects in protected areas and indigenous territories.   
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
Table 2.  List of Interviews Conducted, 2012-2015. 
Number Affiliation Location Year Recorded 
1 National government official Lima 2012, 
2013,2014 
N 
2 National government official Iquitos 2014,2015 Y 
3 National government official Lima 2011,2014 N 
4 Researcher Iquitos 2013 Y 
5 NGO representative Lima 2014 N 
6 NGO representative Lima 2014 Y 
7 NGO representative Iquitos 2013 N 
8 Economist / policy expert Iquitos 2012, 2013 N 
9 NGO representative Iquitos 2014 N 
10 National government / regional 
research institution 
Iquitos 2013 N 
11 National government Iquitos 2014 N 
12 indigenous leader Lima 2015 Y 
13 NGO representative Lima 2014 N 
14 NGO representative Iquitos 2014 N 
15 NGO representative Iquitos 2014 N 
16 NGO representative Lima 2014 N 
17 indigenous leader Pucallpa 2013 Y 
18 NGO representative Lima 2013,2014 Y 
19 indigenous leader Iquitos 2013 N 
20 indigenous leader Iquitos 2012,2013,2014 N 
21 NGO representative Iquitos 2013 N 
22 National government / regional 
research institution 
Iquitos 2013,2014 N 
23 NGO representative Lima 2014 N 
24 Congress worker / environment and 
indigenous rights 
Lima 2013,2014 N 
25 International Cooperation officer Lima 2014 N 
26 Former Minister of the Environment Lima 2014 N 
27 Congress worker / legal advisor Lima 2015 N 
28 Consultant – environmental policy 
and law 
Lima 2014 N 
29 NGO representative Lima 2014 N 
30 NGO representative Lima 2015 Y 
31 National government representative Lima 2013,2014 N 
32 National government / local branch Iquitos 2014 N 
33 NGO representative Iquitos 2014 Y 
34 indigenous leader Pucallpa 2013 N 
35 indigenous leader Pucallpa 2012 N 
 
 
Number Affiliation Location Year Recorded 
36 Researcher/ indigenous issues expert Lima 2012 N 
37 National government / local branch Iquitos 2014 N 
38 Oil company representative Lima 2015 N 
 38 
 
39 Oil company representative Lima 2015 Y 
40 Oil company representative Iquitos 2015 N 
41 NGO representative Iquitos 2014 Y 
42 Regional government representative Lima 2014 N 
43 Regional government representative Lima 2015 N 
44 NGO representative Lima 2015 Y 
45 NGO representative Lima 2014 N 
46 NGO representative Lima 2013 N 
47 NGO representative Lima 2015 N 
48 Cooperation agency / expert in 
indigenous issues 
Lima 2015 N 
49 Journalist Iquitos 2015 Y 
50 indigenous organization Iquitos 2015 N 
51 indigenous organization Iquitos 2015 N 
52 indigenous organization Iquitos 2015 N 
53 indigenous organization Lima 2015 N 
54 Researcher Switzerland(*) 2015 Y 
55 Researcher U.S. 2015 Y 
56 indigenous organization Cusco 2015 N 
57 indigenous organization Loreto 2015 N 
58 indigenous organization Loreto 2015 N 
59 NGO Lima 2015 Y 
60 NGO Lima 2013 N 
61 Researcher –environmental science Spain(*) 2013 N 
(*) via skype. 
 
Second, I participated in 21 meetings and workshops between indigenous 
organizations, oil/gas companies, national and local authorities.  These meetings took 
place in the Amazon locations of Iquitos (Loreto), Cusco and Lima, these meetings are 
listed in Appendix B.  It is important to mention that it is not uncommon to find Am 
 
Amazon indigenous leaders in Lima and Iquitos, since they regularly travel to 
meet with both regional and national authorities, as well as leaders of other indigenous 
federations.  These meetings were related to oil and gas projects, specifically about 
indigenous rights, governance, and social-environmental issues.   
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Although the indigenous leaders each speak their native language, everyone was 
also fluent in Spanish; therefore, interviews for this research were all conducted in that 
language (of which I am a native speaker).  Along with formal interviews, I also engaged 
in informal conversations with members of environmental and indigenous organizations, 
and participated in events that facilitated the access to contacts and additional 
information.  Though not initially planned, indigenous leaders, PUINAMUDT and DAR 
invited me to participate in meetings with representatives of national and regional 
authorities and government agencies, oil companies, human rights, conservation and 
environmental organizations.  Through these organizations I was able to meet with 
Congress representatives, review environmental studies, health reports, policies and legal 
documents related to oil and gas projects.  DAR and PUINAMUDT facilitated the access 
to key decision-making documents, regulations, maps, information about oil and gas 
activities in blocks 1AB, 8 and 88 that otherwise would have been impossible to access.     
These include reports from government agencies with their opinions to the EIA for the 
expansion of the Camisea project in block 88 that, despite the fact that they are public 
documents, are not available to the average citizen.  I was also able to interact with an 
array of state and non-state representatives about environmental and health issues related 
to extractive industries.    
Research also included a detailed review and analysis of literature about the 
hydrocarbon concessions since the 1970s, especially government policies, laws and 
regulations of the oil and gas sector, internal communications between government 
organizations, indigenous, environmental and conservation organizations, and official 
reports of the environmental and social impacts of oil/gas projects (Appendix C). 
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Additionally, I followed news, websites and media reports with current information about 
the ongoing events with regards to hydrocarbon activities in protected areas and 
indigenous territories in the study area. 
Given the broad and heterogeneous sources of information about the social, 
political, and economic aspects involved in the hydrocarbon sector, the collected data (in 
the form of primary texts, observational field notes, and interviews) was organized in 
major analytic code categories such as ‘policies and regulations, “indigenous 
citizenship”, indigenous movement”, “oil and gas revenues, production and demand”, 
“institutional framework”, “decisión-making mechanisms” and “EIA” (Figure 9).     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Categories of Data 
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These major analytic categories were defined early on and based on my research 
questions.  The content analysis of audio recordings, interview and meeting notes, media 
articles, laws, online and printed reports were analyzed and coded by hand to identify 
terms and phrases to identify primarily themes and patterns to answer my dissertation 
questions.   I chose this approach as several relevant laws, reports and events appeared or 
happened as I conducted this research.  These broad categories were then applied to the 
new and emerging data and allowed me to identify important themes, patterns and make 
connections between the different categories of data.   The mentioned analitic categories 
were also applied to the notes taken from the during numerous meetings and workshops 
where I participated.    This approach was used to answer all the research questions as 
these categories allowed the organization of data and identify and interpret recurring 
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themes such as institutional changes, social-environmental conflicts, identify state and 
non-state actors and the specific sets of information relevant to answered this study’s 
research questions.  The analysis of the distribution of revenues from oil and gas 
activities in Loreto and Cusco involved semi-structured interviews and the collection and 
analysis of reports (government and non-government organizations).  This information 
was collected from public sources, particularly from the economy and energy and mines 
authorities, Perupetro, Revenue Watch, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) and the regional govenments of Loreto and Cusco. 
 
Positionality 
I have been aware of the ethical considerations and challenges in relation to my 
long-term affiliation to local and international non-profit organizations, sustained support 
to indigenous organizations, and its implications in academic research.  Ethical 
considerations have been undertaken with careful and thoughtful attention to conducting 
this research, especially given the polarized opinions around resource extraction in the 
Amazon among indigenous and environmental organizations, companies, and 
government institutions.   As I write this dissertation, several ongoing controversies and 
acute tensions are still present in relation to resource extraction in Peru, specifically as a 
result of numerous oil spills, as well as legal and political changes in the decision-making 
processes for mining and hydrocarbon projects that are taking place at this moment.  
These changes include legal reforms to facilitate large scale oil and mining projects, new 
ways to regulate indigenous peoples’ participation in decision-making processes (such as 
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the creation of the Prior Consultation Law – Ley de Consulta Previa19), and new 
exemptions for the requirement of environmental impact assessment studies of oil/gas 
exploration projects, among other legal changes.   All of these elements affect how oil 
and gas projects are approved and managed, particularly with regards to the role of 
national and local government institutions (this will be analyzed in Chapter IV).  
Consequently, as in other countries in Latin America, resource extraction (especially 
mining and hydrocarbons) is becoming increasingly polarized due to the struggles over 
land, resources, as well as its impacts on health, livelihood, power and political interests.   
Maintaining a broad, reflective, and rigorous analysis in the process of advancing 
academic knowledge is a difficult task.  There is considerable debate in the social 
sciences about “activist” scholarship and the ethical considerations about the value of 
such research to produce scholarly knowledge within the paradigm of ‘traditional 
science’ (Calhoun, 2008, p.xviii; Ruddick, 2004; Hale, 2008; Clocke, 2002; Pain, 2003; 
Warnaars; 2013; Hindery 2004).  These critiques are based on early assumptions that 
academic endeavors and activism are ‘a problem child’ (Ruddick, 2004), an issue that 
could be perceived as problematic for scholarly rigor.  However, as Hale (2008) argues, 
“all knowledge claims are produced in a political context; notions of objectivity that 
ignore or deny these facilitating conditions take on a de facto political positioning of their 
own, made more blatant and unavoidable by the very disavowal.”  But what does 
“activism” mean and what are its implications in geography?   A review of the definitions 
of “activist” and “activism” reveal different interpretations of these terms.  The Merriam-
                                                 
19 Law for the Indigenous Right to Prior Consultation, Acknowledge by the Convention 169 of the 
International Labor Organization / Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas u 
Originarios, Reconocido en el Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Approved in 
September 2011, enforced in April 2012. 
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Webster Dictionary does not define “activist” but defines activism as “a doctrine or 
practice that emphasizes direct vigorous action especially in support or opposition to one 
side of a controversial issue.”  Likewise, the Oxford Dictionary defines activist as “a 
person who campaigns to bring about political or social change”, and “activism” as “the 
policy or action using vigorous campaigning to bring about political or social change.”  
The definition of “activist” and “activism” has different connotations in Spanish.  
Activist denotes “political agitator, a member of party propaganda actively involved in 
direct action or practice” and activism an “intense dedication to a particular line of action 
in public life” according to the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy.  These 
definitions emphasize the nature of militancy and the necessary implication of 
engagement and response to ongoing issues of political and social nature (Ruddick, 2004, 
p. 231).  The terms “activism” and “activist” also imply taking a stance with the 
concomitant aspiration of achieving a goal.  This nature of activism is what seems to be 
at the core of the conflict with scholarship.   But, as Pain (2003, p.652) points out, “while 
many social geographers engage in forms of political activism, recent years have seen 
sharp refocusing of interest in activism as an explicit strategy and outcome of research 
and vice versa.  Earlier assumptions insinuated that academic endeavors and activism 
were distinctive and separate pursuits which had to be forcefully and problematically 
combined have been dispelled.”  Some of the criticisms to activist scholarship depart 
from the assumption that a researcher’s epistemological alignment with particular groups 
of people could hinder the ability to analyze them critically or as Ruddick (2004) says, 
activism is often counted as an irrational, emotive, partial and biased lens that clouds 
proper judgement.  However, scholars such as Charles Hale, recognize that activist 
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researchers have dual loyalties, to their discipline and/or academic community and to a 
political struggle (Warnaars, 2013 p.70, Hale, 2008).   
My own experience working in an environmental organization and as a scholar is 
in agreement with Charles Hale when he says that research and political engagement can 
be mutually enriching and offers a wide range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
perspectives on how the two have been brought together (Hale, 2008, p.2).   In 
conducting this dissertation, I was aware of my professional background and that 
methodological rigor is even more of a crucial commitment in the research process. I 
managed these tensions by finding the best ways to combine these roles instead of 
inhibiting my fieldwork.  This research gave me an opportunity to reflect about the 
alternate activities that geographers are immersed alongside the academic life, and how 
theory and praxis could be interconnected and mutually beneficial.  After all, as Ruddick 
(2004) points out, many geographers came to the discipline to try to make sense of issues 
they were already involved in on the outside, whether it is human rights, issues of 
separatism in Ireland, struggles for water resources in India, or adaptation to climate 
change in the Andes. During my fieldwork process, I encountered several indigenous 
leaders and NGO members who cautioned me that academic researchers are not trusted 
because they are seen as information gatherers who leave without contributing to the 
people they research.  Researchers such as Warnaars (2013, p.71) mentions that in some 
instances researchers are compared to mining companies: “I recall a saying, that just as 
mining companies extract minerals, academics extract information and when they are 
done they never come back.”    
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Conducting this research required critical reflection about one’s own subjectivity 
and a systematic assessment of both the content and meaning of the data collected.  It 
required a special awareness to follow the principles of methodological rigor and 
compliance with them in order to produce valid and legitimate results.  I have been very 
careful following the university research protocols required by the University of Oregon.  
I found that it is not only possible but complementary to be an activist alongside 
conducting academic research.  As mentioned earlier my contacts in government 
institutions, indigenous, and environmental organizations facilitated access to information 
and policy documents that otherwise would not have been easy to access. I disclosed my 
affiliations with the people I interviewed and managed information about my academic 
research openly and with transparency.  This also meant that obtaining interviews with 
members of oil/gas companies such as Pluspetrol was more challenging.  This was due in 
part because of my affiliations and also because of the media reports since 2014 about 
environmental and social impacts in blocks 1AB, 8 by Pluspetrol.    Overall, 
representatives of government agencies were accessible and willing to meet and were 
able to facilitate information.  However, representatives of oil and gas companies and 
their guilds such as the Peruvian Hydrocarbon Society (Sociedad Peruana de 
Hidrocarburos - SPH) and the Peruvian Society of Mining, Oil and Energy (Sociedad 
Peruana de Minería, Petróleo y Energía – SNMPE) are generally more cautious about 
granting interviews to people affiliated to environmental and/or indigenous organizations.   
Action-oriented research involves a “researcher trying to change the system while 
at the same time generating critical knowledge of it” (Small, 1995, p.942).  This approach 
is part of what has been called “Participatory Action Research”, a research method that is 
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essentially different from many other scholarship methods because its end is not just to 
explain or analyze social reality but hopefully would lead to action or positive changes 
for the social groups involved (Hay, 2010).   Action-oriented research does not have a 
prescribed methodology, but it does require a power balance between the researcher and 
the people studied and an awareness of the attitudes and behavior of the researcher since 
these could affect the relationship with the research group (Ibid.).  
 
 48 
 
 
CHAPTER III    
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT  
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the political, economic and social environment influencing 
the extraction of hydrocarbons in the Peruvian Amazon, particularly in blocks 1AB, 8 
and 88 in Loreto and Cusco respectively (Figure 1).  This region has experienced 
profound changes as tropical forests have become a strategic objective for the 
conservation of biological and cultural diversity and for economic growth.  The Amazon 
rainforests are known not only as an important repository of local and global ecological 
services but also as a resource to stabilize the planet’s climate.  This region has also been 
in constant transformation through human activity, particularly in the last ten years as a 
result of a new cycle of public and private initiatives for the exploitation of natural 
resources and infrastructure projects (Dourojeanni, 2010; Barrantes & Glave, 2014).    
As Dourojeanni (2010, p.23) explains, the Peruvian rainforest (selva) is entering 
an unprecedented cycle of frenzied resource exploitation.   As has occurred in the past 
with extraction of rubber and petroleum, this new rush for resource exploitation does not 
take into account the social and environmental consequences.  Of the nation’s 52 new 
large hydroelectric projects, including transmission line, half are proposed on the 
Marañon, Ene and Inambari rivers.  Hydrocarbon concessions cover more than 70% of 
the selva region, overlapping protected areas, buffer zones and indigenous territories.  
Mining concessions cover more than 10 million hectares of the Amazon basin in the 
departments of San Martin and Amazonas and have already devastated more than 7,000 
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hectares in Madre de Dios (Dourojeanni, 2010).   The construction of 2,600 miles of 
waterways on the Marañon River, a 1,600 interoceanic highway connecting the coast to 
Iñapari in Madre de Dios on the border with Brazil, is only one of the IIRSA (South 
American Regional Integration Initiatives) projects funded by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and the Latin American Development Bank (CAF).  The size 
of palm oil plantations doubled from 2006 to 2012 and covers today more than 100,000 
hectares of Loreto’s rainforests.   In addition, there are more than 500 logging 
concessions in the Peruvian Amazon, covering more than 7 million hectares.  However, a 
World Bank report estimated that illegal logging produces as much as 80% of Peru’s 
exported timber.   
These transformations are regulated and conditioned by multiple factors (political, 
economic, social and cultural) that define the use of this space.  What is not up for debate 
is the expectation that Peru’s selva remain “untouched” as many of these extractive 
activities are already occurring; instead, the issue is that resource extraction and large-
scale infrastructure projects are evaluated and approved in an isolated manner without 
coordinated and comprehensive long-term, economic, social and environmental 
assessments.  In addition, the patterns of resource use in this region have revealed that 
often these practices have failed to fulfill the expectations of economic and social well-
being for the local populations.   Moreover, as Barrantes and Glave (2014) note, public 
policies (by action or omission) permitting these activities have the capacity to transform 
social and economic trends and generate irreversible ecosystem changes.   This chapter 
explains this context and also sets the stage for subsequent chapters that compare the 
cases of the oil activities in Loreto and Cusco in order to assess the changes in decision-
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making processes affecting hydrocarbon activities from the 1990s and the influence of 
the hydrocarbon sector in Peru’s resource governance.   
 
Political and Economic Reforms 1990-2014 
The transition from Alan García’s first government (1985-1990) to Alberto 
Fujimori’s presidency in 1990 took place in the midst of a severe economic and political 
crisis. Peru’s annual inflation rate reached 7,600 percent, and the armed conflict of the 
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru - 
MRTA) and Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) was spreading throughout the country.  
Fujimori’s strategy prioritized stabilizing the economy, defeating terrorism and settling 
the frontier conflicts with Ecuador (Santos Granero & Barclay, 2000 p.309).  In the midst 
of this social, political and economic chaos, or perhaps because of it, Fujimori urgently 
petitioned the World Bank for economic support.  Soon after, the country experienced 
economic and political reforms promoting the liberalization of the economy by reducing 
the state’s size (Barrantes & Cardenas, 2010).  Due to these neoliberal reforms (known as 
“fujishock’), the inflation rate rocketed overnight to 398% to “correct” the prices of goods 
and reactivate the economy (Gonzales de Olarte, 1993).    
Fujimori’s reforms included legal changes to facilitate oil and mining extraction.  
One of these included Supreme Decree No. 8-91-EM-VME authorizing an oil concession 
(block 61, by the U.S. Company Texas Crude) in the Pacaya Samiria National Reserve 
(PSNR) in Loreto.  This law countered the intent of Article 71 of the recently enacted 
Environmental Code20 (Código del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales) that restricted 
                                                 
20 Legal Decree No. 613 
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the exploitation of non-renewable resources in protected areas.  However, as will be 
described in Chapter IV, the Occidental Petroleum Corporation (OXY) was already 
extracting oil within the PSNR, and, in fact, the company’s oil operations started two 
decades before the creation of the protected area.  A national and international campaign 
to “save” PSNR from new oil projects argued that the local people in the reserve already 
produce $80 million USD each year in fish and agricultural products (Soria, 2004; 
Solano, 1999).  The international pressure forced Texas Crude to decline the contract and 
close the project.  In 1992 the government amended or cancelled 28 articles of the 
Environmental Code enacted the year before.  To compensate for these changes, in 1993 
the government instated the requirement to conduct environmental impact assessment 
studies prior to granting new licenses for the exploitation of oil in the Amazon (Morel, 
2014).  That same year, Peru ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
(which influenced the enactment of the Prior Consultation Law in 2012, described later in 
Chapter IV).   
After Fujimori’s reelection in 1995, Congress passed the Law No. 27037 for the 
Promotion of Integrated Development of the Peruvian Amazon to further stimulate 
investment in the region (Santos Granero & Barclay, 2000).  Fujimori’s legal reforms 
also reflected the state’s cautions about the creation of new protected areas21.  Solano 
argued that this was probably because the National Natural Resources Institute 
                                                 
21 Three protected areas were declared during Fujimori’s first regime:  Batán Grande, Tumbes Reserved 
Zone and the Algarrobal el Moro. 
 
 52 
 
(INRENA- the sector’s authority at that time)22 observed that protected areas and high 
poverty levels overlapped;  therefore, the government assumed that these areas were seen 
as an impediment to economic development (2011, p.88).  There is still an extensive 
debate about the impacts of protected areas on human welfare.  Ferraro and Hanauer 
(2015) argue that these controversies are due to the variety of methods used to assess the 
mechanisms through which protected areas affect human welfare.  Brockington and 
Wilkie (2015) point out that most of the controversies are about the physical 
displacement or eviction of people, the restriction of economic activities within protected 
areas, compensation payments to affected populations and the governance or 
management authorities of these areas. 
A year after Fujimori’s re-election in 1995, Petroperu signed a landmark contract 
with the Royal Dutch Shell Company and Mobil Oil for the exploration of gas deposits in 
block 88 in Camisea, Cusco.  This project was also a focal point for national and 
international groups concerned about the potential impacts of the project on the 
environment and indigenous population, especially on Matsigenka, Yine, Nahua and 
Nanti groups living in voluntary isolation.  For the next two years, the Shell-Mobil 
consortium invested approximately $19 million USD in explorations, but in July 1998 the 
companies announced their decision not to continue with the project.  The consortium 
requested benefits that the government did not grant, such as the possibility to export the 
gas to Brazil to participate in the distribution of gas in Lima.23  By 2000, the country had 
one of the most liberal economies in Latin America and was one of the world’s top 
                                                 
22 At that time part of the Ministry of Agriculture and national authority of the protected areas. In 2008 it 
was replaced by the National Protected Areas Service (SERNANP) of the Ministry of the Environment. 
23 Organic Law for the Sustainable Use of Natural Resources (Law 26821), Protected Areas Act (Law 
26834) and the Law for the Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity (Law 26839). 
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mining production centers.  The following administrations of Alejandro Toledo’s (2001-
2005) and Alan García’s second term (2005-2010) were characterized by a consolidation 
of an economic model based on resource extraction, exports of primary goods, increased 
foreign investments in the mining sector and the signing free trade agreements mentioned 
earlier.  
In sharp contrast with his left-leaning first mandate, Alan García’s second 
government ((2006-2011) was characterized by a rise of social-environmental conflicts 
and aggressive free market economic reforms to facilitate even more resource extraction 
(large-scale metal mining and agriculture and hydrocarbons) in the Amazon.  García 
published a series of controversial articles in the newspaper El Comercio outlining his 
ideas about how to increase the economic growth.  In the first article, “El Síndrome del 
Perro del Hortelano” (the dog in the manger syndrome) published in October 2007, 
García said that Peru owned many resources that could not be sold, did not attract 
investment and did not create jobs due to “old ideologies, laziness and insensibility of the 
dog in the manger, which says if I cannot do it, nobody can do it.”  García added: “There 
is the old communist anti-capitalist disguised as an environmentalist of the 21st century, 
but he is always anti-capitalist, opposed to investment with no ways to explain how it 
could be possible to boost development with subsistence farming.”   The article also said, 
“Against petroleum, [they] have created the image of the ‘non-contacted’ native, who are 
unknown but presumed [to exist].  Because of this, millions of hectares cannot be 
explored, and the Peruvian oil must remain underground while the world pays $90 USD 
per barrel.  They prefer for Peru to import oil and continue getting poorer.”    
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For García the solution to poverty was to formalize individual land tenure, open 
large extensions of the land to investment and bring modern technology to rural areas.   
García also granted power to the ministries to pass laws without the intervention of the 
Congress, which promoted foreign investment and negotiated a free trade agreement with 
the US in 2006.   Shortly after the publication of these newspaper articles, the García 
administration passed 100 decrees between January and June 2008 based on the above 
mentioned principles.  These articles were influenced by Peruvian economist Hernando 
de Soto who promoted the concentration of land and natural resources in the hands of 
individual owners as opposed to the collective land ownership preferred by the native 
communities (Chirif, 2009; Bebbington 2009)24.   
These reforms were sanctioned in the context of the United States – Peru Free 
Trade Agreement and required amendments to the Peruvian legislation.    Among the 
most controversial decrees passed were the Legal Decrees 1090 (Forestry and Wildlife 
Act) and 1073 which facilitated the sale of communal lands by lowering the quorum 
necessary for communities to sell their lands from two-thirds to fifty percent.  Also of 
particular concern were decrees 1064 and 1090 which facilitated the change of land use 
in the Amazon. These decrees changed the property regimes of the native communities in 
the Amazon, which were considered communal lands.  These reforms changed the 
communal lands to the same legal designation of the agricultural and peasant lands of the 
Andes and the coastal regions.  Controversies were not only about the number and 
                                                 
24 In The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (1989) and in The 
Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
(2000), de Soto argues that capitalism has failed in developing countries due to the lack 
of easy access to individual private property.  He contends that legal barriers are a 
problem for the emerging popular sectors in urban areas to access to credit, to create 
capital and end urban informal economies.   
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content of the decrees but also about the way they were passed.  These were enacted 
directly by the executive branch without any public consultation or participation of the 
congress.   
The above mentioned decrees sparked violent protests throughout the country and 
resulted in the protests of Bagua, Department of Amazonas in June 5 of 2009, where 33 
people died (most of them police) in a violent clash between the police, indigenous 
peoples, and settlers opposed to these legal reforms.  The decrees were rescinded and the 
protest gave unprecedented visibility to the Amazon native communities that had been 
mostly ignored by authorities in Lima.  A few days before the protests in Bagua, a 
congressional commission presented the document “Prior Consultation: Fundamental 
Right of the Indigenous People and Tool to Strengthen the Democracy” (Congress of 
Peru, 2011).  After the protests in Bagua and rise of conflicts in the Amazon related to 
development and extraction projects, Congress appointed a commission to study and 
formulate recommendations about the problems affecting indigenous people (Comisión 
Especial Multipartidaria Encargada de Estudiar y Recomendar la Solución a la 
Problemática de Los Pueblos Indígenas).  On December 2009, this commission 
formulated a set of recommendations that included the implementation of intercultural 
dialogue and the adoption of laws to enforce ILO Convention 169.   By May 2010, the 
urgency to adopt a legal framework for more effective public participation was at its 
peak.  It was then when the Constitutional Court declared that the lack of a specific rule 
for the consultation process to enact the International Labor Organization Convention 
169 was unconstitutional (Constitutional Court Decision: 22-2009: Principles 10-12).   
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The Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. also required the Peruvian government 
to create a Ministry of the Environment.  The law creating the ministry25 in 2008 stated 
its purpose was “to facilitate the implementation of the Trade Agreement between the US 
and its Amendment Protocol” (paragraph 1).   The creation of this ministry in 2008 
replaced the previous environmental authority, the National Environmental Council 
(Consejo Nacional del Ambiente - CONAM) created in 1994.  The new ministry aimed to 
fill the institutional gap in environmental law and policy-making of several ministries 
regulating and controlling the environmental issues independently.   This decision 
irritated some private corporations but was welcomed by many state and non-state actors.   
It could also be interpreted from the Gramscian perspective of power as a decision to 
reduce the tension caused by the rise of social-environmental conflicts in Peru.   During 
the government of Alejandro Toledo (2004-2006), the number and intensity of social-
environmental conflicts rose to a record high.  In the first quarter of 2008, social 
environmental conflicts comprised half of the overall conflicts in the country 
(Ombudsman’s Office, 2008), and by the time President Humala was elected in 2011, the 
social-environmental conflicts had reached peak levels, prompting the creation of a 
special Bureau for the Management of Social Conflicts.26  In June 2015, the Office of the 
Ombudsman reported that 67% of Peru’s social conflicts (141) were primarily (70%) 
related to oil and mining projects in the Amazon and Andes, and at least half of them 
involved violent protests (Ombudsman’s Office, 2015).   
Figure 10.  Causes of Social Conflicts in Peru, June 2015 
                                                 
25 Legal Decree No. 1013 of May 2008. 
26 Created by Supreme Decree No. 010-2010-PCM 
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Data source: Ombudsman’s Office 2015 
The severity of these conflicts also prompted Humala to enact the Prior 
Consultation Law (Ley de Consulta Previa) 27 only a few weeks after his inauguration in 
2011 (see analysis of this law in Chapter IV), but the law has not been effective in 
reducing the number and violence of conflicts.  The enactment of the Prior Consultation 
Law was followed by the adoption of more laws to “reactivate the economy” through 
resource extraction.  These sets of laws or paquetazos (analyzed more in detail in Chapter 
IV) put extractive projects on the fast track, reduced the number of requirements to obtain 
environmental permits, and eliminated many penalties for environmental contamination.   
Although some groups welcomed the Prior Consultation Law as an acknowledgement of 
indigenous peoples’ rights to participate in decision-making processes, others believe it 
would be an obstacle to foreign investments.   The fact is that the law does not allow 
indigenous peoples the right to veto activities that may affect their livelihoods and grants 
                                                 
27 Law No. 29785.  Law for the Right to Prior Consultation of the Indigenous Peoples According to the 
International Labor Organization Convention 169.  Published on September 7, 2011. 
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the government the right act as the final arbiter.  In practice, there is great uncertainty 
about the law’s implementation even in government agencies and indigenous 
organizations because its mechanisms for implementation (procedures, responsibilities, 
budget, etc.) are not clearly defined.  This could be interpreted as Charles Hale (2004, 
p.19) argues, as a form of neoliberal multiculturalism, where indigenous organizations 
are permitted, as long as they do not “amass enough power to call basic state prerogatives 
into question.”   
 
Protected Areas  
Protected areas are continental and/or maritime spaces designated to protect the 
nation’s biological diversity, cultural, historic and landscape assets.  These areas can be 
managed by the SERNANP (the National Protected Areas Service), regional authorities, 
individuals, or private entities.  Protected areas are not only meant to protect natural 
assets but also are created to safeguard historic sanctuaries, indigenous communal lands, 
and territorial reserves where economic activities are regulated.  These are considered a 
“powerful engine for economic development” as they sustain key economic sectors such 
as forestry, fisheries, agriculture, and tourism.   Peru’s National Protected Areas System 
(Sistema Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado – SINANPE) includes 
ten communal reserves (Reservas Comunales) defined as areas for the conservation of 
flora and fauna for the benefit of local populations and indigenous or peasant 
communities.  Communal reserves are managed directly by its beneficiaries, and their 
natural resources can be used according to management plans approved by the protected 
areas’ national authority SERNANP.    For decades many indigenous communities inside 
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protected areas demanded titles to their territories.  The first groups exerting their legal 
rights include indigenous populations living inside the protected areas or in the 
surroundings of the Manu National Park, the Yanachaga-Chemillen, Bahuaja-Sonene, 
Cordillera Azul, Otishi, and Alto Purús.  IUCN estimates that roughly 30% of Peru’s 
protected areas overlap indigenous territories.   
The surge of resource extraction such as mining (metals, coal, sand and gravel) 
and hydrocarbons often overlap protected areas and their peripheral spaces (buffer 
zones).   Researchers, politicians, corporations and civil society groups have been 
discussing the sustainability of resource extraction in protected areas for decades.  
Among these dialogues is the 2nd IUCN World Conservation Congress in Amman, 
Jordan in 2000, where members recommended the protection and conservation of 
biological diversity from resource exploration and extraction in some categories of 
protected areas.   Approximately 14.6% of the world’s land and 2.8% of the oceans are 
part of 200,000 protected areas.   Peru has 76 protected areas covering 19.3 million 
hectares, equivalent to 16% of the national territory.  The national protected areas system 
(SINANPE) organizes these areas into two types of use: direct and indirect (Figure 11).    
 
Figure 11.  Classification of Protected Areas 
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National Protected Areas Act (No. 26834) 
 
 
Areas of indirect use (national parks, national sanctuaries and historic 
sanctuaries) are considered highly vulnerable to resource extraction; therefore, they are 
under a special protection regime.  Consequently, the only activities permitted in these 
areas are scientific research activities that would not affect the areas’ conservation 
purposes.  Tourism and recreational activities can only take place in designated areas and 
resource extraction and any transformation or modification of the natural environment is 
prohibited.   Resource use and extraction is permitted in the areas of direct use such as 
national reserves, wildlife reserves, communal reserves, protected forests, hunting zones 
and regional conservation areas (Table 3).   Extractive activities are permitted primarily 
by local communities and in zones defined in the area’s management plan and must be 
compatible with the objectives of the protected area defined by SERNANP (SPDA, 
2007).  
Table 3. Activities Permitted in Protected Areas According to their Category 
Category Indirect Use Direct Use 
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Type National parks, national 
sanctuaries, historic 
sanctuaries. 
National reserves, landscape 
reserves, wildlife refuges, 
communal reserves, protected 
forests, hunting reserves, and 
regional conservation areas. 
Activities permitted Scientific research, recreation 
and tourism.  These areas do 
not allow the extraction of 
natural resources nor the 
transformation and 
modification of the 
environment. 
Use and extraction of natural 
resources conducted 
primarily by local 
populations and in areas 
defined in the management 
plan.  All use and activities 
must be compatible with the 
area’s objectives. 
Source: SERNANP 
Figure 12.  Protected Areas of Peru 
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Ministry of the Environment, 2015 
 
  In addition to the above mentioned areas in the national system, there are 16 
Regional Conservation Areas (Areas de Conservación Regional - ACR) and 78 
 63 
 
conservation areas (Areas de Conservación Privadas - ACP) throughout the country.  
These are managed by the regional government or the private owners and must comply 
with a management plan.   The designation of the ACR and ACP are subject to an 
evaluation process by the government.   Therefore, there are 170 areas under some 
category of protection nationwide (see categories in Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Categories of National Protected Areas  
Category Definition 
National 
Parks 
Areas that contain representative populations of natural diversity and 
ecologic units.  They are declared untouchable to protect one or more 
ecosystems, wild flora and fauna, evolutionary and succession processes, 
as well as associated cultural and landscape assets.  
National 
Sanctuary 
Areas where the habitat of species of flora and fauna communities are 
declared untouchable, as well as natural formations of scientific and 
landscape value. 
Historic 
Sanctuary 
Untouchable areas with relevant natural values that have significant 
national interest. They may contain monumental and archeologic assets or 
places where outstanding historic events have taken place. 
Landscape 
Reserve 
Protected areas whose geographic integrity exhibits a harmonious 
relationship between humans and nature, and they host relevant natural, 
cultural and aesthetic assets. 
Wildlife 
Refuge 
Areas that require active intervention for the management and 
maintenance of the habitat, supply the special needs of determined species, 
such as reproduction areas or other critical places for the recovery and 
maintenance of the population of those species. 
National 
Reserve 
Areas destined for the conservation of biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of wild flora and fauna (terrestrial and aquatic).  In these 
areas, the commercial use of natural resources is permitted according to 
management plans previously approved and supervised by the national 
authority in charge. 
 
 
Category Definition 
Communal 
Reserve 
Areas designed for the conservation of wild flora and fauna for the benefit 
of the rural populations in their vicinity.  The use and commercialization 
of resources will be undertaken according to management plans approved 
and supervised by the authority and conducted by the beneficiaries.  These 
areas could be established in farmlands, livestock areas, forestry areas, and 
wetlands. 
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Protected 
Forest 
Established to protect water catchment areas, river banks and other water 
sources in general for the protection against erosion.   Use of resources 
and activities that would not affect the vegetation coverage is permitted. 
Hunting 
Reserve 
Areas designated to the use of wildlife through the regulated practice of 
sport hunting. 
Reserved 
Zone 
This is a temporary status for areas that initially qualify for protection but 
are under assessment to determine the extension of the area and its 
category of protection. 
 
 Approximately 16 oil and gas concessions overlap 12 natural protected areas; 
some of them are considered priority conservation areas such as the Pacaya Samiria 
National Reserve and the Reserved Zone Pucacuro in the Department of Loreto.  Oil 
concessions also overlap five out of the ten existing communal reserves (DAR, 2010; 
Calle & Brehaut, 2007).  As mentioned earlier, some areas inhabited by indigenous 
groups and denominated as “communal reserves” are also listed as protected areas 
managed by the central government.  The Protected Areas Act of 1997 defines communal 
reserves as areas for the conservation of wild flora and fauna for the benefit of the 
neighboring rural populations.  As mentioned, use and commercialization of resources by 
the local population is permitted according to management plans approved and 
supervised by the national authority (SERNANP, 2010).   Today oil and gas concessions 
overlap half of the existing communal reserves (Benavides, 2010a).28, 29   
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Spatial Overlap of Oil Concessions and Protected Areas 
 
                                                 
28 A separate category is the “territorial reserves,” or reservas territoriales, designated for the protection of 
indigenous people in voluntary isolation or in initial contact.  It is estimated that territorial reserves cover 
an area of 2,812,868 hectares of the Peruvian Amazon.  
 
29 Communal reserves cover an area of 2,166, 588 hectares of the total 13,599, 898 hectares of demarcated 
(not necessarily titled) indigenous territories in the country. 
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Scurrah, 2014 
 
 
The Indigenous Peoples in Blocks 1AB (192), 8 and 88 
 Ethnic groups30 of the Peruvian Amazon are very diverse; varieties include 
indigenous groups in voluntary isolation31, others in initial contact, and many also 
entirely integrated into the mainstream society.  The Amazon is also inhabited by a wide 
                                                 
30 Ethnicity is not a term that has fixed referents.  Ethnos refers to “nation: in Greek although it is 
understood as a discourse of cultural meaning, which in this case is spread over geographical space by 
virtue of the fact that social, kin and blood relations become concrete in spatialized form.  This is translated 
in the principle of territoriality through which this group of individuals claims primacy over the use of 
resources within a common territory (Wade 2006, Barclay 1980). 
 
31 Are native groups who do not have permanent social relations with the other members of nation’s 
society, or who after brief contact have opted to discontinue them (Ministry of Culture 2014).  These 
groups are small in number and include the Yora, Yaminahua, Amahuacas, Pisabo, Kugapakori, Nahua, 
Nanti, Murunahua, Mashco Piro, Isconahua and few others.  The term “initial contact” refers to a wide 
variety of situations depending on the nature of the social and economic relations in which they are 
involved (García Hierro and Barclay 2014). 
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variety of migrants and settlers (colonos) from all over the country.  The Peruvian 
Amazon comprises an area of 78,282,060 hectares (61%) of the national territory and is 
distributed in 11 departments (Loreto, Ucayali, San Martin, Cusco, Ayacucho, Junin, 
Pasco, Huanuco, Madre de Dios and Cajamarca) (IIAP, 2005).    
The 2007 census indicated that this area is inhabited by 3,675,292 people (13% of the 
national population is estimated at 28,220,764) of which 332,975 (9%) live in native 
communities that occupy approximately 27.1 % of the region (Benavides, 2010).   
Although it is difficult to make a simple classification of these native groups, officially 
there are approximately 53 ethnic groups from 12 linguistic families (a list of the ethnic 
groups is in Appendix E).    The colonization of the Peruvian Amazon since the 1800s 
has been deeply influenced by boom and bust cycles of natural resource exploitation.  
The exploitation of rubber in the late 1800s had a profound impact on the indigenous 
population, particularly in Putumayo where thousands were enslaved and died from 
diseases brought in by colonos and explorers.32    
The Achuar 
 The Achuar are one of four indigenous groups of the Jivaro33 linguistic family 
(Achuar, Shuar, Candoshi, Aguaruna, and Huambisa) and are probably the largest 
homogeneous culture of the Amazon basin (Descola, 1986).  Their territories comprise 
rainforests in the southwest of Ecuador and northwest of Peru.  In 2007, Peru’s Achuar 
                                                 
32 Abuses against the indigenous peoples and other social impacts are documented numerous publications 
and novels such as The Vortex of Jose Eustasio Rivera (1924); The River that God Forgot by Richard 
Collier (1968) Roger Casement’s Report (1904) that inspired Mario Vargas Llosa’s novel “The Dream of 
the Celt” (2010). 
 
33 Jivaro is also a term used in Puerto Rico to refer to mountain peasants or gente de montaña.  Different 
from the Jivaro of South America, the Jivaros of Puerto Rico are descendants of the Taino indigenous 
peoples and Spanish. 
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population was estimated at 11,000 and is a subgroup of  the Jivaro group,  which has a 
total of 79,871 members in the country.34  The Achuar live in the provinces of the Datem 
of Marañon and Alto Amazonas in Loreto; Bagua and Condorcanqui in Amazonas; San 
Ignacio in Cajamarca, Rioja in San Martin and Coronel Portillo in Ucayali (Figure 14). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Spatial Distribution of the Achuar Indigenous Peoples  
 
Ministry of Culture, 2016 
                                                 
34 The most numerous group of the Jivaro linguistic family is the Aguaruna (Awajún) with 55,366 people.  
The Huambisa population is estimated at 10,163, Candoshi-Murato 3,255. 
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The early records of the Amazonian Jivaros35 describe their first contact with Spanish 
Jesuit missionaries from the first encounters in the mid-1700s until the expulsion of this 
religious group from Peru in 1769.  Records from the mid-1880s detailing the arrival of 
foreigners in the Achuar territories describe the first exchange of guns and other goods 
with the indigenous peoples until the early 1900s.   Researchers such as Karsten (1935), 
Stirling (1938) and Harner (1984) published some of the earliest ethnographic 
information available about this ethnic group. More recent works by Descola (1986) and 
Uriarte (2007) note that the Achuar remained mostly isolated from Western society until 
the 1970s.  This group has been known as warriors for their head shrinking tradition and 
especially for their defensiveness against outside threats (Harner 1984).   Before the 
1970s, the Achuar of Peru occasionally traded mahogany (Cedrela sp.) and lupuna 
(Ceiba pentandra) with non- indigenous traders known as patrones (bosses) in exchange 
for manufactured goods such as guns, machetes, and hatches.  These exchanges were 
only possible through the rich fluvial system in their territory, especially along the 
Marañon River. 
 Descola (1986) argues that oil activities in the Achuar territory in the early 1970s 
could only have been possible after the indigenous peoples established contact with the 
protestant missionaries of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), who tried to 
evangelize and “pacify” them.  The SIL used a system similar to the old reducciones in 
which the missionaries managed to concentrate indigenous groups by encouraging the 
formation of small communities around the land strips surrounding the protestant 
organization.  The presence of missionaries in the area also weakened the cultural and 
                                                 
35 Jivaro is also a term used in Puerto Rico to refer to mountain peasants or gente de montaña. 
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economic influence of patrones in the area as the religious group brought new trading 
opportunities and social values.   Today, approximately half of the Achuar population 14 
years and older are independent workers.  Most of them are exclusively self-sufficient 
farmers, and only small groups (roughly 12.8%) are seasonal, part-time and/or temporary 
workers for the oil company (INEI, 2007).    
The Achuar are organized in at least five federations representing communities along the 
main rivers in their territories36.   Organizations such as FECONACO and FECONAT 
(from the Corrientes and Tigre rivers respectively) represent the Achuar in the oil 
concession 1AB (now 192).  These organizations and their activities are described in 
more detail in Chapter IV. 
 
The Cocama Cocamilla   
 The Cocama Cocamilla (Kukama Kukamiria) are members of the Tupí Guaraní 
linguistic family and live in the flooding areas of the low Ucayali, Tigre and Marañon 
rivers (Figure 15).  Their population is estimated at over 11,000 (INEI, 2007).   Their 
livelihood is influenced greatly by seasonal flooding in their territories.  They prepare 
well in advance to survive during the two to four months of the rainy season by storing 
corn and other agricultural products such as wood, meat, etc.; and plant crops in the river 
banks during the dry season. 
The federation ACODECOSPAT (Cocama Association for the Development and 
Conservation of San Pablo of Tipishca) coordinates closely with FECONACO and other 
indigenous federations in Loreto and Ucayali.  The organization defines its mission:  
                                                 
36 These include the National Achuar Federation of Peru (FENAP), FECONACO, FECONAT of the 
Corrientes and Tigre rivers respectively, ATI (Achuarti Irontramu), ORACH (Achuar Chayat 
Organization), and others. 
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“We make [the authorities] hear the voice of the Cocama Cocamilla, request the 
authorities to address problems caused by resource extraction that affect our 
communities in any claim they have against oil companies which have been 
contaminating and enriching themselves for over 40 years. We want to request 
that Pluspetrol stop contaminating our water so we can live healthy without lead, 
cadmium and mercury in our blood streams.”  
 
(Lopez Tejada, 2011). 
 
Figure 15. Spatial Distribution of the Cocama Cocamilla Indigenous Peoples 
 
Ministry of Culture, 2015 
 
 
Although the men of this native group are known for their fishing skills, they also 
hunt and gather to supplement their income and feed their families (Rivas, 2011).  The 
group also has had extensive commercial experience (trading tools, guns, etc. for lumber, 
fish and other forest products) with other indigenous people in the area since the 1800s 
and have been involved in commercial activities ever since.  In the 1970s these 
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communities received loans from the Agrarian Bank to support their agricultural 
production and worked temporarily in productive activities in the area (Ministry of 
Culture, 2015).    An interviewee mentioned that some groups along the major rivers 
(ribereños) are losing their native language and prefer to be identified as mestizos.   
 
The Kichwa  
 This ethnic group is located mainly in the margins of the Pastaza, Tigre, Marañon, 
and Huallaga rivers and their affluents in Loreto, although there is a group of Kichwas in 
Madre de Dios (Figure 16).  The Kichwa (estimated population 20,467 in 2007) are 
divided in four major groups distributed in three departments: The Napo and Tigre rivers 
of Loreto, Lamas in San Martin, and the Kichwa Santarrosinos in Madre de Dios.  
Despite their diverse origin and spatial distribution, the Kichwa share an identity as a 
single ethnic group (Ministry of Culture, 2015).   
Information about the origin of this indigenous group is scarce; however, there are 
reports that Jesuit and Dominican missionaries used the Quechua language from the 
Andes to evangelize indigenous peoples in the Amazon (AIDESEP, 2000).  It is believed 
that the Kichwa of Loreto formed from small groups of indigenous peoples in Ecuador 
and Peru such as the Canelos, Urarinas, Romaynas, Arabelas, Muratos and Achuar who 
may have migrated in the 1700-1800s to areas neighboring Dominican missions seeking 
refuge from forced labor.   
Figure 16.  Spatial Distribution of the Kichwa Indigenous Peoples 
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Ministry of Culture, 2015 
  
 
Dominicans could have contributed to the genesis of the Kichwa peoples by 
promoting the marriage between the Canelos, Achuar, and Kichwas peoples of the Napo 
River and imposing the Quechua language.   Lumber and oil extraction in the 1900s 
affected the social and economic structures of this group and catalyzed the formation of 
federations such as FEDIQUEP (Kichwa Federation of the Pastaza) and FECONAT 
(Federation of the Native Communities of the Tigre).  As other ethnic groups in the area, 
their livelihood depends on farming, fishing and hunting.  They grow yucca and bananas, 
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and raise chicken and pigs, which they sell to merchants who travel along the rivers and 
to Pluspetrol.   
 
The Matsigenka 
 The Matsigenka or Matsiguenga are members of the Arahuac linguistic family, a 
large group widely distributed in the tropics of the Americas (Santos-Granero & Barclay 
2004).  In Peru, the Matsigenka are located in the Urubamba, Camisea, Timpia, Manu, 
and Apurimac rivers in the Departments of Cusco and Madre de Dios (Figure 17).  Their 
population is estimated at 11,279 (INEI, 2007).   
The first records of the Matsigenka date from the late 1700s, when Franciscan 
missionaries arrived in Urubamba.  Some of the early references to this group use the 
denomination Campa (mostly used by the Franciscans but perceived by the indigenous as 
a derogatory name) in reference to both the Ashaninka and Matsigenka people.  The 
establishment of Dominican missions in the early 1990s contributed to the creation of 
more detailed records that are currently available in the Jose Pío Aza in Lima.  Rosengren 
(2004) notes that some segments of the Matsigenka people remain in voluntary isolation, 
such as the Nanti, which in Matsigenka mean “I am.” The Nanti have also been called 
Kugapakori, a derogatory term rejected by this group of people as it means “those who do 
as they want,” (Ibid.). 
 
Figure 17.  Spatial Location of the Matsigenka Indigenous Peoples 
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Ministry of Culture, 2015 
 
 As mentioned, records show that the Matsigenka people have had contact with 
Dominican, Franciscan and Jesuit missionaries since the 1700s.  Interviewees mentioned 
that this contact profoundly influenced the Matsigenka’s views about western societies, 
development and progress.   They agree that the Matsigenka are more “docile” than other 
ethnic groups and are more open to negotiations with oil companies compared to the 
Achuar (as explained in more detail in Chapter IV).   Another influential presence was 
the protestant missionaries of the Summer Linguistic Institute (SLI); this group arrived in 
1952 in the locality of Kompirushato, which is located in the Upper Urubamba, and 
expanded to the Lower Urubamba.  The presence of both groups of missionaries is 
greatly influential in the shaping of the Matsigenka’s societal values; a large group of 
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indigenous peoples from this group consciously seek what they perceive as “modern 
ways of life.”  As Rosengren (2004, p. 55) notes: 
“It is observed that the dominant positions that the missionaries have in the 
rainforest societies is frequently associated with the notion that whites have 
special powers (Santos Granero 1991).  For the Matsigenka, the material wealth 
and political power of white people is evidence of those powers.  The fact that 
white people have these powers does not mean for the Matsigenka that whites are 
better people but that they have superior technical capacities.  A myth of the 
Matsigenka explains the origin of white people’s experience and knowledge as 
coming from Chonkávari, the ‘inventor” god, who actually lives and shares their 
knowledge with them.” 
 
 As mentioned, interviewees also described the influence of Catholic and non-
Catholic missionaries on the Matsigenka’s perception of the discourses of modernity and 
development linked to resource extraction.  Several NGO and indigenous leaders 
mentioned that the Evangelical and Catholic missionaries in the area of the Camisea 
project have brought with them different views of development, rivalries and power 
dynamics.   Olson’s (2006) study of the influence of Catholic and non-Catholic churches 
in Cusco shows the influence of religion in the construction of development 
epistemologies and how people and their religious leaders think and act about modernity 
and development.   His comparative analysis of two cases in the highlands of Cusco 
demonstrates how religious organizations mediate development through the production of 
social values (886).  Jean Pierre Bastian (1998) examined this issue in his book La 
Mutación Religiosa de América Latina (The Religious Mutation of Latin America), 
where he explores the social and political implications of Protestantism among 
indigenous populations living in a subsistence economy in Latin America.    As Bastian 
noted, it is in the poor communities and villages of the “abandoned” where salvation 
movements emerge.  Olson (2006) and Bastian (1998) also point out that the dominance 
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of North American religious literature engenders particular sets of truths about 
development.    Olson’s study about the influence of Catholic and non-Catholic 
missionaries in Cusco’s Andes coincides with the answers given by people from 
Camisea.   The development agendas of the indigenous federations of Catholic and 
Protestant affiliations are different.  The indigenous federation CECONAMA (Central of 
Native Matsigenka Communities “José Santos Atahualpa”) has closer ties with 
Protestants of the SLI than COMARU (Matsigenka Council of the Urubamba River) 
which has a higher number of Catholic members.  Both organizations have been working 
for over 25 years with the native communities in block 88 and have different perspectives 
about the presence of oil companies in the area.  While both organizations are open to 
dialogue, COMARU has been vocal about their opposition to the expansion of the 
Camisea gas project in block 88.  However, CECONAMA has been more welcoming to 
the project as an opportunity to access material benefits, health care and educational 
opportunities, which is described in more detail in Chapter V.  It is possible that the 
presence of Catholic and Evangelicals influenced the way the indigenous peoples 
affiliated with CECONAMA and COMARU perceive development and modernity.  
Some studies agree with Max Weber’s (1930) arguments in The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism about the influence of Protestantism on economic development and 
the existence of a negative correlation between economic progress and Catholicism.   
Some interviewees corroborate the studies by Zalanga (2010) that link economic 
development with Protestantism, but assert that religion cannot be the only determinant 
of how people perceive development and modernity.  However, Grier (1997) and other 
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Weber critics such as Fanfani et al. (1984) contend that Protestantism is not the only 
determinant of growth. 
 
The Amazon Indigenous Movement 
There are four levels of Amazonian indigenous organizations: (a) native 
communities formed by groups of families living within a stretch of a river or its 
tributaries and which address specific needs related to their immediate environment; (b) 
federations organized by several native communities, mostly of the same ethnicity.  
Federations may include more than one ethnic group, but generally their members share 
the same ethnicity.  These organizations address social, economic and political issues 
affecting their members; (c) regional organizations are formed by groups of federations 
that could include different ethnic groups; and (d) national organizations that coordinate 
with their affiliates at the regional level or with federations.   In addition there are 
international organizations such as the Indigenous Coordinator of Indigenous 
Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA).37  
In the 1960s, a few indigenous leaders of the selva central (central jungle) started 
to organize in order to defend their territories from colonization, but it was not until the 
early 1970s when indigenous federations started to proliferate in the region (Dandler, 
1998; Santos Granero & Barclay, 2000).  The Native Communities Act of 1974 required 
indigenous peoples to organize and register as native communities. Due to this law, the 
Amazonian indigenous peoples were recognized as a legal entity for the first time and 
                                                 
37 COICA was created in 1984 in Lima during the 1st Congress of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon 
Basin.  Members:  AIDESEP – Peru, APA – Guyana; CIDOB – Bolivia; COIAB – Brazil; CONFENIAE – 
Ecuador; FOAG – French Guyana; OIS – Suriname; OPIAC – Colombia and the Regional Organization of 
Indigenous People of the Amazon (ORPIA). 
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had access to land titles.38  Moreover, this law declared native territories as inalienable 
and indivisible.  At that time, Catholic missionaries and officials of the national system of 
social mobilization (Sistema Nacional de Mobilización Social – SINAMOS), a public 
entity created during the leftist dictatorship of General Juan Velasco, were pivotal to 
inform and organize the rural native communities about the national legal system and the 
Native Communities’ Act.   Shortly after the law’s passage, the first registered 
organizations39 started to emerge in Loreto among the Naporuna and Shipibo-Conibo 
indigenous peoples.   
In 1979 the Amuesha, Awajun and Ashankinka of the Central Amazon (selva 
central) created the Coordinator of Native Communities of the Peruvian Amazon 
(Coordinadora de Comunidades Nativas de la Selva Peruana). The following year this 
organization changed into the Inter-Ethnic Association for the Development of the 
Peruvian Amazon –AIDESEP- (Dandler, 1998).  Today AIDESEP has nine regional 
branches and represents 64 Amazon indigenous federations and 1,809 communities 
(AIDESEP, 2015).  The organization’s mission is to: (1) achieve the recognition of 
indigenous ancestral territories in order to guarantee their existence; (2) exercise the right 
to live fully with respect to indigenous people’s spirituality and world view and to pursue 
social and human development; (3) implement the right to free determination as included 
in international treaties and declarations such as the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights, among others; (4) develop a system to manage the economy of the 
                                                 
38 Although legal amendments later established that indigenous community lands would only be granted in 
lands categorized for agriculture and livestock uses, excluding forest lands.  Native communities could only 
be granted permits to use forest lands but not land titles (Law Decrees: 22175, 1090). 
39 Organización de Desarrollo Shipibo (Organization for the development of the Shipibo people) and the 
Frente de Defensa de las Comunidades Nativas del Ucayali, a coalition of native communities of the 
Ucayali River basin. 
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indigenous communities in harmony with nature’s laws and principles of interdependence 
(Idem).    
In late 1980s AIDESEP went through an internal crisis that triggered the 
formation of CONAP, the Confederation of Amazon Nationalities of Peru.   AIDESEP 
and CONAP are parallel organizations with different objectives and discourses such as 
CONAP’s more conciliatory position with the government and private interests.  For 
more than 30 years, CONAP and AIDESEP have held different views about 
development, private investments and other strategic arenas (Benavides 2010).  While 
AIDESEP has expressed its opposition to resource extraction on more than one occasion, 
CONAP is openly in favor of these activities and has accompanied Perupetro’s officers 
around the world to show their support to oil activities in the Amazon (Bebbington, 
2008).   Since its early days to the present, AIDESEP’s priorities have been to achieve the 
demarcation and titling of their territories and to defend the collective land rights of its 
members.  As Bebbington (2008, p.57) noted, Andean and Amazonian indigenous groups 
differ substantially in their views about the land.  Some leaders interviewed stated that 
while Andeans prioritize dividing the land in parcels, the Amazonian indigenous peoples 
prefer to defend collective land rights based on a broader perspective as an ethnic group.    
Land titling has been a struggle for the Amazonian indigenous peoples, especially 
with the rise of resource extraction since the mid-1990s.  These groups are still struggling 
with complex and slow bureaucratic processes that are delaying recognition of their 
collective property rights (Richard Chase Smith, 2003).   A report of the Ombudsman’s 
Office from 2014 show that 1,271 of 1,469 recognized Amazonian communities have 
titles to their land and adds that some of the reasons why the number of titles granted to 
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native groups in Peru have dropped in the last years are the complex, disperse and 
contradictory regulations, lack of an official registry of titles and financial limitations.  
As a result, the way the federations have strategized and articulated their demands has 
evolved.  Today many of the federations have gained expertise networking nationally and 
internationally and demand the recognition of their citizen rights along ethnic lines, 
especially in the case of resource extraction, especially wood and hydrocarbons.   
Extraction has always been a concern for the indigenous organizations.  Fifty-
eight of the existing 64 oil concessions in the Amazon overlap titled native lands.  
Twenty concessions overlap 11 communal reserves, and 17 concessions are located in 
areas proposed for territorial reserves for the indigenous in voluntary isolation (Chirif 
2011).  According to articles 7 and 8 of the Hydrocarbon Law (Ley Orgánica de 
Hidrocarburos – No. 26221), the state owns underground hydrocarbons and designates 
Perupetro as the agency in charge of signing contracts for oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation.   The law also allows Perupetro to transfer property rights of the extracted 
hydrocarbons to companies (national or international) through license contracts. 
Despite their differences, indigenous organizations articulate their demand for 
equality as citizens and the recognition of their collective rights in similar fashion. The 
rise of oil concessions overlapping indigenous territories of the Amazon in the last 
decade has not only prompted indigenous peoples to organize but also to network and 
coordinate at the national and international levels.  This process and the indigenous 
peoples’ protests successfully pressured the government to create state agencies such as 
the Ministry of Culture, the INDEPA, the Congress’ Commission of Indigenous and 
African Peruvian Affairs and to enact the Prior Consultation Law (described more in 
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detail in Chapter V).    Then, as Yashar (2005, p.5) notes, the question is to assess 
whether the creation of these institutions and legal frameworks are (un)intentionally 
shaping political identities and ethnic cleavages in a postliberal democracy.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  Number of Native Communities Titled in Peru (1975-2014) 
 
Source:  AIDESEP 2014 
  
The context described in this chapter gives an overview of the complex economic, 
political, environmental, social and cultural dimensions that influence hydrocarbon 
activities in the Peruvian Amazon.   The contradictory and overlapping interests of 
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conservation agencies, international oil corporations, and national economic plans; the 
need to recognize and protect indigenous peoples’ rights; and a growing national demand 
for fossil fuels define when, how and under what conditions decisions are made.  
Chapters IV, V and VI present a fine-grained analysis of the formal and informal ways 
that variously scaled state and non-state actors and institutions negotiate heterogeneous 
interests and how these interactions define how hydrocarbon extraction takes place. 
Figure 19.  Indigenous Territories Titled in the Peruvian Amazon 
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Lu, 2012.   Data sources: Perupetro 2015; IBC 2013. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
EXTRACTING OIL AND JUSTICE:  BLOCKS 1AB (192) AND 8: 2006-2015 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the trajectory of the indigenous mobilizations in blocks 1AB 
(since August 2015 renamed block 192) and 8, and the role of the state, private, and 
public institutions in the governance of hydrocarbon in Peru. The analysis focuses on the 
events immediately after the signing of the Dorissa Accord between Achuar federation 
FECONACO, Pluspetrol Norte S.A., and national and regional authorities on October 22, 
2006 (described in more detail later) until the implementation of the prior consultation 
process to transfer block 1AB (192) to a new company in August 2015.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
The period 2006 -2015 is particularly important as it involved even more neoliberal 
reforms than the ones described in Chapter II.  As mentioned, today Peru imports meet 
roughly 67% of the national demand for crude oil (200 MBD), supplying the growing 
needs of the transportation and the industrial sectors. The fluctuations of the international 
oil market in recent years and the country’s dependence on imported oil and mining 
resources as a source of state revenues prompted the Peruvian government to reform the 
decision-making process for resource extraction.  Key to those reforms was the 
enactment of sets of laws, known as “paquetazos” (big bundles), that involved legal and 
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institutional changes to speed-up the decision-making procedures, especially in the 
environmental impact assessment process, lessening the requirements and reducing the 
duties of environmental enforcement agencies.  The Congress and Presidents García and 
Humala (in office in 2006-2011) approved four paquetazos to remove obstacles for 
extractive industries, such as property rights of landowners, and to reduce the 
requirements for environmental licensing.  As Castree (2008, p.142) argues, deregulation 
or the yielding of state interference in environmental issues is usually accompanied by 
regulation, that is, the arrangement of state policies and norms to facilitate resource use. 
To understand the implications of these measures, this chapter explores the decision-
making processes affecting blocks 1AB (192) and 8, Peru’s main onshore oil production 
areas.40  To analyze this case, this chapter is divided into three sections:  (a) a background 
on the Dorissa Accord, (b) decision-making processes of social-environmental issues 
after the Dorissa Accord, the declaration of environmental emergency of the Pastaza, 
Tigre, Corrientes and Marañon basins and the finalization of the contract with Pluspetrol 
Norte, and (c) the prior consultation process for the transference of block 1AB to a new 
company.  These events are still under debate as I write this dissertation; therefore, it is 
comprised of an analysis of events only through the expiration of the contract with 
Pluspetrol Norte S.A. on August 29, 2015, and the official declaration of end of the end 
of the consultation process with the indigenous communities of block 1AB/192.   
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Average production in 2014 of blocks 1AB 12,972 BPD and 8 9,559 BPD were equivalent to 
7.5 and 5.53 percent of national production (69,304 BPD) respectively (Perúpetro, 2014).   
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Figure 20. Blocks 1AB and 8 
 
 
Pluspetrol, 2015 
 
My trips to Peru in 2014 and 2015 coincided with several ongoing strategic 
meetings and negotiations between the indigenous federations of the Corrientes, Pastaza, 
Tigre and Marañon river basins and national authorities.  I had the privilege to attend 
these meetings which addressed the concerns of the indigenous federations in the four 
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basins and included negotiations of the Prior Consultation Law to transfer the operations 
of block 1AB from Pluspetrol Norte S.A. to a new company (Pacific Stratus Energy from 
Canada) in the now renamed block 192.   
 
Table 6.  Summary of Blocks 1AB (192) and 8 
Block 1AB (2010) 
Contract signed 
(Pluspetrol Norte S.A.) 
Expiration date 
 
Contract signed 
(Pacific Stratus 
Energy)  
 
Expiration date 
June 2000 
 
August 29, 2015 
 
August 30, 2015 
 
 
  September 8, 2017 
Area  
1AB 
 
192 
 
1,119 square miles (2,900 square kilometers) 
 
(197,181 square miles 512,347 square kilometers) 
Production 18.7 thousand barrels/day 
Target market Domestic 
 
Block 8 (2010) 
Contract signed 
(Pluspetrol Norte S.A.) 
 
Expiration date 
May 20, 1994  
August 2024 
Area 1,119 square miles (2,900 square kilometers) 
Production 11.7 thousand barrels/day 
Target market Domestic 
Source: Perupetro, 2016 
 
 
Events that Led to the Achuar Protests in 2006 and the Dorissa Accord 
 87 
 
Oil exploitation in blocks 1AB and 8 started in the early 1970s when the 
Occidental Petroleum Company (Oxy) began operations until the concession 1AB and 8 
were transferred to Pluspetrol (Argentina) in 2000 and 1994 respectively.  For roughly 30 
years, Oxy disposed toxic effluents and wastes (including produced water and drilling 
muds) without treatment into rivers and forests.  At that time, the state company 
Petroperu operated block 8 until Pluspetrol took over the concession in 1996.   These 
practices continued unabated until very recently.   It is estimated that for 30 years Oxy 
discharged 850,000 barrels a day of produced waters (toxic brine at high temperature).   
Produced waters have high levels of chlorides, barium and lead and were discharged to 
the Corrientes, Pastaza, Tigre and Marañon rivers and their tributaries.   Pluspetrol 
continued production with the same practices in both concessions, causing severe 
contamination that affected the health of the Achuar, Kichwa, Urarina and Cocama 
Cocamilla (described later).  This remote area is only accessible by air, and its local 
population depends on the rivers and forests to survive. 
After more than ten years of unfruitful requests to the central government in 
Lima, in 1996 the Achuar, Kichwa, Urarina and Cocama Cocamilla organizations of the 
Corrientes, Tigre and Marañon basins in blocks 1AB and 8 (represented by their 
federations FECONACO, FEDIQUEP (Corrientes), FECONAT (Tigre) and 
ACODECOSPAT (Marañon) started to take strong actions and voice their demands.   
 
Picture 1.  Discharge of Produced Water in Block 1AB (2006) 
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DIGESA, 2006 
 
Picture 2.  Crude Dump Outlet in Block 1AB (José Olaya) 
 
FECONACO, 2006 
 
 
 
Picture 3.  Block 1AB, José Olaya. 
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FECONACO (n.d) 
 
 
During that year, leaders of these federations addressed a letter to President Alberto 
Fujimori requesting that the Ombudsman’s Office, the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), the Congress, and the national Amazon indigenous organization AIDESEP assess 
the contamination affecting the native communities of the Tigre, Corrientes and Pastaza 
rivers. They wanted the government to declare these zones in a state of environmental 
emergency and to take actions in order to prevent future contamination.  The Commission 
of Ecology and the Amazon of the Congress answered this request by asking the Ministry 
of Energy and Mines to respond. The ministry replied that there was no evidence of 
contamination and that Pluspetro’s quarterly environmental monitoring reports showed 
that effluent discharge levels complied with the legal standards (Chirif, 2010; Lu 2009; 
La Torre, 1998).   The indigenous federations decided to continue requesting government 
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agencies (ministries of environment, energy and mines, health, the Ombudsman’s Office) 
to take immediate action and to build alliances with national and international 
organizations and research institutions (such as the University of Barcelona and E-Tech) 
to conduct independent environmental assessments (water, soil and sediment) quality.  
Peru’s legal and economic reforms of the 1990s also included the creation of national 
environmental laws, guidelines, standards and authorities.   One of them was OSINERG, 
a governmental authority in charge of supervising the energy sector (called 
OSINERGMIN since 2007 after it assumed responsibilities for the overview of mining 
activities).  This new agency began to generate the “official” and technical or “scientific” 
data independent from the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) about the 
environmental performance of oil (and mining) companies that civil society groups, 
including indigenous federations, needed to “demonstrate” public health risks caused by 
resource extraction.   
In 2004 OSINERG questioned MEM’s conflicts of interests as the authority in 
charge of both promoting hydrocarbon projects and enforcing social-environmental 
standards.  OSINERG reported that MEM’s single source of information used to 
supervise pollution prevention measures of ongoing oil operations was the quarterly 
environmental reports submitted by the companies.  Until the mid-2000s, MEM stated 
publicly on several occasions that Pluspetrol “did not show any evidence that there is a 
violation of the environmental standards” (Lu, 2009).  Nevertheless, the initial inspection 
report by OSINERG in July 2003 of block 1AB revealed that “the points used [by 
Pluspetrol] to monitor the discharge of toxic produced water were different from the 
actual discharge points [and] that the actual effluent discharge points showed levels of 
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chloride, barium and temperature significantly exceeding legal standards.”  The report 
also indicated that there was evidence of environmental contamination of and damages to 
the rainforest ecosystem in the areas between the actual points of discharge and the 
receiving water sources.    
The indigenous federations in block 1AB pressured the government to take action 
and conduct health assessments in the area.  In 2004 I had the chance to participate in a 
meeting between the Achuar federation of the Corrientes (FECONACO), the Vice-
Minister of Health and representatives of Pluspetrol in which the Achuar leaders 
demanded a health assessment of the area.  In July of the following year, the Ministry of 
Health reported41  that the levels of lead in some river water samples exceeded legal 
standards42 but that their laboratories did “not have the capacity to analyze the 
hydrocarbons levels” (DIGESA, 2005, p.3).   
When Pluspetrol started operations in the area in 2000, the company agreed to follow 
a seven-year Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Adecuación y Manejo Ambiental 
- PAMA43) for blocks 1AB and 8, which was approved by the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines in 1994 and 1996 respectively.  Despite the approval of these plans, in 2006, the 
ministries of production and health reported that the concentration of heavy metals in fish 
and human samples in the concession 1AB exceeded the WHO guidelines (Chirif, 2010).  
For Pluspetrol, addressing the current and previous contamination from OXY’s 
                                                 
41 Report N°1429-2005-DEEPA-APRHI/DIGESA 
 
42 Samples of the creeks Jibarito and Huayuri showed levels of lead equivalent to 2.27 times the limit 
established in for CategoryVI of Peru’s Water Act (Ley General de Aguas).  The report show the values of 
lead found in some samples were close to the legal limit.   
43 After the enactment of new national environmental laws and specific provisions for the energy and 
mining activities in the early1990s, the Ministry of Energy and Mines established that activities starting 
prior 1993 should present seven-year environmental management plans (PAMA) to progressively comply 
with the Rule of Environmental Protection for Hydrocarbon Activities (Supreme Decree N°046-93-EM). 
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operations was more challenging than expected; therefore, in 2006 the company 
requested the MEM’s approval of an updated version of the environmental management 
plan called Plan Ambiental Complementario –PAC)44.  The MEM approved the request 
and also extended Pluspetrol’s deadline to be in full compliance of environmental laws 
by two and three additional years for blocks 1AB and 8 respectively (PUINAMUDT, 
2012a).  With this evidence in hand, FECONACO asked for the intervention of the 
authorities to address the persistent contamination in the area and the health impacts on 
the population.  The indigenous federation FECONACO organized events and meetings 
between 2004 and 2006 without tangible results (Orta, 2008; Lu, 2009).  Given these 
circumstances, on October10, 2006, FECONACO decided to take over the oil wells of 
block 1AB and 8 and demanded the government take immediate action to stop the 
contamination and address the health problems of the indigenous population, which had 
been affected by decades of exposure to toxic pollutants from the oil activities in the area.  
For approximately ten days, indigenous peoples took over Pluspetrol’s facilities, an 
action which halted approximately 50% of national oil production (115 oil wells 
producing at that time roughly 30 thousand barrels a day) and transportation (roads and 
fluvial) along the Corrientes area.   
The Achuar’s protest received the support of the national Amazon indigenous 
organization AIDESEP and of international environmental and indigenous rights groups.  
The protest caught the attention of the national authorities and of Pluspetrol, which up to 
that day underestimated the capacity of the local people to organize; indeed, the 
occupation has been considered a landmark in the emergence of the Amazonian 
indigenous movement (Scurrah, 2010).  Roberto Ramallo, at that time General Manager 
                                                 
44 Supreme Decree N° 028-2003-EM 
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of Pluspetrol Norte S.A., stated that the Achuar’s mobilization was inspired by the 
protests in La Oroya and other mining sites in the mid-1990s, where residents had also 
been by decades of contamination. On October 12th, a delegation from the government 
was already in block 1AB negotiating with FECONACO leaders.   
Negotiations were tense and under time pressure because the interruption of oil 
production meant a loss of $3 million USD each day.   As in similar circumstances, the 
government targeted individual leaders and their advisors with accusations of being 
subversive and opposed to development.  On October 16, 2007, Pluspetrol Norte S.A. 
filed a legal petition in the Prosecutor’s Office of Nauta, Department of Loreto, against 
Lily La Torre, a lawyer from the NGO Racimos de Ungurahui supporting FECONACO 
and ten Achuar leaders of FECONACO for the crimes of coercion, violation of private 
property and threatening the security of the oil company45.  The timely intervention of the 
Ombudsman impeded the increase of tensions.  A October 18, 2006, letter from the Prime 
Minister Jorge del Castillo addressed to the Ombudsman46, Beatriz Merino, stated that 
“[the attitude of] some indigenous leaders was instigated by the presence of Lily La 
Torre, representative of the NGO Racimos de Ungurahui, who persuaded the leaders to 
maintain a hostile attitude …” (emphasis added).  Merino replied by saying she had a 
different interpretation of the issue and that the Ombudsman’s Office had “denounced the 
serious environmental and health situation affecting a large percentage of the Achuar 
population caused by the discharge of produced water and accumulated environmental 
contamination [and that] the Ombudsman had publicly and officially requested the 
                                                 
45 Public Ministry, Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Nauta, Loreto.  Petition received on October 16 2006 
at 13:09 hrs. 
 
46 Presidency of the Council of Ministers of Peru, Letter N°492-2006-PCM 
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intervention of the Executive Branch, without any immediate response from the 
Ministries of Energy and Mines or Health.”47    
After four days of tense negotiations FECONACO, the ministries of Energy and 
Mines and of Health, the Regional Government of Loreto, Pluspetrol Norte S.A. and a 
representative of Ombudsman’s Office signed the Dorissa Accord on October 22, 2006.  
The agreement was preceded by disagreements between the parties about the validity of 
an agreement made on October 13 which the indigenous peoples claimed was signed 
without their consent.  The Achuar argued that this first agreement omitted important 
petitions of the native population, that it was not translated into Achuar, and that they 
were pressured to sign it using only a flashlight to read it (La Torre, 2014 personal 
communication).   
The Dorissa Accord is considered a landmark agreement as it achieved the 
unprecedented commitment of the government and an oil company to comply with a plan 
to prevent contamination and to take concrete measures to minimize the health and 
environmental impacts of resource extraction in Peru.  The agreement included a number 
of measures requested by the Achuar of the Corrientes River such as:  
1. The reinjection of all the produced water discharged in the Corrientes River basin 
and in block 8 by December 31, 2007. 
2. A comprehensive health plan conducted by the regional health authority 
(DIRESA) in coordination with the Ministry of Health (MINSA).  This plan 
called Integrated Health Plan of the Corrientes (PEPISCO) for $11.9 million USD 
and the construction of a hospital both funded by Pluspetrol.     
                                                 
47 Letter N° 0215-2006-DP 
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3. Health insurance for the indigenous communities managed by the Ministry of 
Health and the Regional Government of Loreto. 
4. A $4 million USD development plan coordinated between FECONACO (based 
on the native populations’ priorities and understanding of development) funded by 
the Regional Government of Loreto. 
5. Temporary food supply provided by the National Food Support Program 
(PRONAA) and the municipalities.    
6. Clean drinking water supplied by Pluspetrol to all the communities. 
7. Monitoring of water contamination and the cleanup and remediation of the 
environmental damages in blocks 1AB and 8. 
In the midst of the crisis that led to this agreement, the president in office Alan García 
passed the Urgency Decree N° 028-2006, which states that the communities living in oil 
exploitation areas expressed their dissatisfaction with the way they had been deprived of 
the economic benefits generated from the exploitation of natural resources: “impeding in 
an extraordinary and unpredictable manner the normal development of oil exploitation, 
with a clear negative impact in the country” (7th paragraph).  The decree explicitly states 
that “in order to mitigate the mentioned negative economic impact, it is necessary that the 
state take action take urgent economic measures […] and require local and regional 
governments to invest 5% of the economic benefits from the exploitation of the 
aforementioned resources in social projects [known as canon petrolero]” (6th paragraph).   
The decree was amended in 2009 and 2010 to require that the funds must benefit the 
communities in the areas where oil and gas exploitation activities are undertaken.48  
                                                 
48 Urgency Decree N°079-2009, amended by the Urgency Decree N°026-2010 
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These benefits include social and health services, education, electricity, potable water and 
sanitation.   
FECONACO noted that the media distorted the events, portraying the blockade as 
violent, and announced the agreement as a victory. “We have achieved 98% of our 
demands, and won recognition of our rights,” said Andres Sandi, President of 
FECONACO, the representative organization of the Achuar people of the Corrientes 
River. “This victory is the result of the strength of our people who came together and 
pressed hard and would not abandon our demands,” he stated (Lu, 2009).   
 
 
After the Dorissa Accord  
 
 
The Dorissa Accord was followed by another agreement signed in May 2011 
between the Kichwa indigenous peoples of the Pastaza River basin and the Regional 
Government of Loreto (the Pastaza Accord).  This regional authority made a commitment 
to persuade Pluspetrol to draft a work plan to address the local people’s environmental 
concerns and comply with the agreements.  According to FECONAT, the regional 
government failed to attend the follow-up meetings scheduled in July and September 
2011 and in March and May of 2012.  In June 2012 a public statement of the indigenous 
federation of the Tigre River (FECONAT) said that “the regional government of Loreto 
lied to us for a year.  We are tired.” (La República, June 1, 2012).   In an effort to find 
ways to improve this situation, FECONAT announced that the indigenous peoples would 
march and demand the government appoint a special commission to address the persistent 
delays.  This announcement was effective in mobilizing the Ministers of Environment 
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and Health, representatives of the Ministry of Culture, Energy and Mines, and other 
national and local authorities to fly to the remote locality of Alianza Topal, district of 
Andoas, province of Datem del Marañon in Loreto, to negotiate another agreement with 
FEDIQUEP’S President, Aurelio Chino.   The agreement, called the Accord of Topal, 
was signed on June 16, 2012, when the government committed that within ten to fifteen 
days it would create a “high level” commission49 to (a) conduct a health campaign in 
Alianza Topal and address the health concerns of the people living in the Corrientes, 
Tigre, Pastaza and Marañon river basins; and (b) draft a comprehensive health plan for 
the aforementioned communities.   
 
To date, the enforcement of these agreements has been incomplete and has required 
the native leaders to build strategic alliances with NGOs in Lima and abroad in order to 
coordinate with the national and regional authorities.  However, one of the most tangible 
achievements of these agreements and negotiations between the indigenous federations 
and the national government is the enforcement of the reinjection of all the produced 
water according to a legal provision50 created in 2006, the same year the Dorissa Accord 
prevented the discharge of thousands of barrels of untreated toxic effluents in the 
freshwater sources not only in block 1AB but at the national level as well.  However, 
none of these agreements include provisions requesting an investigation to determine 
legal responsibility for current or past environmental or social impacts.   
In 2013 the Justice and Human Rights Commission of the Peruvian Congress reported 
that the local and regional government of Loreto failed to enforce the Dorissa Accord and 
                                                 
49 Created in October 3 2006 with the participation of the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Supreme Decree 
346-2006-PCM 
50 Supreme Decree No. 015-2006-EM Rule for the Environmental Protection in Oil Activities, published in 
March 3, 2006 and replaced by Supreme Decree No. 039-2014-EM of November 2, 2014. 
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that the indigenous communities in areas of oil exploitation “have not seen the benefits of 
the necessary services and infrastructure to improve their life standards according to their 
cosmology.”  Additionally, the Comptroller General of the Republic (the independent 
audit institution in charge of controlling the public administration) reported in 2010 that 
the regional government of Loreto failed to distribute the funds received from the oil 
revenue “canon” due to the lack of capacity of the authority to conduct social projects in 
the communities in areas dedicated to oil exploitation.  The report also stated that in 2008 
only 21% of the benefits received by the regional government from oil activities were 
actually spent; by 2010 more than one million USD of these funds remained unused, and 
this situation persisted in the following years (Congress of Peru, Commission of Justice 
and Human Rights 2013).   
 
Table 7.  Status of Completion of the Dorissa Accord in 2010 
Commitments Deadline Responsible party Status of 
Completion 
Reinjection of 100% produced 
water block 1AB in the 
Corrientes River    
12/31/2007 Pluspetrol Complete 
Reinjection of 100% produced 
water block 8 in the Corrientes 
River    
7/31/2008 Complete 
Ministry of Energy and Mines 
will review and approve the 
environmental management 
plans of blocks 1AB and 8 
12/31/2007 for 
block 1AB and 
7/31/2008 for 
block 8 
MINEM Complete 
Enactment of a comprehensive 
health plan 
 MINSA (regional), 
GOREL, 
FECONACO 
In process 
Election of four representatives 
of the communities participating 
in the enforcement of the 
agreement through a Special 
Plan 
11/26/2006 FECONACO and 
the communities 
 
A board will be appointed to 
participate in all the stages of 
Board of the 
Special Project 
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the project, including the 
management of funds 
The Health Plan will be funded 
by Pluspetrol for 10 years, 
managed by the regional health 
authority 
Pluspetrol Complete 
 
 
 
 
Commitments Deadline Responsible party Status of 
Completion 
Start date of the health plan December 2006 MINSA (regional) Ongoing 
Support resources for the health 
plan 
 MINSA 
Construction of a rural hospital 
in Villa Trompeteros 
Start date 
January 2007 
GOREL, funding 
by Pluspetrol 
Annual  audit of the health plan  Pluspetrol Complete 
Health insurance for native 
communities 
2007 GOREL, MINSA 
(regional) 
Complete 
Implementation of small scale 
health services in the Corrientes 
River basin 
2007 GOREL, MINSA 
(national and 
regional) 
Ongoing 
Census of the communities in 
the Corrientes River basin  
1/2007  
GOREL, 
FECONACO 
Complete 
 
Draft an Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP) for the 
communities of the Corrientes 
River basin according to the 
priorities defined by the 
indigenous peoples  
 Approved 
Allocation of US$ 3.5 million 
dollars for the IDP 
 GOREL Partially 
accomplished 
The native communities of the 
Corrientes will define a 
schedule to enforce the IDP and 
will overview the distribution of 
funds 
 Pluspetrol, 
GOREL, MINSA 
(national and 
regional), 
FECONACO 
The indigenous 
communities are 
coordinating with the 
authorities its 
enforcement 
Pluspetrol will pay the lease of 
a boat for the native 
communities of the Corrientes, 
to transport agricultural goods 
to the markets of Iquitos 
 Pluspetrol in 
coordination with 
the GOREL 
GOREL, pending 
National Food Program 
(PRONAA) will provide food 
for one year 
 PRONAA, 
Pluspetrol 
Partial 
Food during a year to the 
indigenous people of the 
Corrientes River, while they 
recover their production 
capacity. 
1/2007 Ongoing 
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Commitments Deadline Responsible party Status of 
Completion 
Health authorities will monitor 
the quality of drinking and 
freshwater sources quarterly 
 MINSA (regional) 
and FECONACO 
Follow up 
Train community members to 
conduct native leaders to 
monitor the impacts of oil 
activities 
 
Starting in 
January 2007 
Pluspetrol 
Petroperu will contract a 
company to remediate the areas 
affected by oil pollution in 
block 8 
Arcadis Ongoing 
 
Overview of the enforcement of 
the Dorissa Accord 
Ombudsman and 
FECONACO 
Ongoing 
Source: Scurrah, 2011 
 
 
In compliance with the Dorissa Accord, in March 2007 Pluspetrol made its first 
payment of roughly $156,200 USD out of a total of $12 million USD to the regional 
health authority to conduct a ten-year health plan managed by the Ministry of Health.  
The plan, called PEPISCO (Special Project for the Integrated Health Management Plan of 
the Corrientes River Basin), had no precedent.  The plan has four components: cover the 
costs of providing a health center, pay salaries of health staff, conduct environmental and 
nutritional assessments and provide onsite health services. For the regional health 
authority (DIRESA), it was the first time it had sufficient funds to work on a river basin 
(Chirif 2010).  The project was not able to launch during the first three years due to 
bureaucratic requirements, limited management capacity and institutional weaknesses 
(Scurrah 2011).  In the interim, the MEM approved the environmental rule for 
hydrocarbon activities in March 200651 after receiving complaints from the indigenous 
                                                 
51 Supreme Decree No. 015-2006-EM 
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populations on blocks 1AB, eight reports from eight other Amazon indigenous peoples 
such as the Shipibo indigenous affected by oil spills in block 31-B in Ucayali52, alerts of 
impacts on the Kugapakori Nahua Nanti Reserve in block 8853 in Cusco, and anticipating 
the Achuar’s protest in the Corrientes (Caffrey 2002, Weemaels 2005).   
 
Health and Environmental Effects of Oil Activities in Blocks 1AB and 8 
 The environmental and health effects of oil activities in blocks 1AB and 8 have 
been documented extensively in numerous government reports since the mid-1980s to 
date.  In 1984 the at that time environmental authority, the National Office for Natural 
Resource Assessment (ONERN) reported that produced water and waste effluents from 
campsites and oil facilities were discharged to the rivers without treatment.  ONERN 
reported that freshwater sources in blocks 1AB and 8 had chloride concentrations of 
34,000 ppm, consequently this agency declared this area “one of the most the most 
critically polluted environmental regions in the country” (La Torre, 1998).   Since then, 
several community members stated that oil activities in the area entailed the discharge of 
drilling muds, produced water and other toxic substances in these concessions.  In 1988 
Roberto Pezo, Research Director of the Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon 
reported that lead and chloride levels of concentrations in the Tigre River in block 1AB 
exceeded 100 times the guideline values (Chirif, 2010, La Torre 1998). 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
52 Operated by Maple Energy since 1994. 
 
53 The Camisea Gas Project is operated by a consortium: Pluspetrol (leader), Hunt Oi, SK Corporation, 
Sonatrach, and Graña y Montero since 2000. 
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 In 1998, an assessment by the Ministry of Energy and Mines (as part of a World 
Bank’s Technical Assistance Program) reported high levels of oil, grease and mercury in 
all the Corrientes, Pastaza and Tigre rivers receiving the discharges of produced water 
from oil operations in the mentioned area.  Results showed high levels of heavy metals, 
chlorides and hydrocarbons as high as 43 595.5 mg/kg.  The mentioned ministry found 34 
hectares with high levels of barium (a common component of oil drilling fluids) and 
estimated that 52.2 hectares were highly contaminated from the dump due to the 
unprotected dumping of drilling muds (Orta et al. 2007, p. 5).    In 2004 OSINERG 
reported high levels of contamination in soil samples due to old and new oil spills in 
rivers and soils around oil production facilities.  This report also stated that Pluspetrol 
Norte S.A. did an inefficient separation of hydrocarbons and grease prior to discharging 
the produced water on the soil or freshwater sources (ibid. p.6).  This report also stated 
that Pluspetrol’s sampling points (for its environmental monitoring reports for block 1AB 
and 8) were not located in the points of discharge of effluents. 
 Since the 1990s the Achuar indigenous federation of the Corrientes River 
requested many times the intervention of the national authorities to assess the potential 
effects of oil activities in the local people’s health.  In July 2006, Peru’s national 
environmental health authority (DIGESA) reported the results of water consumed by 
local communities in blocks 1AB and 8.  This report found that 66.2% of 74 blood 
samples from people under 18 years of age exceeded the (at that time) reference value of 
10µg/dL of lead.  This report also revealed chloride levels in six out of 24 fresh water 
samples exceeded 20 to 73 times the U.S. EPA freshwater criteria of 230 mg/L for the 
protection of aquatic life.   In addition, of five sediment samples, all showed 
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concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons between 370 and 1560 mg/kg and lead 
levels of 18-24 mg/kg (Orta et al., 2007, p. 6).    This situation is especially serious since 
the indigenous communities in blocks 1AB and 8 depend of the local freshwater sources 
for drinking water and food supply, particularly fish.   
 In 2012 the indigenous federations of the Corrientes, Pastaza, Tigre and Marañon 
rivers achieved the creation of a commission coordinated by the Ministry of the 
Environment and included authorities from the health, water, hydrocarbon sectors, as 
well as agencies in charge of enforcing environmental laws (OSINERGMIN, OEFA). 
This group assessed the social and environmental impacts of oil activities in blocks 1AB 
and 8.  This group found high levels of pollutants that motivated the declaration of 
environmental and sanitary emergency in all the mentioned basins in 2012-2013. 
  
 
The Declaration of Environmental Emergency of the Corrientes, Pastaza, Tigre and 
Marañon River Basins 
 Management of the environmental contamination in blocks 1AB and 8 was more 
complex than Pluspetrol had expected in 2000 when it acquired the concessions.  OXY’s 
environmental management plans of these concessions required a review and update; 
therefore, the MEM granted extensions to the plans in 2003 and 2005.54 The new 
environmental management plan or PAC mentioned earlier included the installation of 
new reinjection wells in the Jibarito and Dorissa oil production sites, closing old oil wells 
and remediating polluted areas in both oil concessions (PUINAMUDT, 2012b).  
 
Figure 21.  Location of the Tigre, Corrientes, Pastaza and Marañon River Basins 
                                                 
54 Supreme Decree No. 028-2003-EM 
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In 2006, Pluspetrol requested the MEM grant another extension and make 
amendments to these plans in order to reinject the produced water using a different 
process.  The following year the ministry approved another plan to reinject the produced 
water with an investment of $165.4 million USD and a new deadline of December 2008 
(Ibid.).  Although the reinjection of produced water meant a significant improvement, 
there were 25 spills in block 1AB, releasing 473,845 barrels of crude oil and 80.5 barrels 
of produced water to the environment. These spills were due to the corrosion of old 
pipelines and the overflow of storage tanks between 2009 and 2012. During the same 
period, there were 30 spills in block 8, releasing 2,722.33 barrels of oil and 566 barrels of 
drilling fluids (PUINAMUDT, 2012a). 
 
In June 2014 the Cocama Cocamilla organized a three-day march named “Fuerza 
del Pueblo” where roughly 800 members walked 100 kilometers from Nauta to Iquitos, 
where they camped for ten days.  They demanded the Regional Government of Loreto to 
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take actions about the oil contamination in the Marañon River.  The Regional 
Government agreed to support the creation of a community monitoring group and provide 
them technical training.  With the support of NGOs in Lima, ACODECOSPAT was able 
to use drones to take images of the oil contamination of their lands and to provide them to 
a Congress representative, who presented them at the Indigenous People’s Summit in 
New York in September 2014.   Indigenous communities are using not only small drones 
to film the contamination in the Amazon, they are also using social media such as 
Facebook to network with national and international groups and raise awareness about 
the impacts of oil activities in their territories (El Comercio, September 26, 2014).  Pío 
Quinto Pérez, inhabitant of the native community San José de Saramuro said “this gizmo 
is very important for me, we need to be better prepared and know more about this” (Este 
aparatito es para mi importante, que nos preparen más y podamos conocer esto a fondo).   
Alfonso López Tejada, leader of ACODECOSPAT added: “[drones] allows us to 
overview the territory in a more efficient and practical manner, using technological 
advances” (son un mecanismo para poder vigilar el territorio de forma mas eficiente, 
práctica y con los avance técnicos).    The use of new technologies to gather evidence of 
pollution and social media are some of the new estrategias de lucha (strategies of 
struggle) that the indigenous peoples living in remote areas of the Peruvian Amazon have 
begun to use more extensively.  Videos and pictures of polluted rivers and forests are 
powerful ways to show the local people’s concerns in a clear and eloquent manner and 
gain national and international support.   Social media provides a space to network and 
build linkages with other indigenous, human rights and environmental organizations and 
bring local concerns to a global audience.   Using Escobar’s terms, the use of social 
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media by the indigenous federations affected by oil pollution in the Amazon is a way to 
“transnationalize” their struggles for environmental justice.   
In 2006 the environmental authority OEFA fined Pluspetrol for failing to comply 
with the environmental remediation commitments in the PAC.  This first fine was 
imposed due to 12 irregularities detected during inspections of block 1AB and 8 between 
2012 and 2014.  During that period, OEFA fined Pluspetrol at least nine times for not 
complying with its environmental commitments and environmental standards55.  Eleven 
out of the 22 inspections OEFA conducted between 2012 and 2013 were responses to oil 
spills.  Official reports supporting the fines describe the following violations: soil 
pollution, drilling without the required environmental license, discharging hazardous 
wastes in open spaces, exceeding the area granted for drilling oil wells, failing to comply 
with environmental rehabilitation plans, failing to install pressure valves to control oil 
spills, and polluting and draining the Shanshococha pond, etc.  Although owing payments 
for over $5 million USD, Pluspetrol refused to pay these fines and brought six of them to 
court (Congress of Peru, 2013; OEFA, 2014).   Since its creation in 2008, OEFA (agency 
of the Ministry of the Environment) has been in charge of overseeing, controlling and 
imposing penalties on environmental polluters, especially mining, hydrocarbon, energy, 
fisheries and manufacture industries.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, OEFA could be 
considered an example of those institutions that Tanaka (2008) argues are created within 
the state with certain (and now more limited) degree of independence from longstanding 
economic and political interests.    
                                                 
55 These penalties are documented in the Directorate Resolutions No. 056-2012-OEFA/DFSAI, 209-12-
OEFA/DFSAI, 124-2012-OEFA/DFSAI, 176-2013-OEFA/DFSAI, 203-2013-OEFA/DFSAI and 
OSINERGMIN’s General Management Resolution No. 009880. 
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One of the most notorious examples of Pluspetrol’s attempt to challenge the 
environmental authority was the legal action filed against OEFA’s report No. 411-2014-
OEFA/DS-HID in which the authority stated that the environmental management of 
block 1AB is fragmented; “it does not have an integrated environmental management 
instrument comprising all the elements that form part of the oil concession in an 
integrated manner.”  Additionally, the report found serious violations such as inadequate 
management of solid wastes, industrial and domestic effluents, fuels, lubricants and 
chemical substances, and lack of maintenance of equipment and facilities, among others.  
Pluspetrol filed a legal action requesting the government to dismiss the report and its 
content.  On December 16, 2014, Judge Alexander Rioja Bermúdez of the Civil Court of 
Maynas, Loreto, decided in favor of Pluspetrol and ordered “to suspend the juridical 
efficacy” of OEFA’s report.  OEFA appealed this decision and obtained a favorable court 
decision on April 10, 2015, which denied Pluspetrol’s request to dismiss OEFA’s report 
No. 411-2014.   OEFA was surprised by the decision of Judge Rioja Bermúdez; Sandra 
Rossi, OEFA’s officer, attributed the judge’s decision to a misinterpretation or lack of 
knowledge of the law (Luna 2015). 
From 2012 to 2013, the Ministry of the Environment (MINAM) facilitated an 
unprecedented process to assess the environmental and health impacts of an oil activities 
in blocks 1AB and 8 and coordinated with the Agency of Environmental Assessment and 
Control (OEFA), the National Water Authority (ANA) and the General Directorate of 
Environmental Health (DIGESA) in these efforts.  These agencies conducted six soil, 
water, and sediment samplings in the Corrientes, Pastaza, Tigre and Marañon basins 
between October 2012 and September 2013.   MINAM’s intervention responded to the 
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pressure of the indigenous federations.   In 2014 MINAM presented the results to leaders 
of the four basins in separate events in Iquitos.  I observed one of those meetings in 2014 
and had the chance to observe the presentation of water and soil sediment analyses to 
approximately 40 indigenous leaders from blocks 1AB and 8.  The assessment confirmed 
the existence of 92 locations in block 1AB critically contaminated with oil, heavy metals, 
barium, chloride and other pollutants from Pluspetrol’s operations.  These agencies also 
reported that Pluspetrol failed to adequately manage its industrial wastes and that the 
levels of contamination in the four basins exceeded the environmental standards.   
These results prompted the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to declare the 
four basins (Corrientes, Pastaza, Tigre and Marañon) in a state of environmental 
emergency.56  Additional water quality assessments showed that the water used for 
domestic use and consumption in the four basins is unfit for human consumption so the 
area was also declared in sanitary emergency (Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 
2015).  The Ministry of the Environment coordinated new action plans for the affected 
area that included the installation of emergency health services, provision of drinking 
water, assessments and rehabilitation of the areas affected by effluent discharges and/or 
oil spills, an environmental monitoring system and surveillance of priority areas 
(Ministry of the Environment 2015).    
Between 2010 and 2014, OEFA fined Pluspetrol 12 times for failing to comply 
with the PAC and environmental regulations for over $13 million USD (S/. 39’400,592 
New Soles).  Between March and May 2012, OEFA fined Pluspetrol only three times57  
                                                 
56  Pastaza:  March 25 2013; Corrientes: September 7 2013; Tigre: December 2 2013 and Marañon May 21 
2014. 
57 Directorate Resolutions No. 056-2012-OEFA/DFSAI; 098-2012-OEFA/DFSAI; 100-2012-
OEFA/DFSAI 
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for approximately $ 2.4 million USD (S/. 7’491,405 New Soles) for not complying with 
the PACs and exceeding environmental standards in blocks 1AB and 8 (PUINAMUDT 
2012).   The PAC specifically required the company to remediate 27 polluted sites in 
blocks 1AB and 8, especially in the Corrientes, Capirona, Pavayacu, Valencia and 
Yanayacu oil production sites by March 17, 2009 (Diario Gestión, June 11, 2015).  The 
company refused to pay the fine , challenged six of them in court and filed a 
precautionary measure against an OEFA report that declared that the company was liable 
for the contamination and was required to remediate 92 polluted sites in block 1AB 
(Luna, N. La República February 15, 2015).58  In June 2015, a Court in Lima59 decided 
against Pluspetrol’s request to invalidate one of the fines for $9 million USD 
(S/.29’773,900 New Soles).   
 
The tense negotiations between the indigenous leaders of FECONACO, 
FEDIQUEP and ACODECOSPAT and the national government continued.  Another 
unprecedented accomplishment took place in May 2015, when the Peruvian government 
(without the participation of Pluspetrol) allocated $12 million USD for an Environmental 
Remediation and Contingency Fund (Ley No. 30321).  The creation of this fund was one 
of the conditions that the indigenous federations had requested in the agreement signed 
with the government in March 2015 in preparation for the consultation process to transfer 
block 1AB (renamed 192) to a new operator after Pluspetrol’s contract expired in August 
2015 (explained in the following section).  Currently the fund is managed jointly between 
                                                 
58 http://larepublica.pe/15-02-2015/las-heridas-de-pluspetrol-en-la-amazonia-peruana 
 
59 Fifth Special Administrative Litigation Court of Lima (Quinto Juzgado Especializado en lo Contencioso 
Administrativo de Lima)  
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the federations and the government.  As I write this dissertation, the funds are allocated to 
health assessments in the areas affected by more than 30 years of oil activities in the 
Corrientes, Pastaza, Tigre and Marañon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Termination of the Contract of Block 1AB and the Consultation Process with the 
Indigenous Peoples in the New Block 192 
 
The Prior Consultation Law  
 Pluspetrol’s contract to operate block 1AB expired on August 29, 2015, and the 
new concession was renamed block 192.  The continuation of oil activities in this 
concession would entail the enforcement of the Prior Consultation Law (Law No. 29785) 
based on the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16960 (Ley de Consulta 
                                                 
60 Created in 1993 and ratified by Peru in February 2, 1995 according to the Legislative Resolution No. 
26253.  The ILO Convention 169 grants social and economic rights to indigenous populations such as self-
determination. 
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Previa a los Pueblos Originarios Reconocido en el Convenio 169 de la Organización 
Internacional del Trabajo – OIT) and enacted in September 2011.61  This was the first 
time that a consultation process was be undertaken in an Amazonian community for an 
oil project.  As the name of the law states, the act was inspired by the principles of 
international law protecting indigenous rights, specifically ILO Convention 169.  James 
Anaya, former U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, argued that 
the states have a duty to consult with indigenous peoples and that this principle is the 
cornerstone of the ILO Convention 169 (2013).  Peru ratified the convention in 1993. but 
it did not go into force until two years later.  The process of “consultation” differs from 
the right to obtain free, prior and informed “consent” mentioned in Article 19 of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) of 2007.   
Anaya emphasizes that “ILO and UNDRIP stated that the purpose of a consultation with 
indigenous peoples is to obtain their consent or agreement.”  Peru’s Prior Consultation 
Law was created after heated discussions between indigenous federations, congressional 
representatives and authorities in context of a growing number of social-environmental 
conflicts. The debates included discussions among Amazon indigenous federations that 
resulted in a “Pact of Unity” (Pacto de Unidad) through which they decided to participate 
in drafting the Prior Consultation Law.62   As mentioned, this law aimed to reduce or 
control the increasing number of conflicts and the escalation of violent protests against 
mining and oil projects in Peru.  These protests were an expression of a deep mistrust and 
frustration among some groups of the civil society, particularly in relation to the 
                                                 
61 Law No. 29785. 
62 The Pact of Unity includes AIDESEP, the Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining 
(CONACAMI), the National Organization of Andean and Amazonian Women of Peru (ONAMIAP), the 
National Agrarian Confederation (CAN), and the Peruvian Confederation of Peasants (CCP). 
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enforcement of the right to participate in decision-making processes of resource 
extraction and infrastructure projects. In 2011, the Ombudsman’s Office reported that 
124 (57.1%) of a total of 217 conflicts were related to local environmental concerns and 
that half of these gave rise to violent protests (Ombudsman’s Office, 2011).    
 
The Prior Consultation Law was also a pillar of Ollanta Humala’s presidential 
campaign in 2010.  The (at that time left-wing) presidential candidate Humala promised 
during his campaign that his government would respect the people’s voice (respetará la 
voz del pueblo) and that all projects would be subject to consultation.  At the peak of his 
presidential campaign, Humala said to the communities of Puno and Cusco: “If the 
communities disagree about projects that would affect environmental and human 
development, then these projects will be not be undertaken.  The people’s voice is the 
most important thing.  If I am elected president it will be because of their votes and we 
will defend their voices” (América Economía, July 7 2011).     
The Congress drafted the Prior Consultation Law in June 2010, but president 
García refused to support it, arguing that he “could not allow indigenous communities to 
stop the economic growth that would benefit all the Peruvians” (BBC, 2010).  President 
García sent a letter to the Congress explaining his objections: (a) the lack of the 
government’s power to act as final arbiter in cases  when parties in consultation processes 
do not reach an agreement, (b) the possibility that the consultation may open the path to 
more laws and administrative measures that may paralyze the country, and (c) the need to 
make sure that the communities consulted would not have the right to challenge the 
government’s decision pertaining the participation of indigenous people.  According to 
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Gamboa (2012a, p.15), President García’s objections to the law were influenced by 
corporate interests, which were communicated through recommendations channeled to 
the Ministry of Energy and Mines.  On July 13, 2010, a congressional commission63 
bowed to the government’s pressure and edited the draft of prior consultation law, 
specifically eliminating the right of indigenous peoples to veto.    
 
Some controversial issues of the law referred to defining who is indigenous, 
whether or not the law is legally binding and who has the final word in a consultation 
process.  One of the issues most debated is the application of the law to the indigenous 
and peasant campesinos in the Andes who are living in the area of influence of large scale 
metal mining projects.  As explained in Chapter II, the Peasant Communities Law (Ley de 
Comunidades Campesinas) of the 1970s adopted the term peasant (campesino) for the 
groups of indigenous ancestry in the Andes and “native communities” comunidades 
nativas to denote the Amazon indigenous peoples (Yashar, 2005).  Thus, the Prior 
Consultation Law has an unresolved problem defining who is indigenous, especially in 
the Andes where most of the large scale metal mining projects take place.  Roque 
Benavides, CEO of the Peruvian Buenaventura gold mining company, stated “there are 
no indigenous communities in the Peruvian Andes” (La Mula, September 22, 2013).   
Benavides also said, “the Andean communities were created by Velasco” (Remy, 2013). 
During an interview about the consultation law, Carlos Gálvez, Financial Manager of 
Buenaventura, stated “…simply anyone who puts on a feather on the head feels they have 
the right to be consulted…” (SPDA, 2014).   Therefore, the enforcement of the 
                                                 
63 Peruvian Congress Commission of Andean, Amazon and African-Peruvian Peoples, Environment and 
Ecology. 
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consultation law has significantly more resistance in the mining sector operating in the 
Andes than among oil and gas companies in the Amazon.  Consequently, the complexity 
of the Prior Consultation Law exceeds the legal sphere as it strives to regulate the rights 
of groups of people whose identity is questioned, especially in the Andes where most of 
the large scale metal mining takes place.   To solve this controversy, the Ministry of 
Culture created a database of indigenous peoples and generated methodological 
guidelines for the application of the consultation law.  The creation of the database did 
not solve the problem.  Controversies about the indigenous identity of the community of 
San Juan de Cañaris in the Department of Lambayeque and their right to consultation 
caused profound divisions within the Ministry of Culture. 
Even though the indigenous identity of the Amazonian communities of 
hydrocarbon concessions in this research was not questioned, there are still other critical 
questions to address.  One of these issues is the fact that the results of a consultation 
process are not binding.   In the words of Luis Peirano, former Minister of Culture: “The 
[Prior Consultation] law is mandatory, but the results of a consultation are not binding” 
(Silva Santisteban, 2014).  This is because Article 15 of the Prior Consultation Law 
establishes that the state has the final decision and that this decision should be based on: 
“…an assessment of the different points of view, suggestions and 
recommendations provided by the indigenous people during the dialogue process 
as well as an analysis of the consequences of the adoption of a particular legal 
measure on the collective rights and the international agreements ratified by the 
Peruvian government.”  
 
    This article also states that the agreements reached as a result of the consultation 
process are mandatory for the parties and that the state will make a decision in cases 
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when no agreement is reached between the parties.  Article 5 of the consultation law rule 
adds: 
(e) “The aforementioned consultations do not imply the right to veto, but the need 
that the indigenous population be heard and to formulate proposals, trying through 
all possible and legitimate means to reach to consent with regards to the measures 
matter of the consultation.” 
 
    As mentioned, ILO Convention 169 addresses the concept of consent as a desired 
outcome of a consultation process, but it does not mention the right of veto.  Eva Linde 
(2009) analyzed this issue in detail and argues that a number of countries rejected the 
concept of consent in a consultation process “as it effectively constituted a veto right for 
a certain group which was incompatible with democracy and equality, insisting that sub-
soil resources were in state ownership” (40). This issue is reaffirmed by state officials; in 
a recent interview Ivan Lanegra, Vice-Minister of Cross-Cultural Affairs declared that the 
“right of consultation does not imply the right to veto” (newspaper El Comercio, 
November 18, 2011).  This objection is similar to the points raised by several countries 
during the drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP).  The US mission to the U.N. clearly sets out this objection: 
“The text also could be misread to confer upon a sub-national group a power of 
veto over the laws of a democratic legislature by requiring indigenous peoples, 
free, prior and informed consent [of indigenous peoples] before passage of any 
law that "may" affect them (e.g., Article 19). We strongly support the full 
participation of indigenous peoples in democratic decision-making processes but 
cannot accept the notion of a subnational group having a "veto" power over the 
legislative process.” 
 
(Linde, E. 2009, p. 51)   
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Canada also voiced its concerns about granting the right to veto to a group of 
people, arguing that such document would be unworkable in a western democracy under 
a constitutional government.   Therefore, it seems unlikely that the rule of the prior 
consultation law in Peru would include the right to veto. It is clear then that the state will 
continue being the ultimate authority in decision-making and in control of the 
consultation process.  The issue of consultation and consent in Peru’s Prior Consultation 
Law is still debated.  Important legal cases such as the Kichwa Indigenous People of 
Sarayacu v Ecuador in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights affirmed the right of 
indigenous peoples to free and informed consent.  In this case the Ecuadorian government 
was accused of signing a contract in 1996 with a foreign company to initiate oil 
exploration in the titled lands of Kichwa indigenous community of Pastaza without their 
approval.  In June 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights acknowledged the 
indigenous population’s rights to consultation before projects begin.    
As mentioned, the Prior Consultation Law continued to be debated during the 
2010 presidential campaign of Ollanta Humala when he expressed solidarity with peasant 
communities affected by gold mines in the Andes.  Humala started his government in the 
midst of an unprecedented number of conflicts related to resource extraction projects 
(Table 8).64   
 
Table 8.  Number of Social Conflicts in Peru (2005-2010) 
Year Number of New Conflicts  Percentage 
2010 95 26% 
2009 121 33% 
2008 90 25% 
                                                 
64 www.defensoria.gob.pe/temas.php?des=3 
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2007 29 8% 
2006 9 2% 
2005 18 5% 
Total 362 100% 
Conflicts in populations of 
extreme poverty 
318 88% 
 
Source: Ombudsman’s Office (2010c) 
  
The number of conflicts reflects problems with key areas creating asymmetries of 
power between the state, corporations and community actors.  These emerge from the 
issuance of permits for oil projects on lands with pre-existing rights such as indigenous 
territories or protected areas and the access and management of information during 
decision-making processes.  Most of the interviewed indigenous leaders expressed 
concerns about the effects of oil/gas projects on their quality of life, subsistence, social 
group, geographic space (territorial rights), culture and health, but these are addressed 
superficially in the environmental impact assessment studies.  These conflicts have been 
exacerbated by a feeling of a lack reconocimiento or “acknowledgement,” which were 
frustrations expressed by the indigenous leaders interviewed.  This reconocimiento refers 
not only to an acknowledgement of the existence of the native communities and 
recognition of their concerns but also to a request to be treated with equality and justice.   
 
First Consultation Processes of Oil and Gas Projects in the Peruvian Amazon 
 
The first consultation processes with indigenous communities in oil project in the 
Peruvian Amazon took place in 2013 and 2014 blocks 169 and 195 in Ucayali and 
Huanuco.  These first consultations were useful to build trust between representatives of 
the government (Perupetro) and the local indigenous populations.  By mid-2015, there 
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were five successful consultation processes concluded (blocks 169, 195 and 164 in 
Loreto; 175 and 189 in Ucayali) with 11 indigenous groups involving 20 organizations.  
The groups that participated are the Ashaninka, Asheninka, Yaminahua, Amahuaca, 
Shipibo-Konibo, Kakataibo, Cocama-Cocamilla, Capahanua, Yine and Matsigenka.   
The objective of the consultation is to reach to an agreement about the  
delimitation, name and size of the oil concession included in oil and gas contracts 
(exploration and exploitation) and that the Ministry of Energy and Mines would approve 
as a Supreme Decree.65  As mentioned, the law establishes that Perupetro is the agency in 
charge of consultation processes of oil and gas projects and coordinates with the Ministry 
of Culture during the planning and implementation of the consultation process.   
An initial assessment of the first consultations from the Ministry of Culture found 
that there are still some challenges to address, such as building cross-cultural 
communication skills of the government staff, inform the local people about the purpose, 
scope and legalities of the consultation process.  The implementation of the consultation 
also poses logistic problems to reach the communities in remote places of the Amazon.  
In addition, negotiations between the government and indigenous representatives result in 
specific commitments and agreements that require follow-up. 
During these processes both the government and the indigenous communities 
learn from each other's views about the project in question.  The first five prior 
consultation processes undertaken from 2013 to June 2015 resulted in agreements 
between the government and the indigenous groups involved.                                                                                                                                                 
 
The Prior Consultation Process of Block 192 (former 1AB) 
                                                 
65 According to the Ministry of Energy and Mines Order No. 350-2012-MEM/DM 
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In early 2013, Perupetro met the indigenous leaders of FECONACO, FEDIQUEP, 
ACODECOSPAT and FECONAT, the main three indigenous federations representing 
the Achuar, Kichwa, Cocama Cocamilla and Urarina communities in block 1AB (192).   
Pluspetrol’s contract was due to expire on August 29, 2015, while Perupetro at that time 
was preparing to start an international bid process to select the company that would 
continue operations in the area for the next years.  The government was also interested in 
coordinating with the native leaders what would be the consultation process with Amazon 
indigenous communities of the concession producing for an oil project. The indigenous 
leaders replied that they would accept a consultation process but set conditions to the 
government; they asked for: (a) remediation of the existing contamination; (b) a 
comprehensive assessment of the social and environmental conditions; (c) a government 
commitment to provide clean water and sanitation services; (d) titles for the native 
communities; and  (e)  the declaration of a state of environmental emergency of the river 
basins affected by oil pollution (described earlier); and (f) a fair compensation for the 
existing and future environmental damages.    
 
A group of congressional representatives addressed these requests and visited the 
Kichwa communities of the Pastaza River in March 2013.  They reported that the 
indigenous peoples’ claims were just and requested the Congress to declare an 
environmental emergency in the Pastaza later that month.  The declaration of emergency 
entailed the creation of a plan with a schedule involving OEFA, OSINERGMIN and 
DIGESA to conduct more assessments in the affected area.  The indigenous federations 
 120 
 
insisted that their conditions were non-negotiable to their continuing participation in the 
consultation process. In response, the government created a coordination group (mesa de 
desarrollo) to negotiate and manage these requests.  The indigenous organizations 
involved in the negotiation had already created a coalition with the support of national 
and international non-indigenous people who provided advice and represented them in 
meetings with the authorities.  The coalition, called PUINAMUDT (Amazon Indigenous 
Peoples United in Defense of their Territories) is based in Lima but was equipped with a 
highly mobile staff and was able to network, build strategic alliances, and serve as a 
crucial liaison between the national authorities and the indigenous leaders from the 
remote communities of block 1AB (192). 
What was clear was that negotiations of the prior consultation process depended 
on the success of parallel discussions demanding the enforcement of territorial, 
environmental, and social rights not formally established as a requisite in the Prior 
Consultation Law. Therefore, the consultation process faced several unanticipated 
complex problems:  (a) addressing indigenous federations’ claims that remained 
unresolved for decades; (b) coordinating and articulating efforts between several 
ministries and government authorities (representatives of the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers, the regional government of Loreto, OEFA, Perupetro, the Ombudsman’s 
Office, and ministries of environment, housing, culture and energy and mines) with 
different interests and agendas; and (c) negotiating the interests of people from different 
cultures, cosmologies, languages, values, and interests.    
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Despite the complications of these preliminary negotiations, they resulted in a 
landmark agreement between the indigenous federations and the government signed on 
March 10 2015, accepting the native communities’ conditions described earlier.  
However, while the native federations expected the government to honor these 
commitments, some representatives of the oil sector had expressed previously a different 
perspective of whether the prior consultation law would allow indigenous groups to make 
definitive decisions about oil/gas projects in the Amazon.  Luis Ortigas Cuneo, at that 
time President of Perupetro, stated: 
“That is not possible. It's not for them to decide the destiny of Peru. What we have 
to do is tell them what's going to happen, how it's going to happen, and reach an 
agreement. This is not a question asking them 'yes' or 'no.' Prior consultation is not 
consent because, imagine it; it'd be like having one country inside another. It's so 
they're well-informed and know what's planned.” 
(The Guardian, May 14 2013)  
Furthermore, President Ollanta Humala declared:  
“We have enacted a [Prior Consultation] law because there are vulnerable 
communities, but the problem is to define which ones are native communities and 
which one are not. With so much informality today, everyone wants to be 
consulted because it gives [people] power to negotiate.”  
 
 (Servindi, April 29 2013).    
 
There were also difficulties within the indigenous federations.  The indigenous 
peoples of the Tigre River and members of FECONAT decided to negotiate separately, 
which meant that there were going to be parallel consultation processes, one with 
FECONAT and another one with the other federations within block 1AB (192) of the 
Corrientes, Pastaza and Marañon rivers (FECONACO, FEDIQUEP, and 
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ACODECOSPAT).  Perupetro handed the coordination of the meetings to the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines, which decided to schedule separate meetings with the two groups of 
federations in July 2015.  Meanwhile the companies Perenco (France), Pluspetrol 
(Argentina) and Pacific Stratus (Canada) communicated their interest in block 192 to 
Perupetro.   
In a parallel process, ACODECOSPAT, FEDIQUEP and FECONACO held 
meetings and consultations with their affiliated communities, agreeing on 27 points on 
July 5, 2015.  These federations also requested the creation of an endowment fund of one 
billion soles (equivalent to $310 USD million) for development projects. In the 
meantime, the communities of Pastaza, represented by FEDIQUEP, faced a problem 
when a handful of Kichwa indigenous peoples of Capahuari decided to create an NGO 
named ORIAP (Interethnic Organization of the Upper Pastaza).  ORIAP was not created 
through an open decision-making process with the communities, but it claimed the right 
to participate in the consultation process. According to President of FECONACO Carlos 
Sandi, ORIAP was created at the last minute by the state with “the purpose to legitimize 
the consultation” (Servindi, 2015). The Vice-Ministry of Culture and Perupetro 
acknowledged ORIAP in record time despite the lack of legitimate representation for the 
communities and invited its members to participate in the consultation process. The 
division of the communities of block 192 affected the consultation process since there 
were two groups of indigenous federations: one group was formed by FECONAT and 
ORIAP, and the other FECONACO, FEDIQUEP and ACODECOSPAT.  These two 
groups had very different agendas and claimed equal right to negotiate with the 
government.  The conciliatory attitude of FECONAT and the ORIAP is different from the 
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other organizations, who firmly request the government’s commitment to enforce the 
agreements previously negotiated as a condition of the consultation process.  Divisions 
between (and within) indigenous organizations during negotiation processes with other 
parties are not unusual.   
Other cases in Latin America which evidence divisions within organizations such 
as the Indigenous Confederation of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB) and the National Council of 
Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu66- CONAMAQ were attributed to the direct intervention 
of the Bolivian government in efforts to destabilize indigenous organizations opposed to 
Evo Morales’ interests (EJU, n/d).  This division and the lack of response from the 
government to the 27 conditions of the indigenous federations resulted in a delay of the 
consultation meetings scheduled in July 2015 in Iquitos.   
Given these circumstances, the government had to undertake parallel negotiations 
with both groups of indigenous representatives and postponed the talks until mid-August 
(only two weeks prior to the expiration of Pluspetrol’s contract on August 29).  
Meanwhile, the chair of Perupetro, Luis Ortega, resigned and was replaced by Rafael 
Zoeger, a former employee of Pacific Stratus Energy, a Canadian oil company that later 
expressed their interest in operating in block 192.  In the interim, the bid process for 
block 192 failed, as no company expressed interest after Pluspetrol, Repsol and Perenco 
withdrew from it.   
                                                 
66 The Qullasuyu or Collasuyo refer to the southernmost region or Suyo of the Inca Empire.  This empire 
was known as the Tawantinsuyo (tawa means four in Quechua) alluding to the four suyos or regions.  
Cusco, capital of the Inca Empire was located at the center of the four suyos: Chinchaysuyo (north), 
Antisuyo (east), Contisuyo (west) and Collasuyo (south).  During the Inca period (1438-mid-1500), groups 
of families sharing cultural and linguistic backgrounds or ayllus, were considered political-administrative 
units.  The marka was a political, social and economic territory between the ayllu (small unit) and the suyo 
(major unit).   
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The government was then forced to act on a plan “B” and negotiate directly with 
one or more oil companies such as Omega (a junior oil company from Colombia) and 
explore the possibility of a two-year contract with the Canadian company Pacific Stratus 
Energy to solve the problem temporarily.  On August 14, 2015, the MEM met with all the 
four indigenous federations offering 0.75% of the production value (roughly $300 
thousand USD annually for each one of the four basins) as a counteroffer to the $310 
USD million proposed jointly by FECONACO and allies.  During this meeting, the 
government did not have a clear plan to address the 27 points negotiated earlier (that 
were still pending as a condition to continue with the consultation process) and gave the 
federations two hours to assess the offer and give a final answer.  The pressure to make a 
decision in such a short time was contrary to the “appropriate procedures” that 
governments must follow to enforce ILO Convention 169, which international funders 
such as the World Bank advocated for (IFC, 2007).  FECONAT and ORIAP accepted the 
MEM conditions and signed the agreement while FECONACO and allies, refusing to 
sign, requested 2% instead of the 0.75% offered by the government.  The government 
abruptly declared that the prior consultation timeframe had ended and announced their 
decision to sign a two-year contract with the company Pacific Stratus to operate block 
192 (Supreme Decree No. 027-2015-EM).    
Even though the native federation of the Tigre basin and the NGO of the upper 
Pastaza signed the agreement, leaders of FECONACO and FEDIQUEP said that these 
groups lacked legitimate representation of the vast majority of the communities in block 
192.  FECONACO and FEDIQUEP represent the people of 11 out of the 13 production 
locations (known as “baterías”) inside block 192; thus, the contract between the 
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government and Pacific Stratus does not have the necessary “social license” (licencia 
social) or communities’ agreements to operate67.   
The decision sparked enraged reactions from the Regional Government of Loreto 
(GOREL), FECONACO and FEDIQUEP. GOREL and some leaders of the Tigre River 
basin supported a 48-hour regional strike in Loreto on September 2 and 3, 2015. The 
strike was organized by the Patriotic Front of Loreto, a regionalist non-indigenous group 
demanding that the state-owned oil company Petroperu should operate block 192. They 
wished to cancel the contract with Pacific Stratus and assign the oil concession to the 
state-owned company Petroperu. The proposal generated even more divisions, especially 
within the government where 15 members of the Congress presented a motion supporting 
the Patriotic Front of Loreto’s request while the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the 
Prime Minister argued that Petroperu lacked the capacity and financial resources to 
manage the oil production in the concession. As mentioned earlier, the state-owned oil 
company Petroperu does not produce oil or gas; instead, it is dedicated to crude oil 
refining.  For Humberto Campodónico, former President of Petroperu, the state company 
should have assumed control of the operations in block 192 and blames the Ministry of 
Economy for the failure to do so: “[the Ministry of Economy]’s real goal is another: to 
prevent Petropero from exploiting oil, and to advance and strengthen itself.”  
Campodónico argues that Ministry of Economy does not want [Petroperu] to “look good” 
to the state (Campodónico, 2015). 
                                                 
67 The concept of licencia social or social license emerged in the mid-1990s when a growing number of conflicts 
started to affect the reputation of mining companies. The term was used in discussions between representatives of 
mining companies and the World Bank in 1997 and was soon adopted as a standard term for the social acceptance, or 
local communities’ agreement of an activity, project or initiative (Escobar Banda, 2015).  The social license is not 
unique in this case, as Owen and Kemp (2013) argue, and it emerged as a response of extractive industries to 
opposition and a mechanism to ensure the industries’ “survival”.   
 126 
 
FEDIQUEP and FECONACO announced that they were not opposed or against 
Pacific Stata or Petroperu. They submitted a petition to President Humala to continue the 
negotiations and solve the pending issues, while FECONAT and ORIAP supported the 
Regional Front of Loreto’s strikes and proceeded to take over some oil facilities in block 
192/1AB.  As the regional strikes and social unrest threatened the political stability and 
the continuity of oil production in the area, the Congress in Lima reversed its decision 
and voted overwhelmingly in favor of assigning the oil concession to Petroperu.  As of 
mid-September 2015, the issue was still a matter of heated debate and social unrest and 
the solution remains in discussion.  Some communities are claiming that issues such as 
territorial, cultural, and social rights as well as environmental contamination and its 
impacts on health and life quality of the indigenous communities in the oil concession are 
currently not part of the political discussion and need to be resolved. 
The right to a prior, free and informed consultation and consent has been a 
longtime demand of the indigenous peoples not only in the Peruvian Amazon but also 
around the world. James Anaya, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, declared in May 2010 that Peru’s Prior Consent Act based 
on ILO Convention 169 “could set an important precedent of a good practice for other 
countries in the region and the world” (Anaya, 2010).   Yet, Peru’s “new” consultation 
law is not the first and only provision regulating public participation in decision-making 
processes of resource extraction.  In the midst of the rise of social-environmental 
conflicts linked to extractive industries, the Ministry of Energy and Mines approved the 
Guidelines and the Rule of Citizen Participation in Hydrocarbon Activities with 
procedures to conduct workshops and hearings with civil society groups living in oil and 
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gas concessions.68 However, public participation can only take place in a short window of 
time (45 days)69 during the EIA process, in which the viability of a project is not 
questioned.   Moreover, some politicians and representatives of the guild of oil and 
mining companies see the Prior Consultation Law as an obstacle to investment “larger 
than the surcharges imposed on the companies’ revenues” (La República, October 30, 
2011).    
 
The Multiple Faces of the State  
 The consultation process of block 192 unveils multiple dimensions of the state in 
the governance of resource extraction.   As mentioned, O’Donnell (2010) defines the 
state as a set of apparatuses and bureaucratic institutions; a legal system with variable 
binding and sanctioning capacities; a benchmark of collective identity; and a barrier that 
distinguishes between the state and other states.  In Peru as in other countries in Latin 
America, the role and performance of the state has shifted following the dominant 
interests of a particular era (oligarchy until the 1940s, populism until the late 1980s, and 
neoliberalism onwards). Although it could be assumed that the state functions in a 
particular way according to these interests, a closer analysis in cases such blocks 1AB 
(192) and 8 show that the interactions between the civil society and the state in the last 
two decades has resulted in the creation of new institutions (such as OEFA, the Ministry 
of the Environment, OSINERGMIN and the regional governments) with a certain degree 
of autonomy within the state.  Some new legal provisions such as the Prior Consultation 
                                                 
68 Ministry of Energy and Mines Resolution No. 571-2008 and Supreme Decree No. 012-2008 
 
69 A timeframe questioned as too short for communities in remote areas to access, review and formulate 
observations to lengthy environmental studies. 
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Law also seem to counterbalance the dominant political and economic interests.  
However, these institutions and laws could end up legitimizing state decisions based on 
economic interests, particularly in projects dealing with key economic activities such as 
the expansion of resource extraction frontier in remote areas.  However, today it is almost 
impossible to think about conducting these activities without some level of 
“participation” of social groups that have been traditionally marginalized and categorized 
as “subordinate.” Carlos Herrera Descalzi, former Minister of Energy and Mines, said 
that “the Prior Consultation Law will be decisive to assure the development and will 
legitimize large projects that otherwise will be paralyzed” (interview in El Comercio, 
October 25, 2011).  In that interview, Herrera Descalzi was clear about the government’s 
views regarding the consultation; however, he emphasized that the population may 
express their opinion but could not veto a project: “the Prior Consultation Law will 
strengthen the country’s efforts to advance key projects and will grant a platform for the 
people to express their opinion.”   As Foucault (1991, p.90) pointed out when referring to 
Machiavelli’s The Prince, the objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, 
strengthen and protect the principality. It does not represent the objective of an ensemble 
of its subjects and territory but rather the prince’s relation with what he owns, with the 
territory…and with his subjects. Therefore, the consultation law could be used by the 
state as an instrument to legitimize its control over territories and the local communities. 
 
In this analysis, the aforementioned state institutions were key to generating 
critical information, such as the environmental and health assessments in the Corrientes, 
Pastaza, Tigre and Marañon basins, that were contrary to the historic trend of the 
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Ministry of Energy and Mines (which traditionally centralized all decision-making in oil 
and mining projects) to deny the existence of environmental contamination and dismiss 
the indigenous peoples’ allegations of its social and health impacts.  Dargent (2008) 
explains that changes in the state institutions ensued from state reforms during the 1980-
1990s (in the context of a market economy) when governments in Latin America created 
technical areas with certain degree of autonomy (such as OEFA and OSINERGMIN) 
with the objective to improve the state’s inefficient management capacity in face of 
corruption and private interests.       
The creation of regional governments in 200270 also created the opportunity to 
include multiple levels of government in the decision-making processes involving 
extractive industries, such as oil and mining projects. Contrastingly, the central 
government based in Lima decides the number, size, shape, and location of oil 
concessions, negotiates contracts, collects and administrates the revenues, grants 
environmental licenses and supervises oil/gas activities (Perupetro and the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines); however, the regional governments are now claiming more decision-
making power in these political spaces.   
The indigenous peoples living inside the oil concession 192 demanded the 
participation of the Regional Government of Loreto as the legitimate authority that 
should represent their interests in the negotiations with the central government.  At the 
same time, they urged the regional government to solve the pending land title issues of 
the communities living in areas granted in concession to oil/gas companies. Even though 
                                                 
70 After a process of discussions that started in the late 1980s (proceso de regionalización) which aimed to 
create decentralized political regions with administrative and economic independence from the central 
government based in Lima.  Currently there are 25 regional governments in what were previously 
denominated “departments.”  
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the current legal framework excludes the regional governments from the key decision-
making processes affecting oil projects in the Amazon such as the oil concession 
negotiations , the recent events of block 192 show the importance of clearly defining their 
role and responsibilities in these processes.71      
   It is in this context of democratization that the ethnic mobilization in the 
Amazon has emerged and demanded recognition and a solution to the environmental and 
health problems they have endured for decades.  There is no precedent in Peru of efforts 
of this scale and magnitude to advance the ethnic-based claims for the indigenous peoples 
of block 192.  The state is struggling to have the final decision and keep control of the 
consultation process. Many communities are not satisfied with the results of the 
consultation. resulting in violent conflicts.  
 
Political Identities and Neoliberalism 
  
The previous analysis shows that while there is a substantial rise in the number of 
extractive projects, it is not possible to undertake them without the so called “social 
license” or a minimum level of agreement with the local communities (Bebbington et al., 
2008; Slack, K., 2012).  Consultations with local communities are now more common 
and are becoming “standard practice” in undertaking resource extraction and 
infrastructure projects.   Peru’s Prior Consultation Law and its regulating decree are the 
first ones of their kind enacted in Latin America to date and pose complex and 
contradictory problems to the government as it aims to grant special rights to groups of 
                                                 
71 However, these decentralized governments receive part of the revenues of oil/gas activities in their 
jurisdiction (known as canon petrolero and canon gasífero for oil and gas projects respectively) although 
the allocation of these funds has been affected by allegations of corruption. 
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people based on ethnic and cultural distinctions without clear ways to identify and define 
them, especially in the case of Andean communities in mining areas.  During a television 
interview in Lima’s television station channel 2 on May 2013 about the law, President 
Humala said: 
“…where there has been a problem is defining which communities are natives 
[sic] or not.  Because here –with so much informality- everyone wants to be 
consulted because it grants some power of negotiation.” 
 
“In the Andes, most communities are peasants as a result of the Agrarian Reform, 
etc.  Mostly, native communities are in the Amazon (selva); they were often or in 
the past called no contactados (not contacted), right? But today with infrastructure 
and modernity, we are trying to articulate with all communities.” 
 
 The majority of oil and gas projects in the Amazon overlap indigenous territories; 
therefore, it is expected that indigenous groups will demand their rights more explicitly 
around indigeneity.  For McDonell (2015), indigenous mobilizations in past years in Peru 
have been an expression of national and global-level neoliberal restructuring coupled 
with anti-extractive/indigenous rights claims.  In McDonell’s words, “this can be seen as 
neoliberal-era Polanyian “double movement,” a reaction to usurpation and 
commodification of natural resources due to increases in extractive industries activity 
made possible by market deregulation.” (113)72.    
 
 The consultation process of block 192 (former1AB) provides empirical evidence 
that the law was not able to prevent social-environmental conflicts as expected.   Based 
on this dissertation, it is possible to state that the consultation process of block 192 was 
undertaken mostly under pressure from the central government to reach an agreement in a 
                                                 
72 In The Great Transformation (1944), Karl Polanyi argued there is a dialectical process or double 
movement through which market societies are shaped.  On one side there is a movement to liberalize 
markets and other side a movement to protect the society from the negative effects of market pressures.  
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very short timeframe and included strategies to weaken and foster divisions between the 
indigenous groups participating in the consultation process.   At the same time, the 
process was useful to strengthen the capacity of dialogue and organization of the parties 
involved.  Despite the fact that the consultation law is not binding, it is now a right that 
indigenous groups can invoke to voice their claims and opinions about issues affecting 
their livelihoods.  
The government accepted the recently created ORIAP (an NGO which is not an 
indigenous federation is aligned with the government) as a legitimate party in the 
consultation process to oppose indigenous federations participating in the process, 
thereby weakening indigenous demands.  Therefore, the consultation process can be 
exploited in accordance with government interests, increasing the communities’ level of 
frustration and conflict.   While the Andean community of Cañaris (community listed as 
indigenous but opposed to mining) request to enforce their right to consultation under the 
new law was denied, ORIAP (NGO “malleable” to the government’s conditions) was 
accepted as a participant in the consultation process.  As Charles Hale (2004) states, 
neoliberalism entails a cultural project in which multicultural governments use cultural 
rights and the concept of the “authorized Indian” (indio permitido) to divide and 
domesticate indigenous movements.   In other words, multicultural state policies 
encourage certain forms of indigenous identification and organizations and determine 
which indigenous groups, politics and claims are “legitimate” (McDonell, 2015; 
Schilling-Vacaflor, 2015; Hale, 2004).   
 The Amazonian and Andean populations living in areas rich in mineral resources 
of Peru are demanding their right to be consulted under the Prior Consultation Law.   
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Even though these groups have a long history of demanding that national authorities 
listen to their demands in relation to resource extraction, they are now organized along 
ethnic lines and are pushing for participatation in the decision-making processes.   This 
entails opening the debate about identity politics, discussing how these rights and 
identities affect the use of space, and determining the best course of action to reshape the 
role of the state and the use of natural resources in the current economic context.   
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CHAPTER V 
STRUGGLES OVER THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THE 
EXPANSION OF THE CAMISEA GAS PROJECT IN BLOCK 88. 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the EIA process for the expansion of the Camisea gas 
project in block 88 of the Peruvian Amazon that took place from November 2012 until its 
approval in January 201473.   In this chapter I examine the role of government and non-
government actors in the decision-making process that authorized the expansion of 
exploration activities in block 88.  
 The Camisea project comprises the exploitation of Peru’s largest natural gas 
deposits in blocks 88 and 56 (not included in this analysis) the low Urubamba valley in 
the district of Echarate, province of La Convencion in Cusco in the department of Cusco.  
With reserves estimated in 2012 of 11.96 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas and 
614.7 million barrels (MMB) of natural gas liquids, Camisea is considered one of Latin 
America’ most important energy breakthroughs of the past century (Perupetro 2014).  
Camisea (especially block 88) provokes controversy as it overlaps the buffer zone of the 
Manu National Park, one of the World Wildlife Fund’s (WWF) “Global 200” eco-regions 
for conservation, and the Kugapakori, Nahua, Nanti Territorial Reserve (RTKNN), a 
protected area inhabited by indigenous people including groups in voluntary isolation and 
initial contact74 (SERNANP 2010, Duellman 2005).    
                                                 
73 Ministry of Energy and Mines Resolution No. 035-2014-MEM/AAE 
 
74 There are approximately 64 indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation in the Amazon forests of 
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.  These mysterious groups have avoided all contact with strangers for 
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 The Camisea project comprises three independent components shown in Figure 
23:  (a) “upstream” operations consisting of the exploration and exploitation of the gas 
deposits in Camisea, Cusco and a processing plant in Las Malvinas (roughly 20 km from 
the main production locations) and operated mainly by Pluspetrol (in association with 
Hunt Oil, SK Corporation, Repsol, Tecpetrol and Sonatrach as investment parties);  (b) 
“downstream” gas transportation along a 453 mile-long pipeline to the city gate in Lima 
and a branch pipeline to a  gas terminal in Pisco (105 miles south of Lima) operated by 
the TGP Consortium (Tecgas, Pluspetrol, Graña y Montero, SK Corporation, Hunt Oil 
and Sonatrach); and (c) distribution of gas for industrial and domestic users in Lima and 
Callao, operated by the company Gas Natural de Lima y Callao (GNLC).   This analysis 
focuses on the decision-making process for the expansion of gas exploration that is part 
of the upstream operations. 
 
Figure 22.  Camisea Gas Deposits (Blocks 56 and 88) 
 
Perupetro, 2014 
                                                                                                                                                 
centuries.  Most of what is known about their existence has been gleaned from brief encounters with other 
indigenous groups or chance sightings of loggers, oil companies’ staff and missionaries.     
Camisea 
River 
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Figure 23.  Location of the Three Components of the Camisea Project in Block 88 
(Upstream, Transportation and Distribution)  
 
 
Pluspetrol (n.d) 
 
 
Block 88 began to produce natural gas in 2004 with an average production of 78 
million cubic feet/day which increased to 709.75 million cubic feet/day by June 2015.  
This concession generates 52% of Peru’s total domestic gas production (Perupetro 2005, 
2015).   During its first decade block 88 has contributed roughly US$ 10.7 billion dollars 
in state revenues (OSINERGMIN 2014, p.236).        
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Table 9.  Summary of the Camisea Project (Block 88) 
 
Block 88 
Contract signed December 2000 
Area 554 square miles (1435 square 
kilometers) 
Companies Pluspetrol (Argentina) 27% 
Hunt Oil (US) 25% 
SK Corporation (Korea) 18% 
Repsol (Spain) 10% 
Tecpetrol (Argentina) 10% 
Sonatrach (Algeria) 10% 
 
Royalties (natural gas / natural gas 
liquids) 
37.24% / 37.24% 
Start production date 2004 
Target market Domestic 
Data source: Perupetro  
 
Figure 24.  Location of Block 88 
 
The Economist, 2014 
 
 
Table 10. Investment of the Camisea Consortium  
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Year Project 
Stage 
Block Activities Million USD 
2001-2004 1 88 Seismic prospecting, drilling, 
pipelines, transformation and 
transportation to the coast 
(Pisco) 
703 
2004-2008 2 56 Seismic prospecting, drilling, 
pipelines, transformation and 
transportation to the coast 
(Pisco) 
846 
2006-2012 3 88 Drilling, pipelines 647 
2008-2014 4 88 Transformation plants (Malvinas 
and Pisco) 
543 
2008-2-14 5 88/56 Other work structures, drilling 
and internal gas pipelines 
745 
Source: Perupetro 2014 
 
The Expansion of the Camisea Project in Block 88 
In the early 2000s, Pluspetrol decided to reduce the size of their exploration 
activities75 once the contractor firm Veritas found that these posed risks to the indigenous 
groups living in isolation and in initial contact living near the concession’s boundaries 
(Barclay & García Hierro, 2014).   In June 2010, Pluspetrol sent a letter to Perupetro 
requesting permission to conduct prospecting activities in an area not previously explored 
in block 88.76    Perupetro accepted the initial request, which indicated that the next step 
for Pluspetrol was to undergo the EIA process in order to obtain the necessary license to 
start the proposed activities in the area.  
In 2012 Pluspetrol company decided to go ahead in its decision and officially 
proposed the government to expand explorations inside the RTKNN, including 18 
exploration wells in six places (San Martin Norte, Kimaro Oeste, Kimaro Centro, and in 
Armihuari North and South) and the creation of a gas pipeline from San Martin Este to 
                                                 
75 3D seismic exploration in 13.51 square miles north of the Camisea River, and 154 square miles of what 
today is the Armihuari camp in the south of the Camisea River) 
76 Letter PPC-C0-10-0320-GOB 
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San Martin 3 (ERM, 2012).    The expansion of exploratory activities in block 88 
comprises exploration and development activities in the northwest and south areas of 
block 88, all of them inside the RTKNN (Figure 26).  These activities are: (a) Seismic 
prospecting 2D (122.4 miles) and 3D (379 square miles); (b) Prospective drilling 
including at least 18 wells in 6 locations (two exploration wells and one to reinject liquid 
wastes in each site); and (c) Installation of a 6.2-mile gas pipeline from San Martin East 
to San Martin 3 (ERM 2012).    
Proposed seismic activities were planned to take seven months each and comprise 
clearing forest along lines of 6.5 feet wide and excavating 3,300 holes 600 feet apart and 
50 feet deep to install in each one 8.8 pounds of explosives.  The estimated total amount 
of explosives required is 46 tons (ERM, 2012, p. 2-7, 14).   Drilling operations would be 
conducted in a 15-month period, and the construction of the gas pipeline would take five 
months.  The EIS is not clearly specify if these activities would be performed 
simultaneously.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Expansion of the Camisea Gas Project  
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(Proposed expansion of block 88 in red)  
ERM, 2012 
 
With an estimated cost of $480 million USD, the expansion of the Camisea 
project in block 88 entails clearing approximately 525 hectares of primary forests for 
seismic prospecting, drilling operations, and installation of pipelines, helipads, campsites 
and unloading areas summarized in Table 11.  In addition, the project requires a labor 
force of 1,800 workers, 600 of which would be recruited from the local villages (ERM 
2012).   
 
 
 
Table 11. Expansion of Activities in Block 88: Area of Forest Cleared 
Activity Facilities Area of Forest 
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Cleared (ha) 
Seismic prospecting 2D Sesmic lines 39.4 
44 Temporary campsites (40 
people each) 
6.2 
At least 22 Helipads of 0.24 ha 
each one 
10.6 
1,100 unloading áreas (for 
equipment and  materials) 
3.3 
Large campsites 3 
Sub-total 62.5 
3D Sesmic lines 322.4 
36 Temporary campsites (40 
people each) 
5 
19 Helipads of 0.24 ha each one 8.6 
2,700 unloading areas 8.1 
Large campsites 3 
Sub-total 347.1 
Area seismic prospecting 2D and 3D 409.6 
Drilling 6 locations 34.5 
Gas pipeline Right of way 20.8 
Temporary campsites 1.0 
Workshops and other supporting facilities 18.8 
 40.6 
TOTAL 525.3 
Source: ERM 2012 
  In addition, the expansion of the project would generate domestic, industrial and 
hazardous wastes, including drilling muds.  The plan also requires creating facilities for 
health services, power generators, fuel storage, and water treatment, among others.  
The project required undergoing an EIA process managed by the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines which entailed earning the approval of several state and non-state 
actors such as the indigenous federations COMARU (Matsigenka Council of the 
Urubamba River) and CECONAMA (“Juan Santos Atahualpa” Matsigenka Native 
Communities Groups of Low Urubamba).  These organizations represented the 
indigenous communities living inside the concession area.   In this case, since a 
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consultation with indigenous peoples in isolation would not be viable, the opinion of 
Ministry of Culture about the project was binding and there were consultations with the 
local indigenous federations and representatives of communities in initial contact whose 
opinion was also crucial to approve the project.  The EIS for the expansion of the 
Camisea project in block 88, mention areas of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ influence depending 
on the degree of the project’s intervention.   The study defines ‘direct’ influence as the 
“area or geographic space where hydrocarbon activities would have considerable 
impact”; and ‘indirect’ influence as those areas where their activities would not be 
undertaken but that may affect indirectly the resources used by the indigenous peoples, 
especially those from the RTKNN (ERM, 2012, p. 4-2).   Pluspetrol created social-
environmental safeguards additional to the study and set up a community relations plan to 
prevent negative effects on the indigenous population in block 88.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26.   Seismic Lines for the Proposed Expansion of Block 88  
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(Seismic lines in green).   ERM, 2012 
  
 
Indigenous Groups Inhabiting Block 88 
One of the most controversial issues associated with the expansion of the Camisea 
project is that it overlaps with lands inhabited by indigenous groups in voluntary isolation 
and initial contact.  In Peru, there are approximately 13 groups of people living in 
isolation and/or initial contact (Huertas, 2004; Barclay, 2003).   The terms “isolated”, 
“not contacted,” and “voluntary isolated” refers to Amazonian groups who refuse to 
establish sustained contact with the rest of society. While the indigenous people in 
isolation tend to refuse to maintain interaction with other social groups, the people in 
initial contact have sporadic interactions with other groups (indigenous or otherwise) 
(Huertas, 2004).    The exact population of these groups is unknown, and their level of 
interaction is variable.  They are considered extremely vulnerable because their immune 
systems do not protect them from communicable diseases caused by microorganisms 
which are not necessarily lethal to the rest of society, and therefore, contact with 
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outsiders can cause diseases or death.  Documents dating from the 1500s until the present 
show the devastating effect that the exposure to exogenous disease agents had on 
indigenous peoples, causing a massive number of deaths (Barclay, 2003)77.     
 
Figure 27.   Spatial Distribution of Indigenous Peoples in Isolation in Peru 
 
 
                         IWGIA. 2013, p. 59 
 
The indigenous population in the RTKNN and block 88 is comprised of the 
Nahuas (Yoras) from the Mishahua and Serjali rivers, the Nanti of the Upper Camisea 
and Upper Timpia rivers; and the Matsigenka (Machiguenga) and Kirineri from the 
                                                 
77 Detailed records from the 1500 to 1700s were important documents that aimed to explain the devastating 
effects that epidemics and how they influenced the failure of numerous religious missions during the 
colony (Barclay 2003). 
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Paquiria River (ERM 2012).   The Matsigenkas are distributed in small native 
communities in the Lower Urubamba River, although there are some still living in 
various degrees of isolation distributed throughout the RTKNN, the Megantoni National 
Sanctuary, Manu National Park and the Matsigenka Communal Reserve.  Some of these 
groups emphatically refuse all contact with other people, while others “occasionally 
exchange hatchets, pots and machetes with neighboring native communities” (ERM, 
2012, Huertas 2010, p.12).   A sub-group of the Matsigenka, the Kirineri, who live in 
Alto Paquiría, has sporadic contact.  Reports from the early 2000s show that Pluspetrol’s 
operations in block 88 resulted in forced contact with some Matsigenka people in 
isolation, leading Pluspetrol oil company to reduce the area for gas exploration and to 
enact laws declaring the area known today as RTKNN, as protected. Economic activities 
that could be undertaken within it were also limited.  (Anaya, 2014; Ombudsman’s 
Office, 2003; ERM, 2012).    
The exact population of these indigenous groups is unknown, although there are 
some estimates of the population in initial contact.   The EIS for the expansion of 
activities in block 88 estimates the population of the RTKNN at 755 people (Table 12).  
This estimate does not include the population of the Timpia basin and the people in 
voluntary isolation due to lack of information. 
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Table 12.  Estimated Population in the Area of Block 88 Overlaping the RTKNN 
(2007) 
Basin Ethnic Group Village Population 
Mishahua/Serjali Pano and Nahua (1) Santa Rosa de Serjali 285 
Paquiria Matsigenka and Nanti  
(2) 
Boca Kipatsiari 
Mañokiari 
22 
Camisea Matsigenka and Nanti 
(3) 
Inaroato 
Shiateni 
Kovantiari 
Tyorikitiari 
Sagondoari 
Marankeato 
Montetoni 
409 
Cashiriari Matsigenka and Nanti 
(3) 
Shimpanashiari 
Mashopoaro 
Serialo 
44 
Total   755 
Source:  ERM, 2012 
 
Figure 28.  Indigenous Communities in the RTKNN Overlapping Block 88  
 
 
ERM, 2012 
 
 147 
 
In the early 1970s, the French oil company Total Peru conducted preliminary oil 
exploration activities in the Lower Urubamba and High Ucayali.  These explorations 
continued between 1982 and 1988 when Shell Oil Company conducted seismic 
prospecting in what today are blocks 88 and 56.  In both cases workers had sporadic 
encounters with non-contacted indigenous people from the Yaminahua, Nahua and 
Kirineri groups in the Alto Mishahua and Serjali rivers as (according to these workers) 
who were looking for metal tools such as machetes and hatchets.  In 1984 almost half of 
the Nahua population died from an epidemic of respiratory and infectious communicable 
diseases allegedly caused by the contact with oil workers (ERM 2012).   There are other 
indigenous groups present in the RTKNN such as the Mashco-Piro, a hunter-gatherer 
nomadic group living in isolation and seen sporadically in the Purús, Las Piedras, Los 
Amigos, Manu rivers and its tributaries in Ucayali and Madre de Dios.  Apparently this 
group inhabits the RTKNN during the dry season of July and August in order to gather 
turtle eggs (ERM, 2012).  
Other native groups living in the RTKNN are the Nahua and the Nanti (estimated 
population under 1,000) who lived in voluntary isolation in the headwaters of the Timpía 
and Camisea Rivers until recently (Barclay, 2003).   Records of the Nanti (also known as 
Kugapakori, although this is a derogatory term) are scarce and have been collected 
through oral accounts described in detail by Barclay and García Hierro (2014).   The 
Nanti of Upper Camisea are located in Montetoni and Marankeato (Marlanksiari or 
Malaksiá) with an estimated population of 250 on the banks of the Timpía River (Ibid.).   
These groups lived in voluntary isolation until roughly 2000, when they started to visit 
community settlements in Montetoni and Marankiato sporadically (ERM, 2012).  
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Table 13.  Indigenous Peoples in the Areas of Direct and Indirect Influence of 
Exploration Activities in Block 88 
Project Component Indigenous Village in the 
Area of Direct Influence 
Indigenous Village in the 
Area of Indirect Influence 
Seismic 3D Indigenous community of 
Segakiato 
Villages:  Kovantiari, 
Tyorikitiari-Shivageato-
Koentiari 
Villages outside the RTKNN: 
-Santa Rosa de Serjali 
- Montetoni 
-Marankeato 
_Sagondoari 
Areas used by indigenous 
peoples in the RTKNN – 
Block 88 
Kovantiari 
Shivageato 
Kyoritiari - Koentiari 
 
Seismic 2D Indigenous Community of 
Cashiriari 
Indigenous Community of 
Ticumpinia 
Population living, hunting, 
fishing and gathering inside 
the RTKNN 
Cashiriari River basin: 
Shimpanashiari Creek, 
Mashopoari Creek, Mouth 
of the Serialo 
Areas used by the 
indigenous groups in the 
RTKNN – Block 88 
Camisea basin:  Inaroato, 
Shiateni, Kovantiari and 
Shivageato.  Kyiritiari –
Koentiari 
Areas used by indigenous 
people of the RTKNN 
outside block 88: 
Camisea basin: Montetoni, 
Marankeato and 
Sagondorari 
Population living, hunting, 
fishing and gathering inside 
the RTKNN 
Cashiriari River basin: 
Shimpanashiari Creek, 
Mashopoari Creek 
Areas used by indigenous 
peoples in the RTKNN – 
Block 88 
Santa Rosa de Serjali 
Population along the 
Paquiria River basin 
(Kipatsiari). 
Areas used by the 
communities of: Segakiato, 
Cashiriari and Ticumpinia.  
Gas pipeline Not information available  
Source: ERM, 2012 
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 Other group, the Nahua (Yora) live mostly near the Sepahua and Mishahua rivers.  
These groups lived in isolation until about the mid-1980s, when they began to contact the 
people of Sepahua more regularly, as they were looking for help during a flu and 
tuberculosis epidemic that caused the death of roughly 60% of their population (Hill & 
Kaplan, 1989; Dagget, 1991; Barclay, 2003).   According to the national Amazonian 
indigenous organization AIDESEP (2008, p.13): 
“It is possible to say that this area [between the Camisea and the Mishahua rivers] 
has been tightly guarded by the Nahua until 1982 when workers from Shell Oil 
Company contacted them from the distance.  It is said that several times the 
Nahua took clothes, tools and other items from the company workers performing 
seismic prospecting… they [Nahua] were forced to contact [other people] once 
they were chased and tied; this is how they were infected (with chickenpox, flu, 
tuberculosis, etc.), causing a massive death of the group and affecting their 
seasonal migration patterns.” 
 
Their exposure to other groups of society, even other indigenous groups such as 
the Yaminahuas, resulted in the exploitation of some Nahua people, who were not 
familiar with concepts of economic compensation for work and the market economy 
(Barclay, 2003; Wahl, 1990; Zarzar, 1987; Cloudsley, 1989; ERM, 2012).   
Consequently, the Nahua began to seek support from the Dominican missionaries in the 
late 1990s, creating the village of Santa Rosa de Serjali, where they live without much 
contact with other indigenous groups in the protected area (ERM 2012).  
 
 
 
As mentioned, the RTKNN was created in 1990 in the western rainforests of 
Cusco to protect the Nahua and the Nanti indigenous people in voluntary isolation or in 
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initial contact.  Laws to protect these groups were created when the Camisea project 
started in the early 2000s, however, as explained earlier, the at that time president Alan 
García questioned the existence of indigenous people in isolation in the RTKNN while 
the ministries of Culture, Energy and Mines, and Environment and the company 
Pluspetrol acknowledge their presence in the project area (explained below).   President 
Humala’s declarations of August 2013 stated, “Mostly there are native communities in 
the jungle (selva), often or in ancient times called ‘non- contacted’ (no contactados), 
right? But today, with infrastructure, modernity, we are trying to communicate with all 
communities.”   The presence of indigenous people in isolation in block 88 is at the same 
time debated and problematized.   Barclay and García Hierro (2013) argue that there are 
efforts to assimilate the Nanti “no matter what” (como sea) and are trying to remove the 
RTKNN’s status as a protected area because it overlaps a gas concession of great interest 
to the government and oil companies.  In the early 2000s, the phrase Camisea como sea 
was coined as a way to describe the government’s pressure to approve the initial EIS of 
the Camisea project despite strong objections from some groups (La República, August 6 
2003).  The expansion of block 88’s overlap of the RTKNN would lead the government 
to take more actions to integrate the area’s indigenous population and remove the 
RTKNN’s protective status in the future (Barclay, personal communication). 
Pluspetrol acknowledges the existence of the indigenous people in isolation in 
block 88.  The company has admitted having at least 6 encounters and 11 sightings with 
the people in isolation by 2011.  Page 78 of Pluspetrol’s 2010 “Social and Environmental 
Sustainability Report” states: 
“During 2010 we continued with the implementation of Anthropological 
Contingency Plan (ACP), aimed at safeguarding the communities settled within 
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the Kugapakori Nahua Nanti Territorial Reserve. The program seeks to preserve 
the traditional organizational patterns and productive systems of those indigenous 
communities settled in the reserve that live in voluntary isolation or uncontacted. 
To that end, 14 community watchmen perform monitoring with the purpose of 
registering any population displacement toward the reserve area that is close to 
the production platforms. In 2010, no encounters were produced with people 
uncontacted or in voluntary isolation.  Nonetheless, watchmen registered 11 
sightings in the vicinity of Pluspetrol locations. Most of these events were related 
to ‘mitayo’ hunting activities." 
 
In a report submitted to the IDB, the consultant firm Matrix Solutions Inc. of 2011 (p. 
240) evidenced encounters with the indigenous people in isolation and initial contact in 
block 88: 
 
“[Pluspetrol] watchmen reported encounters with seven encounters.  Six of these 
were with people [insolation] who approached them asking for food, blankets and 
utensils.”  
 
 
 In addition, there are Nahua and Nanti indigenous in “initial contact” with the 
outside world.  This groups of people (estimated population 800) live in the vicinity of 
block 88 but hunt, fish and gather food inside the gas concession area and began to 
interact with religious missionaries and neighboring indigenous groups in the 1980s.   
Today, these communities continue in contact with missionaries and have access to 
primary education and health services in Santa Rosa de Serjali.  They are also in contact 
with AIDESEP, the national-level organization of Amazonian indigenous peoples to 
discuss their social and environmental concerns (del Río 2014).     
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Camisea Project 
The IDB played a decisive role in the development of the project and the 
decision-making related to it. In 2002 the bank approved a $5 million USD loan to the 
Peruvian government to strengthen its capacity to “supervise and monitor the social and 
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environmental impacts of the Camisea project and implement instruments and 
mechanisms for sustainable development in its area of influence” (IDB, n.d).  The project 
was highly criticized at the national and international levels, organizations such as 
Amazon Watch, Cultural Survival, International Rivers Network, Rainforest Alliance 
publicly expressed their concerns about the social and environmental impacts of the 
project.  These fears influenced the decision of the Export-Import Bank of the United 
States (Ex-Im Bank) in 2003 to deny a $214.6 USD million loan to the Camisea project 
because it did not meet the Ex-Im Bank’s environmental guidelines (Ortiz, 2003).   
Although the IBD did not fund the exploration and exploitation activities in block 88 
(highly debated due to the potential impacts on the indigenous population), the bank 
endorsed it by approving a $75 million USD loan to TGP for the transportation 
component in 2003, which put pressure on the government approve the upstream 
operations. 
This support sparked harsh critics from national and international indigenous 
rights and conservaton organizations which led the IBD to include 21 environmental and 
social conditions for the Peruvian government.  The IDB also required the adoption of 
stricter legal provisions to secure a “permanent and adequate level of protection” of the 
RTKNN and to prohibit new rights for the use of natural resources within it, including 
those considered of national interest (Barclay & García Hierro, 2013).   In this context, in 
2003 the Peruvian government enacted a law (Supreme Decree No. 028-2003-AG), 
granting the highest level of protection to the RTNNK.  The law established limits of the 
activities developed in the area and assigned national authorities to guarantee the rights of 
the indigenous people in voluntary isolation and initial contact in the area.    
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Even though the project proponents originally publicized that the gas from 
Camisea (blocks 88 and 56) would supply national demand for gas, in 2006 the 
government of president Toledo negotiated the export of gas from block 56 and built an 
LNG plant in the port of Pisco 105 miles south of Lima (funded by the IDB with a $400 
miilion USD loan) to export the gas to Manzanillo, Mexico.   The IDB backed this 
initiative and stated that the [Camisea gas] project could be shipped “to the west coast of 
the Americas and the Far East markets of the Pacific Basin” (IDB, Peru LNG Project – 
PE-L1016, p. ii78).    
 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Process 
Hydrocarbon activities (exploration, exploitation, transportation and refining) 
require an environmental license obtained through an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) process.  The EIA process lies at the heart of decision-making for a wide range of 
public and private projects worldwide and consists of a multi-step process created to 
assess the viability of a project based on assessments of its potential social and 
environmental impacts.   This process also aims to ensure that environmental and social 
considerations are integrated in the design of a project or plan prior to its implementation.  
It also constitutes a legal requirement intended to analyze their overall potential positive 
and/or negative environmental and social effects of a project and that all concerns are 
addressed throughout its implementation.  The principles of the environmental 
assessment have been also incorporated in large-scale development plans, or sets of 
projects of regional scale as “strategic environmental assessment”.     
                                                 
78 http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1195576 
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Overall, the EIA process is envisioned to inform all parties involved in the 
decision-making process (government and non-government) of social and environmental 
consequences so government and non-government parties can discuss, modify, reject or 
approve a project, plan or activity (UNEP, 2004).   Preparing and reviewing an 
Environmental Impact Statement/Study (EIS) with an analysis of the potential social and 
environmental effects of a project is a key element of environmental governance.  The 
EIS describes in detail a project, the physical, biological and social environment (also 
called “baseline” conditions); and an assessment of the project’s potential social and 
environmental impacts and propose management measures to prevent, control and/or 
mitigate a project’s impacts on the physical, biological and social environments.   In 
Peru, the EIA process and the public review of an EIS are mandatory requirement prior to 
initiating national, local or regional plans and programs that could have significant 
environmental effects, as well as public and private activities, construction or works that 
could cause negative environmental impacts.79    
The MEM has taken the lead in advancing guidelines, regulations and procedures, 
and enforcing this requirement prior to the initiation of mining and energy activities.  
Therefore, the EIA process is considered by the stakeholders as the most important 
instrument for environmental decision-making (Calle, 2012).   In 2012 the government 
created the National Environmental Certification Service (SENACE) within the Ministry 
of the Environment to take charge of reviewing and approving EIS;80 however as I write 
this dissertation SENACE was not still completely in operation as of December 2015.    
                                                 
79 Article 1. National Environmental Impact Assessment Law. Legal Decree, No. 1078 April 20, 2001.   
 
80 Law No. 29968 
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As in most countries, EIA regulations in Peru require the opinion and 
authorization of national and/or local authorities, as well as the participation of local 
communities (with different degrees of influence).  The passing of the legal requirement 
to undergo an EIA process prior to initiating oil and gas activities coincided with the 
adoption of structural economic, political and legal reforms to promote foreign 
investments and consolidate its primary-export growth model (mainly energy and mining 
sectors).   One of these changes was the Law for the Promotion of Private Investment of 
1991 (Decree No. 757), which designated the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) to 
stimulate private investments in the sector and centralize decisions necessary to approve 
and supervise the environmental performance of oil and gas projects.81   Therefore, the 
ministry’s functions have been designed with a conflict of interest built into their very 
core as the ministry’s role has been both to promote investment and to rein it in if this 
investment causes environmental and social damage (Bebbington, 2012, p.70).   More 
recent institutional and legal changes added the requirement of endorsement from other 
agencies such as the newly created water authority ANA, the protected areas’ agency 
SERNANP and in the case of block 88, the Ministry of Culture, whose approval of 
project was a requisite for the project to continue.    
During and EIA process, the project proponent hires a private consultant firm 
registered in the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) to prepare an EIS report 
according to the content defined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) drafted by the project 
proponent and approved by MEM.   The report’s goal is to present the results of a 
comprehensive evaluation of the potential social and environmental impacts of a 
                                                 
81 The Law for the Promotion of Private Investment of 1991 (Law Decree No. 757) established that each 
sector’s authority will develop and enforce the necessary requirements to grant environmental licenses. 
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proposed action to state and non-state actors (local authorities, communities, NGOs) that 
participate in the process. The principles of participation are included in international 
agreements such as Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development of 1992,82 ILO Convention 169, and U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) among others.    By law, each environmental impact study 
(or statement) must be available to local communities and discussed onsite in public 
hearings (audiencias públicas) organized in the place where the project is proposed.  
Authorities, NGOs and local communities can submit written comments or observations 
prior to the public hearing deadline, which are discussed and answered by the project 
proponent.   The MEM centralizes these comments and questions and submitted them to 
Pluspetrol for clarification.  Responses are then submitted to the authorities (not to the 
public) for further review until each authority formally approves the environmental study.   
The centralization of EIA institutional arrangements and procedures is common in Latin 
America and other regions of the world.83    
The overwhelming bias of the EIA process in favor of project proponents reduces 
its credibility in the eyes of the local communities (Beder & Connelly, 1997).  While 
local communities and some authorities generally expect EIS to be ‘scientific’ and 
‘objective’, in fact the studies are tailored in favor of the project proponent.  Among other 
reasons, the financial stability of the consultant firms and the companies that hire them is 
at stake if a project is rejected (Hindery 2014, M. Scurrah, personal communication, July 
20, 2014).   Oil companies pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars to consulting 
                                                 
82 Adopted in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
June 3-14, 1992. 
 
83 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Colombia are some countries where the EIA system is decentralized 
and where province and municipal authorities participate in the decision-making process (Verocai, I (n/d).   
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firms which spend several months to over a year to prepare each environmental impact 
assessment study. Companies and the consultant firms making these studies have 
invested interest in presenting studies that favor the proposed activity, consequently the 
EIA process have lost credibility among the population.  Studies often claim that most of 
a project’s impacts are “not significant”, often omit describing significant parts of 
projects, and claim that all negative impacts will be managed using the “best 
technology”, often does not happen (Hindery, 2012).   In addition, the assessment reports 
are very lengthy (an environmental impact assessment study can run to many volumes), 
and can contain complex technical terms not accessible to the average citizen and 
authorities, therefore local communities question its value to safeguard their health and 
the environment from pollution. (Pratt, 2012; Earle, 2009).   
 
The Environmental Impact Assessment Study (EIS) for the Expansion of the 
Camisea Project in Block 88 
 
The Terms of Reference and Public Participation Plan 
Prior to the preparation of the EIS, the law requires that the Environmental Affairs 
Office of Ministry of Energy and Mines (DGAAE) to approve the Terms of Reference 
(ToR) of the EIS and a Public Participation Plan (PPP).  The ToR define the content of 
the EIS and the PPP must describe in detail the measures that the project proponent (and 
the consultant firm in charge of the EIS) should undertake before and after the EIS is 
released for comments.  The private consultant firm in charge of drafting the EIS must 
gather environmental and social baseline data for the study, which includes interviews, 
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surveys and meetings with community members.  The PPP also details how, when and 
which communities should give an opinion about the project once the study is released 
for comments.   The study’s PPP and the ToR required the authorization of SERNANP 
and the Ministry of Culture because 100% of the project expansion ovelaps the RTKKN 
and the buffer zone of the Manu National Park.  The PPP was not available to the public 
and did not require the opinion of the indigenous people living in the project area.  James 
Anaya, former U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, noted 
weaknesses in the public participation process in the expansion of the Camisea project in 
block 88 and called the Peruvian government to enforce international human rights 
agreements (2014). 
Initially, the Ministry of Culture approved the ToR with some recommendations, 
assuming that the exploration activities were within the concession area approved in 200 
for the initial phase of the project.84   However, a few days later, the National Institute for 
the Development of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian People (INDEPA), an 
agency also of the same ministry (part of the Vice-Ministry of Cross-Cultural Affairs of 
the Ministry of Culture) disputed this initial decision in a report85 with serious 
reservations to the ToR, declaring that the prospecting activities could put the indigenous 
people in voluntary isolation and in initial contact in the RTKNN in danger.  INDEPA’s 
report also contained guidelines to safeguard the native population of the protected area, 
invoking the ILO Convention 169 and national regulations safeguarding the indigenous 
                                                 
84 Letter No. 061-20110MC-INDEPA-OPD DCPI PIACI 
 
85 Report No. 001-2012-INDEPA-OT-PIACI/FVS/VAV/JIM 
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groups in voluntary isolation and in the RTKNN86.  The report remarked that the seismic 
prospecting would cover 36% of the area of block 88 overlapping the RTKNN and that 
the project area comprises:  
“territories where the indigenous in voluntary isolation and initial contact live, 
move, hunt, gather and fish and are areas of social-cultural interaction (including 
sacred sites).  The operations would put in extreme risk the people in isolation of 
the catchment area of the Cashiriari River, the Upper Serjali River, Bobinsana 
Creek, catchment area of the Paquiria River and the populations in initial contact 
of the Camisea River, its tributaries (from Kuria to Inaroato) and those identified 
so far living in the Cashiriari River (Serialo, Shimpenashiari and Mashopoari).”     
Source: INDEPA Report No. 001-2012-INDEPA-OT-PIACI/FVS/VAV/JIM, page 2. 
 
 
INDEPA also indicated that the expansion of oil/gas exploration would entail 
additional pressure on the native people who may be affected by the cumulative impacts 
of previous prospecting activities already conducted in block 88.  While the Ministry of 
Culture had divergent opinions about the project’s impacts on the native population, the 
National Service of Protected Areas (SERNANP) approved the entry of Pluspetrol in the 
buffer zone of the Manu National Park87, allowing the EIA process to continue.    
The EIS had serious gaps of information and weaknesses.  Among other 
weaknesses, the $480 million USD project to expand operations in block 88 assigned 
only $5,000 USD in the environmental management plan budget to manage hazardous 
substances for the seismic prospecting activities and the same amount to manage toxic 
effluents during 15 months of prospecting drilling (equivalent to $333 USD) a month to 
manage drilling muds, produced waters, among others.  Similarly, the whole project 
assigned $7,000 USD to treat all domestic wastewater produced in six large campsites 
                                                 
86 The report mentions several legal provisions granting a status of special protection to the RTKNN and 
the indigenous people in voluntary isolation (Supreme Decree No. 028-2003-AG and President Resolution 
No. 018-2005-INDEPA-PE) 
87 According to the Oficio No. 136-20120SERNANP-DGANP 
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during the project’s lifetime.  In addition, the EIS did not have detailed information about 
treatment of industrial effluents generated during the drilling operations (DAR, 2013). 
 
Role of the Government Agencies in the EIA Process 
As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Energy and Mines approval of the EIS 
required the endorsement of the water and protected areas’ authorities but depended on 
the approval of the Ministry of Culture which was considered binding. The Ministry of 
Culture assessed the viability of the project based on its impacts on the indigenous groups 
in voluntary isolation.   Each agency involved in the EIA process formulated observations 
to the EIA independently and were channeled through MEM, which sent them to 
Pluspetrol.  The oil company responded each set of observations individually and sent 
them to MEM who would sumbit them to the corresponding agency.   Indigenous 
federations and NGOs were also interested in reviewing the EIS and ask questions, 
however, the only binding judgment required to approve the EIS was that of the Ministry 
of Culture, which exclusively addressed social impacts of the project (not environmental, 
technical or health issues) (Gamboa, 2013).    
 
 
 
Table 14.   Authorities Participating in the EIA Process for the Expansion of the 
Camisea Project in Block 88 
Authority Role 
Perupetro Negotiate contract with Pluspetrol 
Coordinates with the Ministry of Culture to produce the 
technical opinion about the social impacts of the project in 
the RTKNN 
Ministry of Energy and 
Mines 
Coordinates with all the participating authorities to review 
the EIAs. Submits the authorities’ observations to 
Pluspetrol. Receives and distributes Pluspetrol’s answers 
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to the authorities.  Approves or rejects the EIA study.  The 
DGAAE (environmental affairs office for energy) reviews 
the EIA and formulates a technical opinion. 
Ministry of Culture Provides a binding opinion about the project based on the 
potential impacts on the indigenous people inside the 
RTKNN 
National Protected Areas 
Service (SERNANP)  
Technical opinion  
National Water Authority  - 
ANA 
Assesses the potential impacts on water resources 
Ministry of Agriculture Assesses the potential impacts of the project on the forest 
ecosystem 
 
 
The Struggle from Behind the Scenes:  The Review and Approval of the EIS for the 
Expansion of the Camisea Gas Project in Block 88  
Pluspetrol hired the international consultant firm Environment Resources 
Management Peru S.A. (ERM) to prepare the project’s EIAs and to submit the executive 
summary and a detailed Environmental Impact Assessment study to the DGAAE in 
November 2012.   ERM is one of the largest and most reputable EIS consulting firms 
working for mining, oil, pharmaceutical, manufacturing and chemical industries (ERM 
2016).  This company prepared the EIS for several oil and gas projects around the world, 
including other environmental studies for different components of the Camisea project 
such as the first EIS of the project of and the gas pipeline of the early 2000s.  The 
company’s website states:   
 
“ERM is committed to providing a service that is consistent, professional and of 
the highest quality to create value for our clients [emphasis added].  Over the past 
three years we have worked for more than 50 percent of the Global Fortune 500 
delivering innovative solutions for businesses and selected government clients 
helping them understand and manage the sustainability challenges that the world 
is increasingly facing” 
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(ERM, 2016).   
 
Initially, SERNANP, the Ministry of Agriculture (the state institutions that 
manages authority of forestry issues) and MEM requested Pluspetrol amend the 
Executive Summary, which MEM approved88 four months later, allowing the study to be 
subjected to comments from authorities and the public (Gamboa, 2013).        
The authorities participating in the EIA process sent their comments to MEM’s 
Environmental Bureau (DGAAE), that centralizes the exchange of observations, the 
company’s answers to those observations, and has the final word to grant the 
environmental license.  The EIA law does not set a limit to the number of observations 
that any authority could have to an EIS, otherwise the process of review has no specific 
end.  Also, it does not establish criteria to assess, approve or disqualify an EIS.  The 
different authorities’ comments, observations, and the company’s responses are not 
shared with the public because the law does not require it.  A close review of the 
authorities’ observations made to the EIA and the answers submitted by Pluspetrol show 
that there are gaps in the process such as the lack of an opinion of the health authorities, 
even though one of the main risks of the project involved health impacts on the 
indigenous population in the RTKNN. Pluspetrol told the authorities that it would create 
a communication plan to inform the indigenous communities inside the RTKNN about 
the EIS and the details about the project.  The company was aware of the special 
characteristics of the population and offered to broadcast details of the project amongst 
“the population living permanently in the RTKNN, its area of influence and neighboring 
areas (Program of Communications and Consultation).  This schedule would also be 
                                                 
88 Oficio No. 346 MEM/AAE. 
 163 
 
announced in the villages with some level of contact with other groups in the RTKNN.”89 
(ERM, 2012, pp.6-22).  
 
Chronology of the EIA Study Review Documents by Government Authorities, 
Indigenous Federations and the Pluspetrol  
 
[The number in parentheses indicates the Ministry of Energy and Mine’s record number]. 
 02/07/2013. SERNANP sends EIA review to DGAAE (No. 2267015). 
 02/07/2013. Pluspetrol answers observations of the Ministry of Agriculture (No. 
2267252). 
 02/20/2013.  INDEPA informs DGAAE that the EIA was submitted to the Vice-
Ministry of Culture (No. 227333) 
 2/27/2013.  DGAAE sends SENANP’s EIA review to Pluspetrol (597-2013-
MEM-AAE). 
 03/04/2013.  Pluspetrol submits evidence of providing the communities copies of 
the responses to the authorities’ observations which had been given to the EIA. 
(No.2272569). 
 03/27/2013. Pluspetrol submits to DGAAE its responses to SERNANP’s 
observations (No. 2278811). 
 04/12/2013. DGAAE submits Pluspetrol’s responses to SERNANP (0937-2013-
MEM-AAE). 
 04/30/2013. ANA files their observations to DGAAE. (No. 2287282) 
                                                 
89 ERM (2013) “Levantamiento de Observaciones al Estudio de Impacto Ambiental para la Ampliación del 
Programa de Exploración y Desarrollo – Opinión Técnica No. 044-2013-SERNANNP-DGANP”. Lima: 
Pluspetrol, p. 79 
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 05/10/2013. The Ministry of Energy and Mines sends their comments (DGAAE) 
regarding the EIA in reports No. 049-2013-MEM-AAE-IB and No. 048-2013-
MEM-AAE-NAE-/RCO. (Auto Directoral No. 259-2013-MEM/AAE). 
 05/30/2013. Pluspetrol answers ANA and DGAAE’s observations 
 06/03/2013. DGAAE sends Pluspetrol’s responses to ANA (Official letter No. 
1504-2013-MEM-AAE). 
 06/06/2013.  SERNANP sends its comments to DGAAE (No. 2297407) 
 06/07/2013.  Ministry of Culture announces officially that its decision about the 
EIA is binding. (No. 2298055). 
 06/07/2013.  Pluspetrol sends its responses to DGAAE to ANA’s observations 
(No. 2298117). 
 06/19/2013.  Pluspetrol sends its responses to DGAAE to SERNANP’s 
observations (No. 2301756). 
 06/25/2013.  DGAAE submits Pluspetrol’s responses to SERNANP (No. 1750-
2013-MEM-AAE). 
 06/25/2013.  DGAAE sends more observations to Pluspetrol in Report No. 093-
2013-MEM-AAE/IB (No. 366-2013-MEM/AAE). 
 07/08/2013.  Pluspetrol answers DGAAE’s observations of Report No. 093-2013-
MEM-AAE/IB.  (No. 2310088). 
 07/11/2013.  Pluspetrol responds to observations (No. 2312006). 
 07/12/2013.  SERNANP sent its technical opinion to the DGAAE with 
observations. (No.2311808). 
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 07/12/2013. SERNANP sent to DGAAE additional comments to the Technical 
Opinion No. 181-2013-SERNANP-DGANP with no observations (No. 
23122002). 
 07/15/2013.  The Ministry of Culture publishes a resolution from the Vice 
Ministry of Cross Cultural Affairs (VMI) No. 005-2013-VMI-MC with a binding 
opinion.  The document had 83 observations detailing the serious potential social 
and cultural impacts of the project.  The VMI made the document public instead 
of submitting it to the DGAAE.  The document was removed from the Ministry of 
Culture’s website the next day. 
 07/18/2013. SERNANP sends to DGAAE the Official Letter No. 843-2013-
SERNANP-DGANP approving the EIA 
 08/06/2013. DGAAE sends Pluspetrol its report No. 119-2013-MEM-
AAE/IB/MSB/GCP/MMR/MSC with additional observations (No. 476-2013-
MEM-AAE). 
 08/12/2013. Pluspetrol answers DGAAE’s report No. 119-2013-MEM-
AAE/IB/MSB/GCP/MMR/MSC (No. 2319549). 
 08/12/2013. Pluspetrol sends DGAAE additional information to answer ANA’s 
Technical Report No. 024-2013-ANA/DGCRH/ZTA (No. 2318768). 
 08/13/2013. DGAAE submits to ANA Pluspetrol’s additional information (No. 
2233-2013-MEM/AAE). 
 08/12/2013. Pluspetrol sends a letter ANA to clarify information (No. 2319628). 
 09/04/2013.  DGAAE sends to ANA additional information from the company 
(No. 2476-2013-MEM/AAE). 
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 09/11/2013. ANA announced to DGAAE its approval of the EIS through Official 
Letter No. 537-2013-ANA DGCRH and Report No. 026-2013-ANA-
DGCRH/MAQM (No. 2326783). 
 11/29/2013.  The VMI announced its approval of the EIS.   
 
Following is a brief overview of some of the above-mentioned documents: 
 
The Ministry of Energy and Mines 
The General Directorate of Environmental Affairs or Energy Projects (DGAAE) 
formulated at least three sets of observations to the EIS (Table 15). Several of these 
observations required Pluspetrol to address issues such as water pollution prevention, 
waste treatment, a plan to rescue wildlife species, and extraction of aggregates from the 
Cashiriari River, among others.  
 
Table 15.  DGAAE’s Observations to the EIS for the Proposed Expansion of the 
Camisea Project in Block 88 
 
Document Number Number of 
Technical Opinion 
Date Content 
259-2013-MEM-
AAR-DGAAE 
049-2013-MEM-
AAE/IB 
05/09/2013 122 observations 
and the assessment 
of 14 answers to 
previous 
observations 
366-2013-MEM- 
AAR-DGAAE 
093-2013-MEM-
AAE/IB 
06/26/2013 38 additional 
observations 
476-2013-MEM- 
AAR-DGAAE 
11-2013-MEM-
AAE-DGAAE 
08/06/2013 Declared the EIA 
“observed” and 
reiterates 11 
observations 
(including two 
about industrial 
effluents) 
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This authority made critical points about necessary environmental remediation 
such as the treatment of industrial effluents from the drilling operations with potentially 
hazardous drilling lubricants.   DGAAE’s Observation No. 15 of Report No. 093-2013-
MEM-AAE/IB prohibited the discharge of industrial effluents into freshwater sources.  
The EIS proposed storing the effluents in sedimentation tanks (described as “Australian 
tanks” without providing much technical details about them) to let them settle before 
discharging them into local water sources and claimed it was ‘treated’ (ERM, 2012, p. 6-
221).   The company replied90 this observation and stated that the discharge of these 
effluents would comply with the environmental standards without affecting the quality of 
the freshwater sources because the “water bodies could assimilate the industrial effluent 
without changing the water quality” (Pluspetrol, 2013, p.5)  
 
SERNANP 
Between February and July 2013, SERNANP produced four documents with 
comments to the EIA shown in Table 16. 
Table 16.  SERNANP’s Observations to the EIS for the Proposed Expansion of the 
Camisea Project in Block 88 
 
Document Number Number of 
Technical Opinion 
Date Content 
144-2013-
SERNANP-
DGANP 
044-2013-
SERNANP-
DGANP 
02/06/2013 68 observations 
653-2013-
SERNANP-
DGANP 
181-2013-
SERNANP-
DGANP 
06/05/2013 20 observations not 
resolved 
822-2013- 234-2013- 07/10/2013 4 observations not 
                                                 
90 Pluspetrol (2013) Levantamiento de Observaciones al Estudio de Impacto Ambiental para la Ampliación 
del Progama de Exploración y Desarrollo en el Lote 88.  Informe No. 093-2013-MEM-AEE/IB. 
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SERNANP-
DGANP 
SERNANP-
DGANP 
resolved 
831-2013-
SERNANP-
DGANP 
234-2013-
SERNANP-
DGANP 
07/12/2013 Declares the 
observations of the 
Technical Opinion 
No. 181-2013-
SERNANP-
DGANP resolved 
and only formulates 
recommendations 
 Most of these observations addressed the descriptive aspects of the EISs, 
especially the biological and physical baseline.  These observations did not include issues 
such as the definition of the project’s area of direct and indirect influence.   SERNANP 
overlooked some aspects relevant for the ecosystem balance, such as the potential 
impacts caused by aggregate extraction (gravel and sand from the rivers).   The EIS 
mentioned the use of heavy equipment to extract gravel from the Cashiriari River that 
would require the temporarily diversion of the river91, which could affect the riparian 
ecosystem.  However, SERNANP did note some risks from the construction of paths 
inside the RTKNN, which were mentioned in the EIA (Chapter 1 of the EIA, No. 
4.1.1.1):  
“The project overlaps routes and paths used by the nomadic indigenous 
population and indigenous communities in the area…”  The EIA describes these 
routes and states a migration of these populations along the Manu River can be 
expected.   The project would entail bringing new people [workers] to the area, 
which implies high use of local resources and potential conflicts with the native 
communities living in the Manu River basin.  The contingency must include plans 
to avoid the migration and/or relocation of nomad populations inside the Manu 
National Park.”92 
 
 
 
SERNANP also stated that it was not within its mandate to address issues such as 
assessing the proposed treatment system for drilling effluents, the effects of the 
                                                 
91 Report No. 093-MEM-AAE/IB, p.12 
92 Observation No. 68 in 044-2013-SERNANP-DGANP 
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incineration of solid wastes (included as a measure in the solid wastes management plan 
of the EIA) or air emissions in the environment because these issues fall outside their 
expertise (Pedro Gamboa, Chief of SERNANP, personal communication).  In less than a 
month, the 20 observations of the Technical Opinion No. 181-2013-SERNANP-DGANP 
were transformed into general recommendations.   
Another controversial point was SERNANP’s opinion in the Official Letter No. 
822-2013-SERNANP of July 11, 2013, requiring Pluspetrol to provide a satisfactory 
answer to two previously formulated observations regarding water quality and 
invertebrates in the project area.  Surprisingly, the next day, SERNANP invalidated this 
requirement - arguing that it was an “involuntary error” (error involuntario), annulling 
the observations of the previous document and formulating three recommendations 
(Official letter No. 831-2013-SERNANP-DGANP).   SERNANP explained the mistake, 
arguing that they had received additional information from Pluspetrol.   
A congressional representative investigating this issue noted that the time stamps 
indicated there were only two-hour difference between the time when the MEM sent 
Pluspetrol’s responses to SERNANP and the time when SERNANP released its 
document annulling its observations and formulated its recommendations.   The 
representative inquired “how is it possible that only in two hours –according to the time 
stamps of both institutions- the documents went from the MEM to SERNANP and that it 
had enough time to analyze the company’s information, decide to cancel its observations 
and formulate a new set of recommendations?” (Zúñiga, J.C., 2014)93.  SERNANP 
declared that Pluspetrol had responded to its observations thoroughly, and the Minister of 
                                                 
93 
http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/Prensa/heraldo.nsf/CNtitulares3/8c24b460a8a4117305257bde00537cb8/
?OpenDocument 
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the Environment apologized saying that ‘it was an involuntary mistake” (AIDESEP, 
September 6, 2013, Congress of Peru n/d94).   This statement raised concerns among the 
public about the independence of the state in the EIA process.  Congressional 
representatives, indigenous organizations and several NGOs questioned this erratic 
behavior of these government agencies.   
 
The National Water Authority – ANA 
Table 17.  ANA Observations to the EIS for the Proposed Expansion of the Camisea 
Project in Block 88 
Document Number Number of 
Technical Opinion 
Date Content 
020-2013/ 024-2013-ANA-
DGCRH/ZTA 
04/28/2013 28 observations 
537-2013-ANA-
DGCRH 
026-2013-ANA-
DGCRH 
09/11/2013 Approval 
  
ANA approved the project95 in September 2013 without major objections. 
 
The Ministry of Culture 
The Ministry of Culture’s opinion was crucial to the EIA process.  The Prior 
Consultation Law of 2012 granted the Vice-Ministry of Cross Cultural Affairs (Vice 
Ministerio de Interculturalidad - VMI) power to veto the project and affirmed that its 
opinion is binding in the EIA process involving indigenous people in isolation (opinión 
vinculante).  Consequently, the ministry’s endorsement was indispensable for Pluspetrol 
to conduct the proposed gas explorations in block 88.   As seen in the list above, this 
                                                 
94 
http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/Prensa/heraldo.nsf/CNtitulares3/8c24b460a8a4117305257bde00537cb8/
?OpenDocument 
 
95 Technical report No. 026-2013-ANA-DGCRH 
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ministry was the last to give its opinion about the project.  The DGAAE sent a letter to 
VMI the on May 27, 2013, requesting its opinion within seven business days.  The VMI 
replied,96 explaining that their opinion required gathering current data from the project 
area according to the UN The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights, James Anaya 
(described later), requested the Peruvian government make an informed decision about 
the project and expressed his concern about the potential risks of the project to the 
indigenous population (Anaya, 2014). 
In July 2013, the Ministry of Culture (through its Vice-Ministry of Cross Cultural 
Affairs) published the order No. 005-2013-VMI-MC from VMI raising concerns about 
the project.  The ministry formulated 83 observations to the environmental study, which 
in summary expressed serious concerns about the impact of the expansion of the Camisea 
gas project on the well-being of indigenous people in voluntary isolation inside the 
RTKNN (Report No. 004-20130DGPI-VMI/MC.  Resolution No. 009-2013-VMI-MC).   
The Ministry of Culture made public their observations by posting this report in its 
website instead of submitting it to the DGAAE and following administrative procedures.  
The document was removed from the Ministry of Culture’s website the next day after the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines sent to the Ministry of Culture 8 more volumes of the EIS 
to the Ministry of Culture.  
Four days later, the VMI published Resolution No. 007-2013-VMI-MC 
invalidating its previous opinion with the 83 observations to the project.   The ministry 
justified its decision by arguing that “prior to releasing the VMI’s opinion of July 15, the 
DGAAE sent eight volumes with new information and details about the EIA; and the 
technical opinions of the Ministry of Agriculture, National Water Authority and 
                                                 
96 Official Letter No. 284-2013 DGIDP/VMI/MC 
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SERNANP, the last two of mandatory compliance” (Ministry of Culture, August 7 
201397).   Soon after this, Paulo Vilca Arpasi, Vice Minister of Cross Cultural Affairs, 
resigned as result of the disagreements about the case (La República, July 26, 201398).  
The “official” version from the Ministry of Culture was that it decided to withdraw its 
first report with 83 observations to the EIA after MEM sent complementary information.  
However, the withdrawal of the Ministry of Culture’s first report was actually attributed 
to pressure from the government and Pluspetrol, which wanted to start activities before 
the rainy season started (Barclay & García Hierro, 2014).   
María Luisa Del Río, former General Director of Biological Diversity of Peru’s 
Ministry of the Environment, noted that this is not the first time that the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines releases additional information after the Ministry of Culture has 
negative observations to a project (del Río, 2014).  Two days later, Luis Peirano 
(Minister of Culture) and Paulo Vilca (Vice-Minister of Cross Cultural Affairs) resigned.  
Soon after his resignation, Vilca defended his report and said he resigned because he 
disagreed with the way the government intends to carry out this project and did not want 
to endorse a situation like that could be triggered by the exploitation of block 88 (Ibid.).   
On August 9, 2013, the newspaper Gestión published some statements of the 
Minister of Energy and Mines who was “hoping to hear as soon as possible [VMI]’s 
binding opinion about the EIA of block 88 to take advantage of the projects’ favorable 
                                                 
97 http://www.cultura.gob.pe/es/comunicacion/noticia/opinion-tecnica-del-ministerio-de-cultura-sobre-el-
estudio-de-impacto-ambiental 
 
98 larepublica.pe/26-07-2013/vilca-renuncia-a-cultura-por-tema-del-lote-88 
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conditions…  [and] that no indigenous populations have been contacted; therefore, the 
prior consultation law could not be implemented.”99   
As mentioned, part of the controversy between the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
and other public and private agencies is about the actual existence of indigenous people 
in isolation despite Pluspetrol admitted having encounters with the people in isolation.  
These discrepancies between extractive industries and indigenous rights precipitated the 
resignation of other government officials such as Ivan Lanegra, who also left the Ministry 
of Culture in the midst of these discussions.  Lanegra stated then: “From my point of 
view, certain rural communities had to be recognized as indigenous peoples, so they 
could benefit from the consultation law.  However due to the lack of willingness I had to 
resign” (del Rio, 2014).    
As described in Chapter III, government agencies have strong differences about 
the social and environmental effects to extractive activities.  These discrepancies increase 
the level of mistrust of the local populations about the independence of government 
decisions.   This study found that there are strong disagreements between different 
government institutions participating in environmental decision-making processes 
affecting the governance of resource extraction.  As Tanaka (2008) contend, the state is 
ambiguous and complex, and in the last years, the Peruvian government has experienced 
the creation of spaces with a certain degree of autonomy that even have the power to 
challenge and oppose longstanding economic and political interests.   However, 
apparently this is not the first time that the Ministry of Culture has been pressured to 
change its opinion.  Another case involved the process of creating an indigenous reserve 
overlapping the oil concessions 39 and 67 in Loreto; the ministry’s report supporting the 
                                                 
99 gestion.pe/economia/gobierno-defiende-mas-exploraciones-gas-lote-88-camisea-2073265 
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creation of the protected area was cancelled as a result of pressure from the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines and an oil company (Hill, 2014; Barclay & García Hierro, 2014).  
In early August, the Ombudsman sent a letter to the President of the Council of 
Ministers (No. 01132-2013/DP) with recommendations regarding the EIA process for the 
expansion of exploration activities in block 88, and requested the inclusion of the VMI’s 
Resolution No. 005-2013-VMI-MC in the EIA process; clearly, this was the high point of 
the discussions with the government about the project.   A group of NGOs proclaimed 
their opposition in a public statement released on August 1, 2013, demanding the 
government take immediate measures protecting the indigenous population of the 
RTKNN (Gamboa 2013).    The President of the Council of Ministers, Juan Jiménez, 
stated that the Ministry of Culture failed to adequately review all the information 
provided by Pluspetrol and the VMI document of July 15 and that the ministry was 
currently reviewing the additional information (Diario Gestión, August 8, 2013,100).    On 
December 03, 2013, VMI published Resolution No. 009-2013-VMI-MC approving the 
EIA.  This decision was indispensable for the DGAAE to finally approve the EIS and 
grant the environmental license to the project. 
 
The Role of the Indigenous Groups in the EIA Process  
The pressure of increasing social-environmental conflicts associated with oil and 
mining projects seem to have influenced the Ministry of Energy and Mines’ decision to 
enact a public participation rule in the form of a Supreme Decree No. 012-2008-EM in 
2008 which stated: “according to an assessment of the facts by the Ministry of Energy 
                                                 
100 http://gestion.pe/economia/gobierno-desecho-informe-que-advertia-riesgos-indigenas-ampliacion-lote-
88-2073160 
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and Mines, it is necessary to develop a Citizen Participation Rule specifically for the 
hydrocarbon sector” (emphasis added).  The rule invokes Peru’s constitution and the ILO 
Convention 169: 
“[ILO Convention 169] requires governments to develop, with the participation of 
the peoples involved, a coordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of 
these peoples and to guarantee the respect of their integrity…in case of the 
existence of subsoil resources or minerals owned by the State… the governments 
must establish or keep consultation procedures with the interested people in order 
to determine if the interests of these peoples would be affected and to what extent, 
prior to undertaking or authorizing any exploration or exploitation program of the 
resources in their lands”  
(Supreme Decree No. 008-2012, paragraph 3).   
 
While the title of the rule refers in general terms to the “public.” the fact that all of 
Peru’s onshore oil activities are located in the Amazon implies that the “public” is, for the 
vast majority, Amazonian indigenous people and mestizo settlers.   This has important 
political and practical implications.   From the political standpoint, the public 
participation rule for hydrocarbon projects (which preceded the Prior Consultation Law 
of 2012 described in Chapter IV) legalizes the right of citizen groups who have been 
historically excluded from decision-making processes to participate (regardless of the 
broad interpretations of what the term implies) in the exploration or exploitation of a 
critical natural resource for the state.  The fact that 100% of the proposed expansion of 
block 88 would take place inside the RTKNN implies that the public “participating” in 
the EIA process would be comprised of mostly indigenous groups, including those in 
voluntary isolation and/or initial contact (at least nominally or represented by 
neighboring native organizations), and to a lesser extent, the mestizo population.    
Despite the fact that the public participation rule for oil and gas projects 
establishes public hearings and information workshops as the only the mandatory 
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requirements,101 the norm does not contain an obligation to change the project based on 
local people’s concerns, require their consent or to allow them to veto the project.  In 
other words, the rule regards public participation only as an informative procedure and 
does not include bestowing any power to the community to affect decisions about the 
project’s activities.  Even though the authorities require companies to explain the project 
to the local communities in their native language, they tend to omit references to the 
project’s potential negative social-environmental impacts because they seek the local 
people’s support of their project.  Several interviewees highlighted this aspect as a 
weakness of the EIA process as had been noted in many other extractive activities by 
community members (Hindery, 2013; Beder & Connelly, 1997).    
Practical aspects such as reviewing lengthy and complex information in the EIS 
are a problem.  Roughly 45% of the indigenous population six years or older in block 88 
has not completed elementary school, and barely 8% has graduated from high school 
(ERM, 1992, p. 4-129).   As the EIA study for block 88 states, there are serious 
difficulties in providing elementary education services (page 4-130). The only schools 
available are multi-degree schoolrooms with a single teacher instructing 15-20 students 
of different degrees simultaneously.   Therefore, the effectiveness of the community 
workshops and public hearings is highly questionable given the population’s literacy 
levels.  Explaining the shortfalls of implementing the national and international mandate 
for public participation in environmental impact assessment processes, a representative of 
the indigenous communities said that they learned about the project after the decision was 
already made, therefore for them EIS was only to be informed about what will happen.  
                                                 
101 The rule also suggests complementary mechanisms such as a mailbox for the submission of opinions 
and observations to the EIAs, guided visits, use of media outlets (radio or television spots) and information 
staff.  
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The outcomes of the discussions between local, regional and national authorities, 
native leaders, national and international NGOs over oil/gas projects are frequently 
influenced by divergent political and economic views (Bebbington, 2013; Caballero, 
2010).  Discussions over resource extraction occur with different levels of complexity 
and at different scales (national and international).    Interviewees overwhelmingly agreed 
that they found the disagreements and contradictions between national institutions 
confusing.  These contradictory opinions, the lack of independence of the EIS and its 
high level of complexity are determinant in the generation of mistrust in the local 
populations, which results in social-environmental conflicts (Ombudsman’s Office, 
2007).   The overwhelming result, according to the indigenous leaders interviewed about 
the audiencias públicas and talleres comunitarios during the EIA process, is a mistrust of 
the EIA studies’ reliability and of the Ministry of Energy and Mine’s role in the decision-
making process.    For most of the people living in the remote comunidades of the 
Amazon who do not read or write well, accessing and understanding the content of an 
environmental study of an oil/gas project is extremely difficult (Ombudsman’s Office, 
2006).   
 Concerned about the weaknesses of the EIS and the potential impact of the project 
on the local population, COMARU sought the support of other national Amazonian 
indigenous organization AIDESEP and other with regional scope sucn as, FENAMAD 
from Madre de Dios and ORAU from Ucayali. A letter was also sent to five United 
Nations representatives (Special Rapporteurs on: the rights of Indigenous Peoples, food, 
housing, the President of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues).  One member of 
COMARU said the federation leaders were concerned that the company alleged that it 
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had rights to conduct exploration activities in the area due to the fact that their contract 
with the government was prior to Decree 028-2003-AG, a law which restricted 
undertaking economic activities inside the reserve.    The indigenous federation faced the 
difficulty reviewing the EIAs and formulating observations in technical terms (social and 
environmental) in order to communicate their concerns about the potential impacts of the 
project on the local communities (including the groups in voluntary isolation and initial 
contact).   Some members of the Nahua ethnic group believed that the presence of 
Pluspetrol could help them access health and education whereas the Nanti, a group in 
initial contact since the 1980s (before the arrival of Pluspetrol in the area), of the 
Montetoni and Marankiato (Malaksiari) localities were less open to the presence of the 
company in Camisea.   A delegation of the Nahua people traveled to Lima in October 
2013 and announced that they agreed with the presence of Pluspetrol in the RTKNN and 
that the NGOs in Lima arguing against the expansion of the Camisea project in block 88 
did not represent their interests (El Comercio, October 13 2013)102.    
Some interviewees indicated that the presence of Dominican missionaries would 
support some of the indigenous populations including some in initial contact in the 
RTKNN, especially because the Dominican Mission Pío Aza would manage a $5 million 
USD trust fund for some of these indigenous communities in block 88:  Santa Rosa de 
Serjali, Montetoni, Marankiato, Sababantiari, and Alto Timpia.  In addition, some local 
people were interested in the job opportunities that Pluspetrol offered during the 
community workshops.  Furthermore, other local indigenous federations and 
CECONAMA (representing 10 communities of Low Urubamba valley) were also 
interested in the benefits offered by the oil company.    
                                                 
102 http://elcomercio.pe/politica/opinion/rebelion-nahuas_1-noticia-1644111 
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COMARU and CECONAMA have different views about this issue, the protection 
of RTKNN and issues such as land titling of the indigenous communities in the region.  
Some local leaders said that COMARU has a closer relationship with the catholic 
Dominican missionaries while CECONAMA has stronger ties with the Evangelical 
protestant groups.  Local people also pointed out that these federations also have different 
views of “development.”  CECONAMA prioritized the exchange of ideas about 
development from outsiders whereas COMARU’s view of “development” was mostly 
integrated with securing land titling and their territories.   Both federations share overall 
ideals for their communities but have different strategies and perspectives about the 
potential economic benefits that the company should offer them.   Therefore, for 
COMARU (even though they disagreed with the expansion of the Camisea project in the 
RTKNN) it was not easy to represent groups which had divergent points of view about 
the project within its membership and which did not have the capacity to articulate their 
objections to the project in technical terms.   Some Nanti who opposed the expansion of 
the exploration activities in the RTKNN thought that, if needed, they could get health 
care and education from the Dominican missionaries in Kirigeti.   A representative of 
COMARU also emphasized that one of the communities’ main concern was the projects’ 
health impacts and that the health authorities do not participate or give an opinion during 
the EIA process.    
An additional concern mentioned is the sparse health support in the area, which 
could improve substantially if the staff receives training to provide services in a multi-
cultural manner.  COMARU and its national allies sought international support to 
counterweigh the government’s pressure to approve the expansion of the Camisea project 
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in the RTKNN.   Therefore, there were clear differences between COMARU’s opposition 
to the expansion of the Camisea project in block 88 and CENONAMA’s perception that 
it was an opportunity to gain from the economic benefits that the project could offer to 
the local communities. 
Patricia Balbuena, at that time Vice Minister of Cross Cultural Affairs of the 
Ministry of Culture (after the resignation of Paulo Vilca mentioned earlier), stated that 
even though the ministry acknowledged the risks, Pluspetrol’s 2000 contract with the 
government granted the company the right to operate in the concession (interview in 
Rumbo Económico, Channel N, November 20 2013).  Balbuena added that some of the 
communities in initial contact demanded land titles for their communities as well as 
health and education services from the state; therefore, the RTKNN’s rigorous legal 
protection status as an indigenous territorial reserve (reserva territorial) that limited 
activities in the area hindered some groups from accessing to these benefits.     However, 
the indigenous people inside the RTKNN and block 88 are also divided about this issue.  
In early August 2013, a group of Nahua from Santa Rosa de Serjali sent a letter to the 
VMI stating that they would not allow oil/gas activities in their territories based on health 
concerns and argued that the company was not complying with the government’s 
commitments with the IDB (described earlier) and the indigenous communities.  Other 
groups such as Segakiato were in favor of the Camisea project.  Some of its members 
with entrepreneurial interests created a fluvial transportation company in partnership with 
Pluspetrol and other private entities, carrying goods and passengers in the area.  The 
Peru’s influential National Mining, Oil and Energy Society, a powerful business 
association representing the largest corporations, awarded the company “Segakiato SAC” 
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with the “Sustainable Development Prize” in 2013.   Although some groups regard 
experience with the company as positive, others still question the actual benefits for the 
community at large.   For instance, Gamboa (2013) and Barclay and García Hierro (2014) 
noted that many of the indigenous peoples in the RTKNN lack national identity 
documents (Documento Nacional de Identidad– DNI) and that the company offered 
temporary work to the people attending workshop in the community of Segakiato on 
March 15, 2013, who showed their DNI.  The question Barclay and García Hierro raise is 
that forcing the Nanti to hold identity documents could be a way to control a native 
population and remove them from their status as vulnerable indigenous groups that justify 
the existence of the RTKNN.   
James Anaya, at that time U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, sent a letter to the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveying the concerns 
of the indigenous leaders and asked that if there are studies about the environmental and 
social impacts related to these activities, this evidence must be available.   In his report 
about the case, Anaya (2014, p.2) summarized the controversy about the EIS:  
“… the government and the company Pluspetrol argue in favor of the project 
because it will supply energy that the country needs.  [They] assert that the 
Camisea Project is compatible with sustaining the biodiversity and well-being of 
the indigenous people in the project area.  They also propose economic benefits 
and jobs that the project would bring.  On the other hand, several national and 
international NGOs have criticized harshly the project with allegedly negative 
social and environmental impacts, and that the expansion of the project according 
to the company’s plans would put at risk the indigenous people in voluntary 
isolation and in initial contact in the reserve.”  
 
In this report, Anaya highlighted the peculiar changes in the VMI’s opinions sent 
to the EIS in July 2013 (described earlier) and a “new opinion in November 2013 with 
only 37 concerns, much less critical than the previous one” (p. 4).   He recommended that 
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the government “correct the lack of an adequate consultation” with the indigenous 
communities whose territories could be affected by the project, including those in initial 
contact. He also recommended there should be effective processes to challenge the 
decisions of government institutions regarding the approval of the project.  
The process to approve EIS continues to be at the core of the decision-making 
allowing new exploration and exploitation hydrocarbon projects.   This is problematic 
because as this study reveals, there are profound contradictions among the opinions and 
stances of government agencies that participate in the EIA process.   Issues such as the 
“involuntary error” SERNANP and the withdrawal of more than 80 concerns to the EIS 
by the Ministry of Culture are evidence of the central government’s pressure to approve 
the expansion of the Camisea gas project in block 88, regardless of its numerous 
weaknesses.  Although the national laws define mechanisms for public participation 
during the EIA process, in practice these consist mainly of workshops where the local 
population is “informed” about a project.   Cases such as the one described here show 
that local people do not have open access to the discussions between government 
agencies about the potential environmental and social effects of oil and gas projects.  This 
study shows these documents were very difficult to obtain in Lima; needless to say, they 
are not available to the people living in the remote areas where oil and gas projects take 
place.   The process that led to approval of the EIS for the expansion of the Camisea 
project in block 88 reveals the need for independence during the preparation and 
evaluation of these environmental studies.  The lack of transparency during the process 
contributes to the growing mistrust of the EIA process in the hydrocarbon sector. 
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Indigenous federations in blocks 1AB/192 in Loreto described in Chapter IV and 
88 in Cusco have created community-based monitoring groups (monitoreo comunitario) 
to keep track of the effects of resource extraction, with mixed results.  In the case of the 
Monitoring Program of Alto Urubamba (PMAC), the Matsigenka people coordinated 
with both the Camisea Consortium and environmental NGOs.   This occurred because 
state agencies, such as OEFA, do not have the technical and financial capacity to fully 
overview the environmental performance of companies.  For instance, this study found 
that OEFA’s office in Iquitos (despite oil production in the region) only has resources to 
oversee gas stations in the city, and depends on staff from Lima to sporadically inspect 
the operations of oil companies in its jurisdiction.  In addition, indigenous organizations 
in both case studies mistrust state agencies’ independence to conduct environmental 
assessments, and therefore feel compelled to organize the monitoring of oil company’s 
activities, themselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
WHERE IS THE MONEY GOING? THE DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS FROM OIL AND GAS PROJECTS IN LORETO AND CUSCO 
 
This chapter analyzes the distribution of the economic benefits from oil and gas 
projects in blocks 1AB (192), 8 and 88 in Loreto and Cusco.  The distribution of 
economic benefits from the extraction of natural resources is one of the most 
controversial issues today. Oil companies emphasize their contribution to economies 
while civil society groups raise questions about the distribution of oil revenues.  Taxes 
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and royalties from resource extraction (primarily metal mining and hydrocarbons) in Peru 
increased from $500 USD million in 2004 to more than $3 USD billion in 2007-2008 as a 
result of neoliberal economic and legal reforms that have encouraged resource extraction 
in the country since the mid-1990s.  This increase understandably generated great 
expectations among the local populations that these funds would improve their material 
well-being.   Resource extraction has not necessarily translated into equitable economic 
benefits for the population; however, actual disparities in access to health services, 
education, and access to basic services between urban and rural populations have 
reinforced the perception of a paradoxical “resource curse”.   The literature on the 
“resource curse” has explored these relationships with particular regard to oil and mining 
in the Global South (Carruthers, 2008; Martínez-Alier, 2002; Bebbington, 2009).  The 
“curse” or “paradox of plenty”, refers to the argument that abundance of highly valuable 
natural resources in countries of the Global South negatively correlates with economic 
growth and wealth (Sachs and Warner, 1999; Auty, 1986; Mikesell, 1997).   Case studies 
exploring mining and oil production in Nigeria, Ecuador, Ghana, Sudan and Congo show 
that chronic poverty, lack of clean drinking water, sanitation, electricity, education and 
health services affect many mining and oil rich regions of the Global South (Watts, 
2015).   Paradoxically, the last two decades of economic growth in Latin America, linked 
to resource extraction has brought with it a rise in the number of social conflicts 
associated with the maldistribution of wealth and the high levels of the contamination in 
mining and oil production sites. 103   
                                                 
103 According to the World Bank (2014), Latin America in the last two decades 70 million people came out 
of poverty; while its middle class expanded to represent more than half of its population. 
http://www.bancomundial.org/es/region/lac/overview 
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In Peru, the economic growth of the last decade reduced poverty104 levels 
(measured in monetary terms, according to a household’s capacity to cover basic food 
basket) from 58.7% in 2004 to 22.7% in 2014 (INEI).   The gap between the urban the 
population of the coast and the rural areas in the Andes and Amazon remain significant 
(Table 18).105 
 
 
 
 
Table 18.  Geographic Distribution of Poverty in Peru (2003-2014) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
(*) 
Total 52.3 58.7 55.6 49.2 42.4 37.3 33.5 30.8 27.8 25.8 23.9 22.7 
Lima City 32.6 44.6 42.4 32.7 25.1 21.7 16.1 15.8 15.6 14.5 12.8 11.8 
Rest of 
the 
country 
60.2 64.7 61.2 56.3 50.0 44.2 41.2 37.4 33.3 30.9 29.0 27.8 
National - Place of residence 
Urban  40.0 48.2 44.5 37.0 30.1 25.4 21.3 20.0 18.0 16.6 16.1 15.3 
Rural 75.2 83.4 82.5 79.3 74.0 68.8 66.7 61.0 56.1 53.0 48.0 46.0 
Region 
Coast 39.7 48.6 44.4 36.4 29.3 25.3 20.7 19.8 17.8 16.5 15.7 14.3 
Andes 68.8 70.0 67.7 63.0 58.1 53.0 48.9 45.2 41.5 38.5 34.7 33.8 
Amazon 64.1 70.4 70.1 65.5 55.8 46.4 47.1 39.8 35.2 32.5 31.2 30.4 
Urban/Rural and Region 
Coast – 
Urban 
39.6 50.8 43.2 37.6 31.7 27.4 23.7 2..0 18.2 17.5 18.4 16.3 
Coast – 
Rural 
61.7 69.3 66.9 62.2 53.8 46.6 46.5 38.3 37.1 31.6 29.0 29.2 
Andes – 
Urban 
47.1 46.9 44.0 37.1 31.8 26.7 23.2 21.0 18.7 17.0 16.2 17.5 
Andes - 
Rural 
80.8 86.7 85.4 83.1 79.2 74.9 71.0 66.7 62.3 58.8 52.9 50.4 
Amazon 
– Urban 
60.6 59.4 58.4 54.6 44.0 32.7 32.7 27.2 26.0 22.4 22.9 22.6 
Amazon 
- Rural 
67.1 81.5 82.4 77.3 69.2 62.5 64.4 55.5 47.0 46.1 42.6 41.5 
(*) Estimated.    Data source: INEI, 2016 
                                                 
104 From 1997-2010 INEI measured Peru’s poverty levels based on the National Household Survey 
(Encuesta Nacional de Hogares) measured comparing per capita income or a household expenditure with 
the minimal food basket (2318 kilo calories/day/person).  INEI updated this method to include changes in 
the urban and rural consumption patterns since 2010.  (INEI 2000, 2014)   
 
105 The most recent poverty level data from INEI is for 2013 and still has only projections for 2014. 
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The same gap is observed with extreme poverty levels.   While extreme poverty 
levels dropped nationally from 16.4% in 2004 to an estimated 4.3% in 2014, the poverty 
level of rural populations in the Andes and Amazon and is 19 and 12 times higher 
respectively (INEI, 2016).   Consequently, Peru’s economic growth over the last two 
decades has not contributed to expected reductions in economic inequalities. The 
following sections explore how the economic benefits from resource extraction are 
distributed and allocated in order to shed light on how these may (or may not) influence 
the decision-making processes involving hydrocarbon activities in Peru.     
 
Royalties, Canon and Sobrecanon 
Since 1976 the Peruvian government has passed laws106 regulating the distribution 
of wealth generated by oil and gas extraction. Like other extraction and energy generating 
businesses (hydropower, forestry, fisheries and large scale metal mining), oil and gas 
companies must pay royalties to the owner of underground resources, the Peruvian 
government. These funds are then distributed to local governments.   The amount paid as 
royalties can vary according to the type of contract (license or service) signed between oil 
companies and the Peruvian state, which is represented by Perupetro.   According to the 
law107, companies operating under a license contract hold property rights to extracted 
hydrocarbons and must pay royalties to the government according to conditions 
established in their contracts with the Peruvian government.   In other words, royalties 
                                                 
106 Canon Act (Ley del Canon): Law No. 27506.  Canon Rule:  Supreme Decree No. 005-2002-EF 
 
107 Supreme Decree No. 049-93-EM Rule for the Application of Royalties and Redistribution of Oil 
Contracts (Reglamento para la Aplicación de la Regalía y Redistribución en los Contratos Petroleros) 
 187 
 
vary in each license contract. In a service contract, oil companies pay royalties as 
restitution for the service they provide by extracting the hydrocarbons. This restitution is 
calculated based on the audited oil production by MEM: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Types of Oil and Gas Contracts 
 
Oil and/or Gas Contracts 
 
 
                                License  
 
 
                 Services  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of contract 
 
Royalties Restitution Type of 
collection  
 
 From 2000 to 2013, the Peruvian government earned roughly $12.9 billion USD 
in royalties, more than for the exploitation of crude oil and gas.  During the same period, 
the central government transferred approximately $7.4 billion USD to the regional 
governments of Cusco, Loreto, Tumbes, Piura and Huanuco. 
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Figure 30. Distribution of Royalties from Oil Production in Block 1AB  
 
Sources: Grandez, 2011; Supreme Decree No. 21678; Laws 29693, 30062 and 26221 
 
The contracts between the government and oil companies also specify the location 
of “audit points” where authorities monitor the amount of oil produced, which is reported 
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as “audited hydrocarbon production.” This amount is important to estimate the market 
value of the hydrocarbons produced according to the current international oil prices 
known as the “price basket.” 108     
In the case of oil and gas exploitation blocks 1AB, 8 and 88, the Peruvian 
government signed license contracts with Pluspetrol.  The company therefore owned all 
the property rights of the oil and gas produced in these production sites. 109  Its financial 
contribution to the government mainly takes the form of royalties calculated from 
hydrocarbon production (according to the specific conditions in their contracts with the 
national government) and taxes.110   The Constitution111requires the government to 
distribute these funds between regional and local governments of areas where resources 
are extracted and to place them in two different funds, canon and sobrecanon.   The 
Ministry of Economy (MEF) 112 collects and distributes these funds based on estimates of 
population density and unfulfilled basic needs.113  As result of this law, oil and gas 
producing regions receive substantially more funds than other localities.   In addition, the 
canon and sobrecanon for oil and gas extraction are calculated differently in each 
department.  Loreto and Ucayali receive 18.75% (15% canon plus 3.75% of sobrecanon) 
of the commercial value of the oil produced and 75% percent of taxes on the company’s 
                                                 
108 Such as the Platts Oilgramm Price Report http://www.platts.com/products/oilgram-price-report 
 
109 The contract of block 1AB expired in August 2015. 
 
110 On May 24, 2001 the contract of block 1AB changed from a service to a license contract.  In the case of 
block 8, Perupetro S.A. signed a contract with Petroperu that was in force until 1996 when Pluspetrol and 
its associates signed a license contract with the government.  The license contract for exploitation of gas in 
block 88 was signed in December 2000. 
 
111 Article 77 of the Peruvian Constitution 
 
112 As required according to R.M. 261-2002-EF, Article 5.2 
 
113 From MEM, the National Institute of Statistics (INEI), and the National Tax Superintendence  
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revenue from oil production.   Huanuco (Puerto Inca) receives 15% of the oil production 
value and 50% of the revenue tax paid by oil companies in its jurisdiction (MEM, 2014).   
In the case of natural gas, Cusco (Peru’s largest producer of natural gas) receives 
more than 90% of the monetary benefits from gas production in the country.  Different 
from the oil canon, the gas canon is comprised of 50% of the companies’ revenue taxes 
and 50% of the royalties from gas production in its jurisdiction (SNMPE, 2015).  The 
Ministry of Economy states that the different distribution of canon between regions is due 
to the fact that each one of them developed a legal framework at different times. 
 
 
Table 19. Laws Regulating the Distribution of the Economic Benefits from Oil and 
Gas Projects 
 
Liquid hydrocarbons Canon for natural gas 
Law No. 27506 
Rule:  Supreme Decree 005-2002- EF 
Decree No. 21678 
Law No. 23350, Article 161 
Law No. 23350 
Law No. 23871 
Law No. 24977, Article 379 
Urgency Decree No. 027-98 
Law No. 27506 and amendments 
Rule:  Supreme Decree 005-2002- EF 
 
 
 
 
To assess how royalties, canon and sobrecanon benefit local people, it is therefore 
necessary to determine how much natural gas and liquid hydrocarbons (crude oil and 
natural gas liquids114) are produced.  Tables 20 and 21 summarize national oil and natural 
                                                 
114 Natural gas consists mostly of methane but it can be found in association with other gases such as 
ethane, propane, butane and pentane, which are called (natural gas liquids).  In the case of the Camisea gas 
project, separation is done through cryogenic process where the lighter hydrocarbon gas (methane) is 
separated from the heavier ones through a temperature-based process. 
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gas production along with canon and sobrecanon distribution to hydrocarbon production 
areas of the Amazon. 
Table 20.  National Hydrocarbon Production 2005-2014 
 
 Liquid Hydrocarbons (thousands of barrels per day) Natural Gas 
(million cubic 
feet per day) 
Oil Natural Gas 
Liquids 
Total 
2005 75 36 111 147 
2006 78 38 116 172 
2007 77 37 114 259 
2008 77 44 120 328 
2009 71 74 145 336 
2010 73 85 157 700 
2011 70 83 153 1,099 
2012 67 86 153 1,144 
2013 63 105 168 1,180 
2014 69 103 173 1,250 
Data source: Perupetro, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21.  Distribution of the Canon and Sobrecanon from Oil and Gas Production 
in the Departments of the Amazon 
Department Percentage Beneficiary 
Loreto 52% 
40% 
5% 
3% 
Regional Government 
Municipalities (provinces) 
National University of the Amazon 
Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon 
Ucayali 40% 
 
20% 
 
Local government, district and province municipalities 
(Department 
 
Local government, district and province municipalities 
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20% 
 
10% 
 
5% 
 
3% 
 
2% 
where the resource is extracted 
 
Regional Government 
 
Local government where the resource is extracted 
 
Public Universities 
 
Technological Institutes 
 
Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon 
Huanuco 100% Municipal Council of Puerto Inca District 
Cusco 10% 
25% 
 
 
40% 
 
25% 
District municipalities where the resource is extracted 
 
District municipalities from the Province where the resource is 
extracted.  
 
Province municipalities of the department where the resource 
is extracted 
 
Regional government where the resource is extracted. 
20% is distributed among the public universities of the 
Department. 
Data source:  MIM Peru (n.d) 
 
 
 
Distribution of the Canon and Sobrecanon from Blocks 1AB and 8 
In spite of the decline of crude oil production described earlier, Loreto produced 
approximately 209.7 million barrels of crude oil from 2001 to 2014 (Propuesta 
Ciudadana 2014).  In 2014 oil production in Loreto recovered slightly once the French oil 
company Perenco began operations in block 67 (Figure 31).  
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Figure 31.  Crude Oil Production in Loreto (2001 – 2014) 
 
Data source: Perupetro 2014 
 
 
 
In the early 2000s the government amended its contract with Pluspetrol Norte 
S.A. for block 1AB, changing the agreement from a service to license contract granting 
the company ownership of the crude oil produced in exchange for 30% of the audited 
crude oil production in royalties.  This represented roughly $1.7 billion USD over ten 
years (Grandez, 2015). 
Table 22.  Royalties from Oil Production in Block 1AB:  2004 to June 2015 
Year Royalties in Million USD 
2004 114.2 
2005 148.0  
2006 172.3 
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2007 181.2 
2008 214.1  
2009 105.4 
2010 140.5 
2011 183.6 
2012 166.2 
2013 146.5 
2014 115.6 
2015(*) 23.2 
Total 1,710.8 
Sources: Perupetro, 2015; Grandez, 2015 
 
Blocks 1AB and 8 produced 87% and 97% of Loreto’s oil canon and sobrecanon 
in the last two years respectively, making them Peru’s main onshore crude oil production 
areas (Perupetro, 2015).   Pluspetrol’s license contracts in Loreto (blocks 1AB and 8) and 
Cusco (in Camisea’s blocks 56 and 88) not only granted the company ownership of the 
largest oil and gas production in the Amazon but also bestowed it with significant 
political power in Loreto as well as the national level.   As mentioned in Chapter IV, the 
government intimidated indigenous leaders and environmental groups who denounced 
the pollution generated by the company.  In addition, on many occasions, Pluspetrol 
refused to pay fines and won a court case brought against them for polluting the 
environment (PUINAMUDT, 2012; El Comercio, November 26 2013; RPP August 27, 
2015).    
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Table 23. Canon and Sobrecanon from Oil Production in Loreto (2014 – November 
2015) 
 
Oil 
Concession 
Canon and Sobrecanon from Crude Oil Production 
Year 2014 
(Million USD) 
Percentage Year 2015 
(Million USD) 
Percentage 
1AB(192) 72.9 49.5% 22 52.15% 
8 54.5 37.0% 19 44.45% 
67 18.2 12.3% 617 1.47% 
31B 1.3 0.9% 0.6 1.41% 
31E 0.53 0.4% 0.3 0.52% 
Total 147.3  42  
  Sources: Perupetro, 2015; Grandez 2015 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Audited Natural Gas Production 2004 – 2013 (National and Camisea). 
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Data source: OSINERGMIN, 2014 
   
How are the Royalties, Canon and Sobrecanon Collected and Distributed? 
Peru’s Constitutions of 1979 and 1993 incorporated for the first time the concept 
of regional governments (gobiernos regionales) in order to decentralize political and 
economic administration of programs.  Political and economic power in Peru has 
historically concentrated in Lima and urban coastal areas, creating power imbalances 
andsocial exclusion between areas of the country.  These power imbalances increased 
even more during the political violence of the 1980-1990s and continued during Alberto 
Fujimori’s first term (1990-1995).  Fujimori’s authoritarian and neoliberal regime 
weakened democratic institutions, grassroots organizations and political parties, 
increasing the concentration of power and strengthening the country’s vertical political 
framework. After the creation of  new regional governments in the constitution, it took 
another decade to develop the new legal frameworks, institutions and administrative 
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capacities to fully start their operation and to advance efforts to decentralize political 
power.115  At the same time, these new authorities have benefitted from the surge of 
resource extraction in the last decade.  Indeed, from 2001-2012 nine departments 
increased their rents over 100% (INEI, 2013).  
Funds from royalties, canon and sobrecanon are a substantial source of income 
not only for the central government but also for the regions where oil, gas and minerals 
are extracted.   Some provinces and districts therefore receive more funds than others 
without oil (or mining) projects.  These imbalances of the distribution of oil and gas rents 
have raised questions about the actual implications of extractive industries in local 
development.   Peru is not an isolated case; Denise Humphreys Bebbington’s analysis 
(2010) of the gas industry in Bolivia shows territorial conflicts between La Paz and Santa 
Cruz over the distribution of rents from the gas industry.   The heterogeneous distribution 
of rents between and within countries in Latin America is one of the main causes of 
economic and social disparities (Gómez Sabaini et al., 2015).  This disparity brings 
severe social and economic consequences as the revenues from resources extraction 
continue to grow.  In 2015, the National Assembly of Regional Governments (Asamblea 
Nacional de Gobiernos Regionales (ANGR) described the effect that the uneven 
distribution of canon has on Peru’s territorial inequalities as “perverse” (Propuesta 
Ciudadana, 2015). 
During the 1990s, information about the distribution of rents from hydrocarbon 
exploitation remained scarce.  It has become more readily available to citizen groups 
today as public and civil society organizations (such as Propuesta Ciudadana, a project 
                                                 
115 Articles 4 and 5 of Law No. 27867, Regional Government Act of 2002 (Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos 
Regionales)  
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of the non-profit organization DESCO, the Ministry of Economy and regional 
governments) make fiscal information available on their websites.  The general public 
became interested in this information during the “super cycle” of oil and mining 
exploitation and the surge of social-environmental conflicts associated with resource 
extraction in the 2000s (Propuesta Ciudadana, 2015a).   Peru’s super cycle of resource 
extraction generated revenues that grew from $259 million USD in 2004 to over $2,590 
million USD between 2007 and 2008 (Ibid.).  In other words, revenues increased ten 
times in three years as result of the surge of mining and oil activities in Peru.  Between 
2011 and 2014, these funds increased even more, reaching $ 2.9 billion USD (Ibid.).   As 
explained in the following section, differencial calculations in the amount that companies 
pay as canon for oil and gas production create spatial disparities between oil and gas 
production areas, along with greater social and environmental inequalities between 
groups.   
 
 
 
The Oil and Gas Canon  
The oil canon and sobrecanon are determined according to specific laws in each 
of the departments producing crude oil (Loreto, Ucayali, Huánuco in the Amazon and 
Tumbes and Piura on the coast) as shown in Table 24.  As mentioned above, the gas 
canon is equivalent to 50% of the royalties (defined in the company’s contract) and 50% 
of the income tax paid by the company.   
 
Table 24. Distribution of Canon in Oil Producing Regions 
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 Loreto Ucayali Piura Tumbes Puerto 
Inca 
(Huánuco) 
Canon Sobrecanon Canon Sobrecanon Canon Sobrecanon Canon Sobrecanon Canon 
Regional 
Governments 
52% 20% 52% 20% 20% 40% 20%  
Local 
Governments 
40% 40% 40%  70% 50% 70%  
District 
where oil in 
produced 
 10%       
Province 
where oil in 
produced 
 20      100% 
Region 
where oil is 
produced 
 40%       
Public 
Universities 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%  
Research 
Institute of 
the Peruvian 
Amazon 
3% 2% 3%      
Technology 
and 
Pedagogic 
Institutes 
 3%  5% 5% 5% 5%  
Data source: Ministry of Economy, Propuesta Ciudadana 
 
 
The Ministry of Economy (MEF) and Perupetro calculate the amounts of the oil 
canon and sobrecanon according to each company’s tax records and monthly production.   
The MEF collects these funds from the companies twice a month and transfers these 
funds to the local and regional governments each month (EITI, 2014).    
The distribution of these funds creates economic disparities. While Loreto, 
Ucayali and Huánuco Tumbes and Piura in the north coast benefit from crude oil 
production, the production of natural gas mainly benefits Cusco where the Camisea 
project is located.   From 2004 to mid-2015, Camisea paid $7.63 billion USD in royalties 
to the government, more than 80% of this region’s income.  In the same time period, 
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Loreto received $940.5 USD million as oil canon (Andina, August 13, 2015; SPH, 2015; 
Propuesta Ciudadana, 2015b).  
 
Distribution of the Oil Canon in Loreto 
In spite of the fall of oil prices and crude oil production, the canon, sobrecanon 
and royalties from blocks 1AB and 8 provide a financial pillar for the Regional 
Government of Loreto (GOREL) representing more than 96% of the royalties in the 
region (Table 25).   
 
 
 
Table 25.  Royalties Paid by Oil Companies Extracting Oil and Gas in Loreto 
(January – June 2015) 
 
Year Concessions and Royalties Paid in US$ Total US$ 
1AB 8 67 31 B/D 31E 
2015 23,202,473.22 16,346,405.36 457,523.42 850,113.52 95,394.98 40,951,910.50 
Sources: Perupetro, 2015; Grandez, 2015 
The contracts for blocks 1AB and 8 established respectively payments of 30% and 
25.5% of the crude oil production market value in royalties.   Of these funds, 62.5% is 
distributed as canon and sobrecanon to Loreto and Ucayali, and 37% is sent to support 
national public entities such as OSINERGMIN and MEM.  According to law,116 the 
canon must be used for regional or local infrastructure projects, the hiring of teachers, 
housing projects for low-income population, and 5% must be distributed to social and/or 
infrastructure projects in the localities where the resources are extracted.  
                                                 
116 Urgency Decrees: 028-2006; 13-2007 and 069-2009. 
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As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Economy transfers funds from the canon 
and sobrecanon, but these amounts and the percentage that regional and local 
governments receive differ in each case.  To determine the distribution index of the canon 
and sobrecanon among the province and district municipalities, the INEI provides the 
Ministry of Economy data about demographics and basic unfulfilled needs (Necesidades 
Básicas Insatisfechas – NBI) for each district, province and department.  With this 
information and the distribution percentages defined by law,117 the Decentralization 
Secretariat (Secretaría de Descentralización) calculates the percentages for each district 
and provincial municipality.  The actual distribution of the canon and sobrecanon 
however does not of substantially help indigenous communities living in oil production 
areas, particularly those in blocks 1AB and 8 from where most of the oil in the Amazon 
region is produced.    
 A close analysis of the transferences from canon and sobrecanon to Loreto shows 
that the population living in the province of Loreto and the districts in blocks 1AB and B 
(such as Tigre, Trompeteros, Urarinas, Nauta, Andoas, Parinari and others) receive only a 
small fraction of the amount that GOREL receives as canon (Table 26).  Most of the 
funds actually benefit the Province of Maynas, especially the city of Iquitos.   As a 
consequence, the urban population of Iquitos receives most of the benefits from oil 
extraction in blocks 1AB and 8. 
In 2015, 80% of the canon and sobrecanon (in the coast and Amazon oil 
production areas) was allocated to transportation infrastructure (29%), agriculture and 
livestock (14%), planning (14%), education (12%) and sanitation (11%) projects (MEF, 
2015).   It is worth noting that blocks 1AB and 8 contain almost no roads and most 
                                                 
117 Law No. 24300, Article 8. 
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transportation is fluvial.    Consequently, it is not a surprise that the vast majority of 
interviewees expressed dissatisfaction about the management of the oil canon and 
sobrecanon and the overall economic benefits offered to the communities where the 
resources are extracted. Most of the jobs offered by oil companies to locals are temporary 
and low paying jobs.   
 
 
 
Table 26. Regional Government of Loreto: Transfers as Canon and Sobrecanon to 
Provinces and Districts (First Semester of 2013)   
 
Locality  USD Millions 
Province of Maynas(*) 8.3 
District of Iquitos 2.2 
Province of Datem del Marañon 1.3 
District of Andoas 0.2 
District of Morona 0.2 
District of Pastaza 0.2 
Province of Loreto 3.2 
District of Nauta 1.1 
District of Parinari 0.6 
District of Tigre 0.5 
District of Trompeteros 0.5 
District of Urarinas 0.6 
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Total amount of canon received by 
GOREL 
58.9 
(*) The Province of Maynas and the district of Iquitos are not within blocks 1AB and 8. Iquitos 
(population 432,476) is the largest city in the Peruvian Amazon and has the largest urban 
population in the region.   
 
 
Oil and gas extraction require skilled workforce brought in from outside the 
region.  This fact, in addition to the lack of transparency and allegations of corruption in 
GOREL, contribute to the local population’s mistrust and dissatisfaction with the 
presence of oil companies in the region.  
 
Distribution of the Gas Canon in Cusco 
The Camisea project (blocks 56 and 88) produce 89% and 93% of country’s 
natural gas and natural gas liquids respectively; Cusco therefore receives overwhelmingly 
more benefits from gas production than any other area in the country.118  As mentioned, 
Camisea’s gas production in blocks 88 and 56 has been growing steadily.  In the single 
year of 2013, block 88’s gas production grew from 11 MMCF to 509 MMCF. 119  
Because Camisea also produces natural gas liquids,120 a group of hydrocarbons used in 
petrochemical plants and blended into vehicle fuel, therefore they are accounted as part of 
oil production.  Camisea’s NGL production represent 62% of the today’s national oil 
                                                 
118 Natural gas is also produced to a lesser extent in Aguaytia (Ucayali), and Tumbes and Piura (north 
coast).  The canon from these fields is managed according to the legal framework applicable to oil 
producing fields. 
 
119 The Camisea project includes block 56 adjacent to block 88. 
 
120 Natural gas liquids (NGL) are hydrocarbons such as ethane, propane, butane, isobutene pentanes and a 
mix of heavier hydrocarbons that could be used as fuels and/or manufacture of industrial products such as 
plastics, anti-freeze, and synthetic rubber.  They can be used directly or mixed with other hydrocarbons as 
fuels for motor vehicles.  
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production while the crude oil production (mostly from the oil fields in Loreto and the 
north coast ones in Piura and Tumbes) accounts for the remaining 38% (OSINERGMIN, 
2014).    
The Camisea project urged the establishment of an ad hoc law121 to regulate the 
distribution of economic benefits, named “canon gasífero” (gas canon), which comprises 
of 50% of the income tax and 50% of royalties.   Considering that Camisea’s gas 
production has experienced an annual 30% growth from 2003 to 2013, it constitutes a 
substantial source of economic funds for Cusco. 
 
Figure 33.  Gas Canon Received by Cusco, 2003 – 2013 
 
Data source: EITI, 2014  
 
In addition to gas, Cusco also collects funds as canon from other activities such as 
mining, hydropower and large-scale metal mining in its jurisdiction.  All of these 
                                                 
121 Law No. 27506 of 2001. 
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represent roughly 75% of Cusco’s overall income, equivalent to approximately $916 
million USD (EITI, 2014; MEF, 2014).  In contrast to the distribution of the oil canon in 
which the regional government receives most of the funds from crude oil production, the 
vast majority of the Camisea’s canon benefits local municipalities (Table 27). 
Table 27. Cusco:  Gas Canon Distribution Criteria 
Distribution Criteria Canon 
Regional government of Cusco   
 
80% to the regional government and 20% to public universities 
 
25% 
All provinces and district municipalities of Cusco (except for the 
province where the resource is extracted) 
40% 
Provincial municipality where the gas is extracted (excluding the 
district municipality where the resource is extracted) 
25% 
District municipality where the resource is extracted 5% 
Data source: Ministry of Economy of Peru 
 
 In addition to the gas canon, the government created the Camisea Compensation 
Fund  - Fondo de Compensación de Camisea  (FOCAM) - for the regions crossed by 
Camisea’s gas pipeline (Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Ica and Lima, excluding the city of 
Lima). 122  Regional and local governments are required to use these funds in public 
works as well as on projects aimed to improve social and economic development (MEF, 
2015).   
Transparency and Accountability  
 As in other countries around the world, the use of resource extraction funds raises 
great expectations and causes grave mistrust, both of which have prompted the creation 
                                                 
122 Law 28451. Article 6 of Law No. 26221 
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of multiple ways to access information about how governments distribute and use the 
money.  The MEF created a public website called Transparencia Económica (Economic 
Transparency) with detailed information about the distribution of funds from the central 
government to national, regional and local authorities.123  Local and regional 
governments also facilitate access to information through their websites about how these 
funds are allocated.   
At the international level, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
promotes public access to economic information about resource extraction.  EITI was 
created during the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 
South Africa.  It aims to promote accountability of government and companies by 
disclosing information on tax payments, licenses, contracts, production and other key 
elements around resource extraction in it 49 member countries (EITI Fact Sheet).124    
EITI began to work in Peru in 2005 with the creation of a Permanent Commission 
for Transparency of Extractive Industries (Comisión Multisectorial Permanente para la 
Transparencia de las Industrias Extractivas).125  The commission has nine 
representatives of oil and mining companies, government agencies, and civil society.  To 
date this group has published four reports (Estudios de Conciliación Nacional) with 
detailed information about oil and mining companies’ tax payments, royalties and canon 
funds.  After a decade of efforts to implement the EITI, it is possible to see more positive 
results: the number of oil companies participating in EITI’s reports has grown from nine 
in the first publication in 2009 to 19 in the fourth one in 2015 and is equivalent to 96.6% 
                                                 
123 
http://www.mef.gob.pe/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=37&Itemid=100143&lang=es 
124 https://eiti.org/files/document/EITI_Factsheet_EN.pdf 
125 Supreme Decree 028-2011-EM 
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of the sector’s production value (Table 28).  In turn, EITI acknowledged this effort and 
placed Peru among one of the 31 “compliant” countries (and the only one in South 
America).    
Table 28. Participation of Oil Companies in EITI’s Reports  
Study/Publication 
Date 
Years Number of Oil 
Companies that  
Participated 
% of the Sector’s 
Production Value 
Covered  
First Study 
(September 2009) 
2004 9 70.9% 
2005 71.6% 
2006 71.4% 
2007 70.6% 
Second Study  
 
(December 2011) 
2008 18 88.1% 
2009 89.7% 
2010 90.3% 
Third Study  
(January 2014) 
2011 15 94.4% 
2012 93.7% 
Fourth Study  
(June 2015) 
2013 19 96.6% 
Data source: Propuesta Ciudadana, 2015 
Oil Companies that Participated in All of EITI’s Reports (2009 – 2015) 
Maple Gas Corporation  Repsol Exploration Peru 
Pluspetrol Peru Corporation Olympic Peru INC 
Pluspetrol Camisea Petrobras Energy Peru 
Hunt Oil Company  Pluspetrol Norte 
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 Civil society organizations welcomed this initiative, which also facilitates the 
dialogue with the state and extractive industries.  However, most of the indigenous 
leaders, researchers and NGO members interviewed said they do not know how the 
royalties and canon are actually spent.   Indigenous leaders claim that funds are not 
reaching their communities as expected.   In addition, they said that the communities 
where resources are extracted have limited access to the internet and thus cannot see 
EITI’s online reports.  
 In sharp contrast to the high rates of canon revenues, official reports indicate that 
poverty levels in the provinces and districts in blocks 1AB (192) and 88 are higher than 
the regional and national average (Table 30).   In other words, despite the millions of 
dollars of royalties and canon funds, the material well-being of people in the major oil 
and gas producing areas in the country has not significantly improved. 
 
 
 
Table 29.  Poverty and Extreme Poverty Rates: National, Districts in Blocks 1AB 
(192) in Loreto and 88 in Cusco in 2007 
 
 Poverty (Percentage) Extreme Poverty 
(Percentage) 
Peru’s National 
Average 
39.3 13.7 
Loreto Regional 
Average 
54.6 23.8 
Loreto Province 66.7 30.9 
District of Nauta 61.0 23.0 
District of Parinari 69.2 36.4 
District of Tigre 71.9 34.0 
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District of 
Trompeteros 
69.4 38.4 
District of Urarinas 74.6 39.9 
Cusco Regional 
Average 
57.4 27.8 
La Convencion 
Province 
57.6 25.0 
District of Echarate 54.7 21.0 
Data source: INEI, 2007 Sistema de Consulta de Principales Indicadores de Pobreza [System of 
Consultation: Main Poverty Indicators]  
  
A comparison of regional and national data shows that the surge of oil and gas in 
Loreto and Cusco has failed to improve the material conditions of the populations where 
these resources are extracted.   Environmental governance of the hydrocarbon sector 
continues to provoke undergoing struggles as citizens demand more transparency and 
accountability from the central and regional governments in the management and 
distribution of the rents from resource extraction.  At the same time, data show that some 
regions benefit substantially more from resource extraction than others, generating not 
only economic inequalities but also higher levels of dependence on the extraction of 
natural resources.   In addition, regions with higher dependence on commodities such as 
oil and gas will be more affected by the volatility of international prices.   Interestingly, 
the decentralization of the administration and distribution of the economic benefits from 
oil and gas activities does not imply a concomitant decentralization of the decision-
making processes.  To the contrary, after a decade of decentralization, the central 
government maintains practically absolute control of the rent generated from oil and gas 
extraction.  Consequently, the regional governments and municipalities depend on 
transferences controlled by the central government in Lima (ANGR, 2015, p.28).   This 
dependency affects regional governments more than the municipalities, as only 4.6% of 
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the regional government budget is independent from the central government’s 
transferences, in contrast with 21.4% of the municipalities’ budget (Ibid.).   Another issue 
to address is whether or not the availability of information and the regionalization process 
can actually translate into improvements in the decision-making process.  The central 
government still holds power over the collection and distribution of funds to the regional 
government and municipalities, creating power dynamics which are vulnerable to volatile 
political interests.   
 
  
 211 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examines the shifting and multi-scalar governance of oil and gas 
projects in indigenous territories and territorial reserves (a category of protected area) in 
the Peruvian Amazon.  Using the cases of oil extraction in blocks 1AB and 8 in Loreto 
(between 2006 to 2015) and the Environmental Impact Assessment Process for the 
expansion of the Camisea gas project in Cusco (from 2012 to 2014), this dissertation 
explores how environmental decision-making processes involving a range of actors 
(indigenous and non-indigenous groups) are structured and enacted.  In doing so, my goal 
is to shed light on the shifting interactions, negotiations, struggles and (at times) open 
conflicts between actors that define why, how and where hydrocarbon projects take place 
in the Peruvian Amazon. 
Taken together, these two cases exemplify the "boom" of oil and natural gas 
production in Peru.  They allow a tracing of the reconfiguration of social, economic and 
political factors shaping decision-making processes of the hydrocarbon sector in the last 
decade.  The growing gap between the national oil production and the demand for energy 
has prompted the Peruvian government to create laws and policies enabling the search for 
oil and gas in the Amazon.   Peru’s neoliberal economic model. based on resource 
extraction, has incited local groups to organize and voice their concerns about the risks 
that these activities pose to their livelihoods.   
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Through the course of this dissertation, I explore how these trends influence resource 
governance, particularly decision-making processes of ongoing and new hydrocarbon 
projects in the Amazon.   Peru’s economic growth, dependent on resource extraction, has 
also coincided with the rise of international debates about indigenous peoples’ rights and 
the conservation of tropical ecosystems.  Resource extraction has also sparked social-
environmental conflicts as indigenous peoples living in oil exploration and exploitation 
areas are increasingly concerned about how these activities may affect the local water 
sources and their health.   
As Bebbington (2008, 2014) noted, social-environmental conflicts related to 
extractive industries have the potential to boost institutional changes that could contribute 
to a more inclusive and legitimate resource governance.  However, the case studies in 
Chapters IV and V reveal some of the potentials and limitations of these changes.  These 
cases reveal that despite the unquestionable benefits more inclusive forms of 
participation, such as the Prior Consultation Law, the outcomes of the consultation 
processes depend on the organizational capacity, access to information, capacity of 
negotiation and follow-up of indigenous communities.  Likewise, state agencies still have 
a pending task to develop the capacity to negotiate and interact in more inclusive and 
inter-cultural manner. 
The analysis of the enforcement of the Dorissa Accord and the declaration of 
environmental emergency (due to over 30 years of oil contamination) described in 
Chapter IV show that the enforcement of environmental laws and agreements between 
state and local communities depend on the level of organization and networking capacity 
of the local people.   The negotiations and agreements between the indigenous federations 
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in blocks 1AB (192) and the government and the oil company Pluspetrol which addressed 
the health and pollution problems caused by decades of oil activities are remarkable.  
This case study also reveals weaknesses in the national and regional government agencies 
ability to enforce the environmental standards and agreements subscribed between 
indigenous communities, oil companies and government authorities.   One example is the 
case of the indigenous federations in blocks 1AB and 8 described in Chapter IV.  The 
empirical evidence presented in this dissertation contributes to the understanding of how 
the indigenous federations in the Peruvian Amazon were able to make the government 
acknowledge the contamination that the state negated for decades, provide hard evidence 
and commit to address it.   This case shows that the solution of the most critical social 
and environmental concerns involving hydrocarbon projects in the Peruvian Amazon 
require the negotiation and/or mobilization of the indigenous federations and are typically 
addressed through specific agreements between the indigenous federations, state agencies 
and oil companies.    
The analysis of oil and gas projects in Loreto and Cusco suggest that there are three 
processes influencing institutional changes in Peru’s hydrocarbon sector.  First, in the 
recent years, the state has created spaces with a certain degree of autonomy, such as 
OEFA and OSINERGMIN, through which the government seeks to legitimize itself and 
gain popular approval.   These new institutions are generating new “official” data 
independent from the Ministry of Energy and Mines about the performance of oil (and 
mining) companies that civil groups (such as indigenous federations) need to articulate 
their demands about the social and environmental effects of resource extraction.   Second, 
there are efforts to decentralize the Ministry of Energy and Mines’ decision-making 
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power, specifically with regards to the environmental impact assessment process 
necessary to obtain environmental licenses for new projects.   The creation of SENACE 
(National Service of Environmental Certification), the new agency of the Ministry of the 
Environment in charge of granting environmental permits, aims to decentralize this task 
and remove it from the Ministry of Energy and Mines.  While I write this dissertation, 
SENACE is beginning to operate; future studies can therefore assess the transparency and 
efficacy of this agency in environmental decision-making.  However, the transference of 
the environmental licensing process from the Ministry of Energy and Mines to SENACE 
coincided with legal reforms to reduce the environmental assessment requirements for 
new oil projects and the placement of new projects on the fast-track for approval.  Third, 
the increased organizational capacity and influence of indigenous federations in decision-
making processes.    
As Bebbington and Scurrah (2013) contend, the resistance and negotiation of the 
indigenous peoples in blocks 1AB and 8 ultimately led to a shift in relationships between 
the indigenous peoples, oil companies and the state.  These sustained processes of 
negotiation and contestation by these indigenous communities brought parts of the state 
(Ministry of the Environment, the Ombudsman’s Office, OEFA) more directly into the 
regulation of extractive activity with effects that reach beyond the specificities of the case 
(Ibid).  The organized work of the indigenous federations and their strategic alliances 
with organizations such as PUINAMUDT, among other national and international 
supporters, in the negotiations with government agencies provided elements paramount to 
the outcomes in the case study presented in Chapter IV.  I contend that these institutional 
shifts have granted (in tandem) some level of legitimacy to certain government 
 215 
 
institutions and credibility to the demands of indigenous populations in Peru’s current 
neoliberal economic context.  This case illustrate that these interactions take place at 
different scales in complex configurations where natural resources mediate the 
relationships between citizens and government institutions (Bakker and Bridge, 2008; 
Valdivia, 2008; Perreault, 2014).     
The case studies I present in Chapters IV and V demonstrate that the state and oil 
companies need to legitimize resource extraction by creating opportunities to reach 
agreements with local communities and obtain the “social license” necessary to carry out 
extractive activities.   Therefore, there is a tension between the liberalization or 
deregulation of resource extraction and the regulations governing public participation in 
decision-making processes (Figure 34).  
 
Figure 34.  Tensions Between the Deregulation of Resource Extraction of 
Hydrocarbon Activities in Peru 
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With regards to the questions of how decision-making processes involving oil and 
gas projects are structured and enacted, as explained in Chapter V, oil companies and 
some government agencies perceive the environmental impact assessment studies as 
“paperwork” obstructing hydrocarbon projects (PSH, 2014).   In contrast, indigenous 
federations and civil society groups expect to find in EIS the “technical and objective 
information necessary for sound decision-making.”   Consequently, this study found 
tensions between the trend to "fast track" the environmental impact assessment process 
and reduce the capacity of environmental enforcement agencies (requested by the guild of 
oil companies) and the need to regulate public participation in decision-making processes 
(such as the Prior Consultation Law).     
Studies such as Hindery’s (2013) assessment of the gas development in Bolivia’s 
Chiquitania exposed some weaknesses and contradictions of the environmental impact 
assessment process.  In this dissertation, I point the attention of geographers to the 
importance of environmental studies and the EIA process as a key issue for future studies 
as it provides not only multiple areas of analysis (political, social, cultural) but also 
because of its centrality in resource extraction.  Communities expect environmental 
studies to provide an “objective and scientific viewpoint” about the potential 
environmental and social impacts (positive and negative) of a project and inform multiple 
actors about its overall viability.  This entails not only power issues (who “knows” what) 
but also has broader epistemological and ontological questions about how the 
environment is defined and managed.  This is particularly important as environmental 
impact studies claim to assess the potential impacts of a project and propose measures to 
“manage and control” them.  However, the dominant knowledge system, according to 
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which the environmental studies are developed, creates power asymmetries between the 
groups involved in the decision-making process because some groups have better 
understanding of the studies than others.    
In the case studies presented in Chapters IV and V, I expose these problems and 
the dilemmas that state and non-state actors face when deciding if and how to exploit 
fossil fuels in fragile ecosystems inhabited by indigenous peoples.  It is possible to 
identify three main issues; the first involves the “power-knowledge” asymmetries of 
using science as a primary basis (at least in theory) to determine the viability and the 
impacts of oil activities before and after projects start, especially in those favored by 
government authorities.   
As Wesselink et al. (2013) contend, the boundaries between science and politics 
are ambiguous and fluid, and the traffic between the two especially dense.  In the case of 
the expansion of the Camisea project in block 88 I describe in Chapter V, the decision-
making process to approve the project was focused on the potential effects of the 
proposed activities on the indigenous people in voluntary isolation, despite the fact that 
the pollution control measures proposed in the environmental study were very weak.  In 
contrast, in the case of blocks 1AB and 8 I present in Chapter IV, the interest of the 
parties involved was in technically demonstrating the extent of the contamination and its 
effects on the local population’s health.  In this case, I exposed the challenges that 
indigenous peoples living in remote areas face in having to adapt to a different system of 
knowledge, based on the principles of technology and modernity, so they can articulate 
their concerns with the government.   These ostensibly “scientific” questions lie at the 
core of decision-making processes that aim to expand the resource extraction frontier.    
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This raises questions for geographers about how the EIA’s decision-making process 
affects human-environment relations and the use of space.   It also suggests concerns 
about how the environmental and social effects of new and ongoing projects are assessed 
within government agencies and how the impacts of a project are valued.   In Chapter V, 
I demonstrate that despite legal stipulations regarding which government agencies should 
participate in the EIA process, these same agencies do not have clear guidelines for 
assessing the quality of the information contained in an environmental study.  Moreover, 
the case study in the aforementioned chapter reveals weaknesses of the EIS and covert 
power struggles between institutions, which finally surrendered to the economic interests 
of government.   
The analysis of the environmental impact assessment process for expansion of the 
Camisea gas project in block 88 (Chapter V) also exposed the issue of representation and 
questions the citizenship rights of indigenous peoples living in isolation in decision-
making processes.  There are approximately 15 indigenous groups living in voluntary 
isolation in Peru, and these communities live in remote areas of the Amazon and are 
vulnerable to diseases from outsiders.  The analysis presented in Chapter V agrees with 
Deborah Yashar’s (2005) view that today Latin American states are more effective 
sanctioning corporate requests than indigenous rights.  The analysis of the expansion of 
the Camisea project in block 88 also raises questions about the role of state institutions in 
the enforcement of the citizen rights of indigenous peoples.  Even though concepts and 
traditional theories of citizenship from western liberal democratic sphere offer a starting 
point to understand the role of the state and institutions in sanctioning individual 
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citizenship, this study shows that they are not effective in beginning to understand the 
experience of citizenship of the wide variety of indigenous groups in rural societies.   
The case studies presented in Chapters IV and V suggest that leaders of some the 
indigenous federations have accepted resource extraction but with clear conditions that 
would benefit their communities.  The analysis of the cases in blocks 1AB, 8 and 88 
show that the indigenous federations accepted hydrocarbon activities in their territories 
but requested that the state and oil companies respect the negotiated conditions under 
which these activities take place in their territories.  These are large ongoing projects that 
the government favored, despite the opposition of some federations to these projects. In 
the end, indigenous communities decided to negotiate conditions with the state and oil 
companies in order to reach specific agreements to allow hydrocarbon activities in their 
territories.  Some indigenous organizations are more willing to negotiate and even have 
organized small businesses providing services to oil companies while other groups have 
more stringent demands.  In general, Amazonian indigenous organizations demand 
recognition of their territorial rights and autonomy, effective participation in the decisions 
that concerns them, title of their lands, and secure health and livelihood.  As I discussed 
in Chapters IV and V, different indigenous groups have diverse viewpoints about 
development, modernity, and resource extraction.   
In addition to the above mentioned conclusions to this research, I also found that a 
significant factor compelling the Peruvian government to grant more oil and gas leases in 
the Amazon is the higher demand for oil in the transportation sector in the urban areas, 
especially on the coast.   As I explained in Chapter I, Peru's policies and planning 
procedures regarding the transportation, energy, and environmental sectors work as 
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independent units with poor capacity to coordinate policies and regulations addressing 
issues such as the country’s dependency on imported oil, climate change and resource 
extraction.   
Additionally, Chapter VI reveals that the majority of indigenous leaders, 
researchers, NGO members interviewed for this research do not know how the economic 
benefits from hydrocarbon projects (royalties and canon) are actually spent.  This 
dissertation contributes to the political economy research of geographers such as Philippe 
Le Billon (2001, 2004) about the political economy implications of “natural resources.” 
This dissertation contributes to the ongoing debates about the spatiality and materiality of 
the kind of “development” resulting from resource extraction.   
Indigenous leaders claim that funds are not reaching their communities as 
expected.  In this dissertation I expose the institutional weaknesses affecting the use and 
distribution of the oil and gas canon and how these have been unable to satisfy water, 
sanitation, health and education needs in the places where extraction occur.  In sharp 
contrast to the high rates of canon revenues, official reports indicate that poverty levels in 
the provinces and districts of blocks 1AB (192), 8 and 88 are higher than their 
corresponding regional and national average.  In other words, despite millions of dollars 
of royalties and canon collected and distributed by the central government, the material 
well-being of people in the major oil and gas producing areas in the country has not 
improved significantly.  Chapter VI also reveals more disparities in the distribution of 
benefits from resource extraction.  Some regions (such as Cusco where the Camisea 
project is located) benefit more than other regions producing less or no oil and gas.  The 
current system of distribution of revenues from the central government to the regional 
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governments rewards resource extraction, creating an economic dependency and 
disparities with other regions with less oil (and mining) production.   Initiatives such as 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) facilitate access to information 
about how the state uses and distributes the revenues from extractive industries.  
However, making this information accessible (available and understandable) remains a 
challenge.  Improving citizens' fiscal literacy may provide one way to improve resource 
governance.    
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ACODECOSPAT  Asociación Cocama de Desarrollo y Conservación San Pablo de 
Tipishca (Cocama Indigenous Association for the Development 
and Conservation of San Pablo de Tipishca) 
ACR     Area de Conservación Regional (Regional Protected Area) 
ACP    Area de Conservación Privada (Private Protected Area) 
AIDESEP  Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Inter-   
Ethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Jungle) 
ANA   Autoridad Nacional del Agua (National Water Authority) 
ANP    Area Natural Protegida (Protected Area) 
BRIC    Brazil, Russia, India, China 
CAF Corporación Andina de Fomento (Latin American Development 
Bank)  
CECONAMA  Central de Comunidades Nativas Matsigenkas “Juan Santos 
Atahualpa” (Center for Machiguenga Native Communities) 
CEDIA  Centro para el Desarrollo del Indígena Amazónico (Center 
Amazonian Indigenous Development) 
CI     Conservation International 
COMARU   Consejo Machiguenga del Rio Urubamba (Machiguenga Council 
of the Urubamba River) 
CONAM Consejo Nacional del Ambiente (National Environmental Council) 
CONAP  Confederación de Nacionalidades de la Amazonía Peruana 
(Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru) 
DAR  Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Law, Environment and 
Natural Resources) 
DIGESA  Dirección General de Salud Ambiental (Ministry of Health’s 
National Environmental Health Authority) 
DIRESA  Dirección Regional de Salud Ambiental (Ministry of Health’s 
Regional Environmental Health Authority) 
DGAAE  Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales Energéticos (Ministry 
of Energy and Mines’ Environmental Authority 
DPLF    Due Process of Law Foundation 
EIA     Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIS    Environmental Impact Study 
ELAW   Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide 
ERM    Environmental Resources Management 
FECONACO  Federación de Comunidades Nativas del Río Corrientes 
(Federation of Native Communities of the Corrientes River) 
FEDIQUEP  Federación de Comunidades Nativas del Río Corrientes 
(Federation of Native Communities of the Corrientes River) 
FECONAT  Federación de Comunidades Nativas del Río Tigre (Federation of 
Native Communities of the Tigre River) 
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FEPIBAC Federación de Comunidades Nativas del Río Corrientes 
(Federation of Indigenous People of the Lowe and Upper 
Corrientes River) 
GDP     Gross Domestic Product 
GHG    Greenhouse gas 
IBC    Instituto de Bien Común (Common Good Institute) 
IDB    Inter-American Development Bank 
ILO    International Labor Organization 
INEI  Instituto de Estadística e Informática (National Statistics Institute 
of Peru) 
INRENA Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (Natural Resources 
Institute) 
IIRSA  Iniciativa para la Integración Regional de America del Sur 
(Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of 
South America) 
IUCN    International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
LNG    Liquefied Natural Gas 
LPG    Liquefied Petroleum gas 
Mbbl   One thousand barrels of oil 
Mbbld   One thousand barrels of oil per day 
MMbbl  Million barrels of oil 
MEF     Ministry of Economy 
MEM   Ministerio de Energía y Minas (Ministry of Energy and Mines) 
MINCU    Ministerio de Cultura (Ministry of Culture) 
MINAM   Ministerio del Ambiente (Ministry of the Environment) 
MDB   One thousand barrels per day 
MMBD  One million barrels per day 
MNC    Multi-national Corporation 
MRTA   Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru 
NGO    Non-governmental organization 
OEFA    Oficina de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental  
(Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement) 
 
OSINERG   Organismo Supervisor de Energía (Oversight Organization for 
Energy) 
OSINERGMIN   Organismo Supervisor de Energía y Minería (Oversight 
Organization for Energy and Mining) 
OXY     Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
PAC    Plan Ambiental Complementario (Additional Environmental Plan) 
PAMA  Plan de Adecuación y Manejo Ambiental (Environmental 
Management and Compliance Plan) 
PCM Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros (Council of Ministries 
Presidency) 
PEPISCO  Proyecto Especial Plan Integral de Salud del Río Corrientes 
(Corrientes River Comprehensive Health Plan Special Project) 
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PMAC Programa de Monitoreo Ambiental Comunitario (Community 
Environmental Monitoring Program) 
PSNR    Pacaya Samiria National Reserve 
PUINAMUDT Pueblos Unidos Indígenas Amazónicos Unidos en Defensa de sus 
Territorios (Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon United in Defense 
of their Territories) 
RTKNN Reserva Territorial Kugapakori Nahua Nanti (Nahua Nanti 
Indigenous Territorial Reserve) 
SENACE  Servicio Nacional de Certificaciones Ambientales (National 
Environmental Certification Service) 
SERNANP  Servicio Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado 
(National Protected Areas Authority) 
SINANPE Sistema Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado 
(National Protected Areas System) 
SINAMOS Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (National 
Social Mobilization Support System) 
SINANPE  Sistema Nacional de Ares Naturales Protegidas por el Estado 
   (National Protected Areas System) 
SIL    Summer Institute of Linguistics 
SNMPE Sociedad Peruana de Minería Petróleo y Energía (Peruvian Society 
for Mining, Oil and Energy) 
TGP    Transportadora de Gas del Perú (Camisea gas transportation 
   consortium) 
USD     US dollar 
UNDRIP  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
WB    World Bank 
WHO    World Health Organization 
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APPENDIX B 
 
LIST OF MEETINGS PARTICIPATED, 2012-2015 
 
 
No. Organizer / Theme Participants Location Year 
1 DAR / Discussion of the 
situation of the Shipibo 
indigenous communities 
affected by oil activities 
(preliminary fieldwork) 
Over 10 
indigenous 
leaders of the 
Ucayali River 
Pucallpa 2012 
2 DAR – Shipibo indigenous 
community, Ucayali / Social 
and environmental effects of 
oil activities 
(preliminary fieldwork) 
Indigenous 
leaders of two 
Shipibo 
communities 
near Contamana 
Contamana 2012 
3 DAR – Shipibo indigenous 
community, Ucayali / Social 
and environmental effects of 
oil activities 
(preliminary fieldwork) 
Indigenous 
leaders of 4 
Shipibo 
communities 
near Santa Rosa 
Santa Rosa 2012 
4 DAR / indigenous rights, social 
and environmental issues 
related to oil/gas projects in 
the Peruvian Amazon 
Indigenous 
leaders of Loreto 
and Ucayali 
Lima 2013 
5 DAR / Environmental impact 
assessment of oil/gas projects 
Chiefs of 
protected areas, 
environmental  
and conservation 
organizations 
Iquitos 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Water Committee – Iquitos / 
Social and environmental 
issues related to oil activities 
in Loreto 
General public Iquitos 2014 
7 DAR – Engineer Association of 
Iquitos. / Technical issues 
related to oil/gas activities 
Regional 
government of 
Loreto, local 
authorities, oil 
companies 
Iquitos 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
8 DAR / Social and 
environmental effects of oil 
activities 
Conservation, 
environmental 
and indigenous 
rights NGOs 
Iquitos 2014 
9 Research Institute of the Researchers, Iquitos 2014 
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Peruvian Amazon – Ministry 
of the Environment 
NGOs, grassroots 
organizations 
10 Ombudsman / indigenous 
territorial rights – land titling 
Local and 
regional 
authorities, 
indigenous 
organizations, 
NGOs 
Iquitos 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Organizer / Theme Participants Location Year 
11 Regional Government of 
Loreto – DAR / Environmental 
impact assessment process in 
oil and gas projects 
Regional 
government staff 
Iquitos 2014 
 
 
 
 
12 Ministry of the Environment / 
Report of water quality 
analysis of oil activities in 
Loreto 
Indigenous 
leaders, national 
and regional 
authorities, 
NGOS 
Iquitos 2014 
13 Group of NGOs – Quechua 
Federation of the Pastaza 
River / Health and social 
issues related to oil activities 
in the Amazon 
Indigenous 
organizations, 
NGOs 
Iquitos 2014 
14 PUINAMUDT: Group of NGOs 
/ Health and social issues 
related to oil activities in the 
Amazon 
Indigenous 
organizations, 
NGOs 
Lima 2014 
 
 
15 20+ leaders affiliated to 
FECONACO, FEDIQUEP, 
ACODECOSPAT strategic 
planning meeting to enforce 
the Prior Consultation Law 
Indigenous 
organizations 
Iquitos 2015 
 
 
 
 
16 PUINAMUDT: Discussions 
between the national 
authorities and 20+ leaders 
affiliated to FECONACO, 
FEDIQUEP, ACODECOSPAT 
strategic planning meeting to 
enforce the Prior Consultation 
Law 
State and 
indigenous 
organizations 
Iquitos 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 PUINAMUDT: FECONACO, 
FEDIQUEP, ACODECOSPAT 
with representatives of the 
Ministry of the Environment 
State and 
indigenous 
organizations 
Iquitos 2015 
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to discuss social benefits 
agenda 
18 PUINAMUDT, FECONACO and 
FEDIQUEP strategic planning 
meetings 
Indigenous 
organizations 
Lima 2015 
19 DAR: 10+ representatives of 
oil companies and national 
authorities meeting discussing 
EIA process 
State, oil /gas 
companies  
Lima 2015 
20 DAR: 70+ representatives of 
NGOs, oil companies and 
national authorities meeting 
discussing governance oil and 
gas in the Peruvian Amazon 
NGOs, state, oil 
and gas 
companies 
Lima 2015 
21 PUINAMUDT: Meeting with 
the Ombudsman legal team 
addressing Amazon 
indigenous issues 
State and NGOs Lima 2015 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
LIST OF LAWS, REGULATIONS, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS  
AND REPORTS REVIEWED 
 
 
Document Name Year  
Legislative Decree 
No. 757 
Framework Law for the 
Promotion of Private 
Investments 
1992 
Law 26221 Hydrocarbon Act 1993 
Supreme Decree No. 
049-93-EM 
Rule for the Application of 
Royalties and Re-distribution of 
Oil Contracts 
1993 
Law No. 26225 Perupetro Organization and 
Functions Law 
1993 
Law No. 26734 Energy Investment Supervision 
Organization (OSINERG) 
1996 
Law No. 27037 Law for the Promotion of 
Investments in the Amazon 
1998 
Law No. 27133 Law for the Promotion and 
Development of the Natural 
Gas 
1999 
Law No 27506 Extractive Industries Royalties 
Act 
2001 
Law No. 29785 Prior Consultation Act 2011 
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According to the International 
Labor Organization Convention 
169 
Ministry Resolution 
No. 350-2012-
MEM/DM 
Approves the Administrative 
Process for the Implementation 
of the Prior Consultation Act 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law No; 26821 Law for the Sustainable Use of 
Natural Resources Law 
Law No. 28611 Environmental Act 
Law No. 27446 National Environmental Impact 
Assessment System Act (SEIA) 
Supreme Decree No. 
002-2009-MINAM 
Rule for Transparency, Public 
Access to Environmental 
Information and Citizen’s 
Consultation in Environmental 
Matters 
2009 
Supreme Decree No. 
012-2008-EM 
Rule for Citizen Participation in 
Hydrocarbon Activities 
2008 
Supreme Decree 
042-2005-EM 
Unified Ordered Text of the 
Hydrocarbon Act 
2005 
Ministry Resolution 
No. 571-2008-
MEM-DM 
Guidelines for Public 
Participation in Hydrocarbon 
Activities 
2008 
Supreme Decree No. 
039-2014--MEM 
Rule for Environmental 
Protection in Hydrocarbon 
Activities 
2014 
Law No. 27506 Canon Act  2001 
Supreme Decree No. 
005-2002-MEF 
Rule of the Canon Act 2002 
Supreme Decree No. 
054-2013-PCM 
Approves Special Administrative Procedures 
for Environmental Licenses 
2013 
Supreme Decree No. 
054-2013-PCM 
Reduce EIA Process for Hydrocarbon and 
Mining Projects 
2013 
Law No. 30025 Facilitates Acquisition, Expropriation and 
Possession of Infrastructure and Facilities 
2013 
Law No. 30230 Establish Tax and Administrative Simplification 
to Encourage Investments 
2014 
Law No. 30327 Fast track the approval of 
environmental studies.  Creates 
the global environmental 
certification which joins the 
approval of water rights, 
clearing and other permits with 
the approval of the EIS.  
 
2015 
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APPENDIX D 
PERU: FREE TRADE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS (AS OF APRIL 2016) 
 
Agreement Countries Year Signed Year In Force 
Andean Community Colombia, Ecuador, 
Bolivia 
1969  
Mercosur Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Guyana, 
Suriname 
2005 2006 
U.S.A. United States of 
America 
2006 2009 
Chile Chile 2006 2009 
Canada Canada 2008 2009 
Singapore Singapore 2008 2009 
China China 2009 2010 
EFTA Iceland 
Liechtenstein 
Norway 
Switzerland 
2010 2011 
South Korea South Korea 2011 2011 
Thailand Thailand 2005 2011 
Mexico Mexico 2011 2012 
Japan Japan 2011 2012 
Panama Panama 2011 2012 
European Union European Union 2012 2013 
Costa Rica Costa Rica 2011 2013 
Cuba Cuba 2012 2013 
Venezuela Venezuela 2012 2013 
 
Treaties Signed But Not In Force 
Guatemala Guatemala 2011  
Alliance Pacific Mexico, Colombia, 
Chile 
2013 
Honduras Honduras 2015 
Trans-Pacific 
Partnership 
Australia, Brunei, 
Chile, United States of 
America, Japan, 
Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Canada, 
Mexico 
2016 
 
APPENDIX E 
LIST OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF PERU  
ACCORDING TO THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF PERU 
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Indigenous Peoples Other Names Language 
Achuar Achual, Achuale, Achuare Achuar 
Aimara Aru Aimara 
Amahuaca Amin Waka,  Yora Amahuaca 
Arabela Chiripuno, Tapueyocuaca Arabela 
Ashaninka Campa Ashaninka Ashaninka 
Asheninka Ashaninka of Great Pajonal Ashankinka 
Awajún Aents, Aguaruna Awajún 
Bora Bo oraa, Miamuna, Miranha, 
Miranya 
Bora 
Capahuana Muskipani, Nunencaibo Capanahua 
Cashinahua Caxinahua, Huni Kuin, 
Kachinahua 
Cashinahua 
Chamicuro Camikódlo, Chamicolos Chamicuro 
Chapra Shapra Kandozi-chapra 
Chitonahua Murunahua, Yora Yaminahua 
Ese Eja Ese’ejja, Huarayo,  
Tiatinagua 
Ese eja 
Harakbut Amarakaeri, Arasaeri, 
Kisamberi, Pukirieri, 
Sapiteri, Toyoeri, 
Wachipaeri 
Harakbut 
Ikitu Amacacore, Iquito, 
Quiturran 
Ikitu 
Iñapari Inamari, Inapari, Kushitireni Iñapari 
Isconahua Isconawa, Iskobakebo Isconahua 
Jaqaru Central Aimara, Aimara 
Tupino, Aru, Cauqui 
Jaqaru 
Jibaro Jibaro od the Corrientes 
River, Shiwiar, Siwaro 
Achuar 
Kakataibo Uni, Unibo Kakataibo 
Kakinte Poyenisati Kakinte 
Kandozi Kandoshi Kandozi-chapra 
Kichwa Inga, Quichua, Lamas, 
Llacuash 
Quechua 
 
 
 
 
Indigenous Peoples Other Names Language 
Kucama Kucamiria Cocama Cocamilla, 
Xibitaona 
Kukama Kukamiria 
Madija Culina, Colina, Madiha Madija 
Maijuna Maijiki, Orejón Maijuna 
Marinahua Onocoin, Yora Sharanahua 
Mashco Piro  Yine 
Matsés Mayoruna Matsés 
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Matisigenka Machiguenga, Matsiganga, 
Matsiguenga 
Matsigenka 
Muniche Munichi Muniche 
Murui-Muinani Huitoto Murui-Muinani 
Nahua Yora Nahua 
Nanti Matsigenka Nanti 
Nomatsigenga Atiri, Nomachiguenga Nomatsigenga 
Ocaina Dukaiya, Dyo’xaiya Ocaina 
Omagua Ariana, Omagua, Yeté, 
Pariana, Umawa 
Omagua 
Quechuas Quechua people do not have 
other denominations, but 
they do have a set of 
identities such as: Cañaris, 
Chankas, Chpccas, Huancas, 
Huaylas, Kana, Q’eros 
Quechuas 
Resígaro Resigero Resígaro 
Secoya Aido Pai Secoya 
Sharanahua Onicoin, yora Sharanahua 
Shawi Campo Piyapi, Cayawita, 
Shipibo 
Shawi 
Shipibo-Conibo Chioeo-conivo, joni, shipibo Shipibo-konibo 
Shiwilu Jeberom Shiwila, Xebero Shiwilu 
Tikuna Duuxugu, Ticuna Tikuna 
Urarina Itucali, Itukale, Kacha Edze Urarina 
Uro Uru Uro (extinct language) 
Vacacocha Abijira, Aushiri, Awshira, 
A’ewa 
Awshira (extinct language) 
Wampis Huambisa, Shuar-suampis Wampis 
Yagua Nihamwo, Yihamwo Yagua 
Yaminahua Jjamimawa, Yora, 
Yuminahua 
Yaminahua 
Yanesha Amage, Amuesha, Amuexia Yanesha 
Yine Chotaquiro, Pira, Piro, 
Simirinche 
Yine 
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